Autonomy, Incentives and Patronage. A Study of Corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities by Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge et al.
  
 
 
Autonomy, Incentives  
and Patronage 
 
A Study of Corruption in the Tanzania 
and Uganda Revenue Authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad 
Ivar Kolstad 
Siri Lange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R 2003: 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autonomy, Incentives and 
Patronage 
 
A Study of Corruption in the Tanzania and 
Uganda Revenue Authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad 
Ivar Kolstad 
Siri Lange 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R 2003: 9 
 
 
 
 
 
Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights 
  
 
CMI Reports 
This series can be ordered from: 
Chr. Michelsen Institute 
P.O. Box 6033 Postterminalen, 
N-5892 Bergen, Norway 
Tel: + 47 55 57 40 00 
Fax: + 47 55 57 41 66 
E-mail: cmi@cmi.no 
www.cmi.no 
 
Price: NOK 50 
 
ISSN 0805-505X 
ISBN 82-8062-062-1 
This report is also available at: 
www.cmi.no/public/public.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indexing terms 
Corruption 
Incentives 
Social norms 
Tax administration 
Tax evasion 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
 
JEL classification: D73, H26,H30, J33, K42, Z13 
 
 
Project title 
Tax evasion and corruption in developing countries: A study of the revenue 
authorities in Tanzania and Uganda 
 
 
Project number 
22022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Chr. Michelsen Institute 2003 
 i 
Preface 
 
The purpose of this report is twofold: Firstly, to explore in greater detail factors that may 
explain the observed patterns of corruption within the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and 
the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). In particular, the study discusses the key assumptions 
behind the revenue authority model and the relevance of these in an African context 
characterised by scarcity of qualified tax officers, accountants and auditors, as well as 
clientilistic networks between political, bureaucratic and economic agents. Secondly, based on 
this analysis and in light of existing political, economic and administrative constraints, the study 
aims to identify options available for sustainable tax administrative reforms in the two countries. 
Issues of particular relevance for foreign assistance towards fighting fiscal corruption and 
strengthening tax administration are highlighted.  
 
The study is commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation, 
NORAD. The present report presents the work done by the project group, counting Odd-Helge 
Fjeldstad (project leader), Ivar Kolstad and Siri Lange.  
 
The main ideas of the report have been worked out by the group as a whole. Some division of 
labour has, nevertheless, been necessary: Fjeldstad (economist) wrote the first outline of the 
report and had the main responsibility for chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8, Kolstad (economist) for 
chapters 5 and 6, and Lange (social anthropologist) for chapter 7.  
 
The analysis is based on a variety of sources of information: official reports and data on tax 
revenues in Tanzania and Uganda; available grey literature produced by the governments, the 
TRA and the URA, donors and business communities; personal interviews and discussions 
with present and past tax officers and board members of the revenue authorities, staff at the 
Ministries of Finance in Tanzania and Uganda, business people and customs clearing agents in 
Dar es Salaam and Kampala, aid workers, tax consultants and researchers; and newspaper 
articles on tax issues in the two case countries. Data collection and interviews were carried out 
by Fjeldstad during frequent visits to Tanzania and Uganda during the period 1996-2003, and 
by Lange in Uganda in November 2002. During the course of the project we have benefited 
from comments by Eyolf Jul-Larsen, Mohamed Othman, and Bertil Tungodden, and from 
discussions in seminars at IDS-Sussex University and at a visit to HM Customs and Excise, 
London. Special thanks to the CMI-librarians for their assistance, and to the many people in 
Tanzania and Uganda who took the time to speak to us. Points of view and any remaining 
errors can be attributed to the authors.  
 
Bergen, November 2003 
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Executive summary 
 
1 Introduction  
1.1 In order to increase revenue and curb corruption, a number of African countries have 
implemented comprehensive reforms of their tax administrations over the past two decades.  
Uganda introduced a major reform in 1991 with the formation of a semi-autonomous 
revenue authority – the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), and Tanzania followed in 1996 
with the formation of the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA).  
1.2 How successful were these reforms? It is naturally too early to pronounce a final verdict. 
Reforms need time and results will always depend on the criteria underlying the evaluation. 
However, neither the TRA nor the URA have been able to sustain their early successes. In 
Uganda, the reforms appeared to be a success in URA’s first six years of existence.  
Reported tax revenue increased sharply - from 7% of GDP in FY 1991 to more than 10% in 
1997. Corruption seemed to be declining too. But since then, the tax-to-GDP ratio has 
stagnated. There are also clear indications that corruption is on the rise again. The Tanzania 
Revenue Authority has experienced a similar development, though the decline in the tax-to-
GDP ratio and rise in corruption came faster compared to the URA: Reported revenue 
increased in TRA’s first year of existence from about 10% of GDP in 1996 to almost 11% 
in 1997. Thereafter, the tax-to-GDP ratio has declined. 
1.3 In both Tanzania and Uganda this pattern, initial increases in revenue collection followed 
by stagnation or decline, took place despite continued economic growth, further reforms of 
important tax legislation in line with best practice as prescribed by the IMF, and 
accumulated operational experiences in the new revenue administrations. There are many 
indications that an increase in fiscal corruption has contributed to reducing the growth in 
reported revenues. Thus, a closer look at the pattern of corruption may shed light on the 
development of tax revenues.  
1.4 The purpose of this report is to explore in greater detail factors that may explain the 
observed patterns of corruption within the TRA and the URA. Three factors are 
highlighted; one is related to the autonomy of the tax administration and political 
interference, the second is linked to the power of incentives schemes for tax officers, and 
the third is connected to patronage and the ‘cultural logics of corruption’. The study 
discusses the key assumptions behind the revenue authority model and the realism of these 
in an African context characterised by (a) scarcity of qualified tax officers, including 
accountants and auditors, and (b) clientilistic networks between political, bureaucratic and 
economic agents. Based on this work, the study aims to identify options available for 
sustainable tax administrative reforms in the two countries in light of existing political, 
economic and administrative constraints. 
 
 
2 The tax systems in Tanzania and Uganda 
2.1 Reforms of the tax systems in Tanzania and Uganda during the last decade have focused on 
simplifying the direct and indirect tax structures, removing discretionary tax exemptions 
and improving the tax administration. In addition to revenue raising, efficiency and 
economic development considerations have motivated recent reforms of the tax system. 
2.2 The major measures implemented are: 
· lower personal and corporate income taxes;  
· simplification of the tax bands and broadening of the bases for personal and corporate 
income taxes; 
· introduction of the value-added tax; 
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· simplification of the excise duty structure;  
· reduction of import duties and simplification of the rate structure; and 
· abolition of export taxes. 
2.3 Administrative reforms are also increasingly stressed, as reflected in the establishment of 
the TRA and the URA. More recently, reforms of the local government tax system and 
harmonisation of local and central government taxes have been addressed in Tanzania. 
2.4 While addressing many relevant issues, the tax reforms of the 1990s have fa iled to tackle 
serious problems of taxpayer-tax administration relations. In spite of the reforms, the tax 
systems in Uganda and Tanzania are characterised by an excessive number of different 
taxes with different rate structures that are difficult for taxpayers to understand. The tax law 
is written in a confusing way and manuals to consult are often absent, opening up for 
discretionary powers by tax enforcers. Tax officials have, for instance, discretion over 
important decisions, such as those related to the determination of tax liabilities, selection of 
audits, litigation, etc. Many administrative procedures, including the procedures for 
reporting tax revenues, lack transparency and are poorly monitored both within the tax 
administration and by the Auditor General’s Office. Moreover, the legal sanctions to 
enforce punishments on either taxpayers or collectors who do not comply with the law are 
weak. Each of these factors contributes to a non-transparent and complicated tax system, 
where taxpayers’ often are left to the discretionary power of tax officers.  
 
 
3 The Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities 
3.1 The TRA and URA are set up as semi-autonomous agencies of Government reporting to 
the Minister of Finance, and operate under the supervision of a Board of Directors. The 
revenue authorities’ main functions are to administer, assess, collect and account for all 
revenues due under the country’s tax laws, and to advise the Ministry of Finance on 
changes to those laws and fiscal policy in general. 
3.2 The choice of a revenue authority aimed partly to limit direct political interference by the 
Ministry of Finance, and partly to free the tax administration from the constraints of the 
civil service system. Firstly, it was assumed that the revenue authority model would be less 
vulnerable to political interventions in its operations. Secondly, a semi-autonomous 
revenue authority can, in principle, recruit, retain and promote quality staff by paying 
salaries above the civil service regulations, and also easier dismiss staff. It was expected 
that such steps would provide incentives for greater job motivation and less corruption.  
3.3 A shift to a revenue authority was also attractive to donors and senior politicians because it 
opens up opportunities for more widespread reforms of the tax administration. To this 
should be added an additional concern: the deep fiscal crisis in the two countries in the late 
1980s and 1990s, and the chronic inefficiencies of the previous tax administration 
arrangements placed in the Ministry of Finance. 
3.4 Although the agencies, in principle, are not constrained by civil service rules on 
employment, including salaries and promotion, there are, in practice, substantial staffing 
constraints: the freedom to set salaries is constrained externally and the real wage  level has 
declined over time. As many other public institutions in Tanzania and Uganda, the TRA 
and URA also lack suitable qualified staff within key areas, in particular there is a shortage 
of economists, IT-specialists, lawyers and auditors. 
3.5 The autonomy of the TRA and the URA has steadily waned over time. Moreover, both 
agencies suffer from micromanagement. The Board increasingly intervenes in the day-to-
day operations. In the URA, the Ministry of Finance is almost in full control of the Board. 
Particularly in staffing matters, the Ministry exerts its power. These interventions 
contribute to undermining the authority and legitimacy of the Commissioner General and 
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the top management of the agencies. In Uganda, it has also led to accusations of biased 
recruitment based on ‘secterism’ and ‘tribalism’. 
 
 
4 Autonomy, incentives and patronage: An introduction to the themes 
4.1 Tax administration comprises three interrelated activities: (i) the identification of tax 
liabilities based on existing tax legislation; (ii) the assessment of taxes to determine if the 
taxes actually paid are smaller (or larger) than tax liabilities; and (iii) the collection, 
prosecution and penalty activities that impose sanctions on tax evaders and ensure that 
taxes and penalties due from taxpayers are actually collected. Such activities require some 
degree of autonomy if a tax administration is to effectively enforce a government’s tax 
policies. Moreover, they require that tax officers are provided with incentives to perform 
their tasks in accordance with the objectives of the tax administration. 
4.2 As noted above, reforms of the tax administrations in Tanzania and Uganda in the 1990s 
resulted in short term revenue increases. But these achievements have proved to be difficult 
to sustain in the longer run. After the initial success, revenues as a percentage of GDP have 
stagnated or declined and the level of fiscal corruption seems to increase. Our study 
explores three factors that may explain this trend: one is related to the erosion of autonomy, 
the other to the power of incentive schemes for tax officers, and the third to patronage and 
‘the cultural logics of corruption’. These factors are discussed in further detail in the 
following three chapters. 
4.3 Firstly, when the autonomy of a tax administration is compromised, revenue collection 
performance suffers. The establishment of a proclaimed autonomous revenue authority 
with comparatively generous remuneration packages and substantial budgets does not 
protect the authority from political interference. To the contrary, as observed in Uganda, it 
may make it a more attractive target because the authority offers both relatively well paid 
jobs and considerable rent-seeking opportunities. Consequently, such an authority is 
vulnerable to political interference, especially in personnel matters.  
4.4 Secondly, even with relatively high wages and good working conditions, corruption may 
continue to thrive. In a situation where there is high demand for corrupt services, it is 
unrealistic to provide tax officers with pay rates that can compensate for the amount gained 
through bribery. Without extensive and effective monitoring, wage increases may produce 
a highly paid but also highly corrupt tax administration. Moreover, hiring and firing 
procedures may lead to more corruption. Corrupt tax officers often operate in networks, 
which also include external actors. These corruption networks seem to have been 
strengthened because many of those fired are recruited to the private sector as ‘tax experts’. 
4.5 Thirdly, as long as corrup tion is legitimised as a natural part of public office and as a way 
to accumulate means to support dependants, its participants may view what they take part 
in as legitimate. In the URA, in particular, patronage runs through networks grounded on 
ties of kinship and community origin. As such, people recognise the benefits of large 
extended families and strong kinship ties, even as their social and economic aspirations 
may be unambiguously modern. This implies that such social relations may rule out formal 
bureaucratic structures and positions. It is difficult to combat corrupt practices as long as 
the people who take part in them view them as acceptable.  
 
 
5 Autonomy and corruption 
5.1 The initially quite substantial degree of autonomy awarded the revenue authorities in 
Tanzania and Uganda has in recent years been undermined. One way in which to 
understand these developments is to consider the strategic interaction of the institutions 
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involved and their interaction with the taxpayer community. In particular, the problem of 
credible commitment to sustained tax administration reform seems particularly difficult to 
resolve. 
5.2 While a semi-autonomous revenue authority may have a sharper focus due to less political 
interference, the downside of this is that it may take a narrow view of its activities, 
disregarding its place in the wider civil service context. In particular, a semi-autonomous 
authority may prove to be less inclined to align its activities with those of the Ministry of 
Finance, where the activities of the two conflict or where there is a need for co-ordination. 
And vice versa, the Ministry might be less eager to assess the impact of its policies and 
practices on the Authority. 
5.3 A fragmentation of the civil service may also lead to the proliferation of regulations and 
discretionary decisions, as each civil service unit seeks new ways of extracting rents. Thus, 
under certain conditions, the creation of autonomous agencies will increase corruption in 
the civil service, as measured by the level of bribes demanded.  
5.4 Given the centrality of the commitment idea to the creation of semi-autonomous agencies 
in other areas of government, it is surprising that this perspective has by and large been 
absent from the discussion of tax administrative reforms. The basic point of departure is 
that taxpayers base their decision to comply or not on the perceived competence, 
effectiveness and fairness of the current tax administration. In countries with an 
incompetent, ineffective and unfair tax administration, we will therefore expect low 
compliance. A government wanting to increase taxpayers’ compliance, thus, has an interest 
in reforming the tax administration. However, a reform is costly in terms of investment in 
personnel and equipment, in addition to the foregone opportunities of patronage and other 
discretionary use of the tax administration. 
5.5 In Tanzania and Uganda, the formal autonomy awarded the TRA and the URA upon their 
inception, and the degree to which this autonomy was exerted in the initial phases of their 
existence, could very well have had a favourable impact on taxpayers perceptions of their 
operations, and hence on compliance rates. However, failure to sustain the initial reform 
efforts has, in both countries, implied a powerful signal to the contrary. The fact that 
nominal wages in the revenue authorities have been stagnant in recent years, and that the 
use of dismissals has decreased substantially, point to a decreasing degree of personnel 
autonomy. Increasing Board and government interference in staffing matters has a similar 
effect, and also signals a lesser degree of managerial autonomy.  
5.6 Moreover, managerial autonomy has been substantially undermined by the increasing use 
of tax exemptions in Tanzania, and by the politically motivated appointment of new Board 
members in both Tanzania and Uganda. There are many indications that the initial 
improvements in taxpayers’ perceptions due to the Revenue Authority reforms, have been 
reversed in later years. To the extent that taxpayers were able to foresee this backlash, the 
reforms may not have had much of an impact on ‘voluntary’ tax compliance in the first 
place, which indicates that any initial rise in tax revenues would be attributable to other 
factors.  
 
 
6 Incentives and corruption 
6.1 A failure to provide effective incentives for TRA and URA staff may be another reason for 
the stagnation in the performance of the TRA and the URA, and the apparent rise in 
corruption. Moreover, the incentive schemes introduced in the TRA and URA may have 
failed to improve performance, due to a failure to meet the basic conditions under which 
monetary incentives can be expected to work. In addition, organisational and behavioural 
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complexities make the use of incentives less straightforward. These matters underscore the 
importance of a careful and comprehensive reform.  
6.2 A core idea behind the introduction of semi-autonomous revenue authorities is their 
freedom to use pay and incentive structures to improve the degree to which organisational 
objectives are met. The idea that pay increases can have an effect on worker performance 
can be traced to two economic models. The first is the shirking model, which basically says 
that paying high wages makes keeping a job more valuable to workers, and they will thus 
exert more effort. The second model is the fair wage model, according to which workers 
provide more effort if they perceive wages to be fair. Each of the two models provides 
conditions under which pay increases result in significant increases in performance. 
6.3 According to the shirking model, the size of the wages required to make tax officers choose 
a high level of effort, depends on several factors. In particular, it depends on the probability 
of being detected and fired if shirking, and on how long a period of unemployment a tax 
collector faces if fired. The less efficient the monitoring of tax officers’ effort, the higher 
the salaries must be to induce a high level of effort. And the lower the level of 
unemployment, i.e. the shorter the period a worker does not have a paid job, the higher 
must the salaries be to make tax officers provide a high level of effort.  
6.4 Regarding the probability of being fired for corruption in the TRA and the URA, it is worth 
noting that the initial wave of dismissals has not been sustained. In addition, the 
appointment of executives known for their integrity in the initial stages of the reform has 
been undermined by recent examples of politically motivated appointments and 
interference into revenue authority affairs. A perception of a more lenient attitude towards 
corruption may thus have formed among TRA and URA staff. The initial pay increases 
may consequently not have had much of a lasting impact on corruption, and the subsequent 
decline in real wages has most likely eroded any initial impact. 
6.5 According to the fair wage model, the initial boost in pay rates for Revenue Authority staff 
should result in increased effort and reduced corruption, by moving pay rates closer to a 
perception of equitable wages, or by reducing the need for additional income from bribes. 
However, the subsequent failure to maintain the new wage levels in real terms implies a 
reversal of effort and corruption. A wage increase followed by a wage decrease might even 
produce less effort and more corruption than if wages had been constant, if the tax 
collector’s perceptions of fair wages are adjusted upward with rising wages. Finally, in a 
wider civil service context, rising wages in one department could imply that the staff of 
other departments views their own wages as even more unfair, with detrimental 
consequences for civil service morale. 
6.6 Besides wage incentives, there are of course other types of quasi-monetary incentives 
which impact on staff performance. For instance, promotion policies based on merit would 
be one, similar in effect to a bonus. Though some effort has been made in the revenue 
authorities to improve hiring and promotion practices, promotion is often based on 
seniority and the ‘right’ connections. Moreover, there are strong indications of internal 
markets for attractive positions. The impact of pay structures on the composition of staff is, 
thus, a subject which requires consideration.  
6.7 With respect to bonus systems, there are convincing arguments against introducing such 
schemes in the TRA and the URA. For instance, the introduction of a bonus system for tax 
collectors may have greater costs in terms of bonus payments than benefits in terms of 
added tax revenue if corruption at higher levels is rampant. The evolution of high level 
corruption in the URA makes this argument important to cons ider. While at their inception, 
great care was taken to staff upper management positions with individuals known for their 
integrity and independence, there seems to be a reversal to past practices of political 
appointments in recent years. A failure to root out high level corruption may thus weaken 
the impact of new incentive schemes on tax collection performance.  
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7 Patronage and the ‘cultural logics of corruption’ 
7.1 Corruption in Tanzania and Uganda is as frequently denounced in words as it is practised in 
fact. But the verbal stigmatisation of corruption rarely leads to legal proceedings or 
sanctions. Political leaders, as well as the ‘grassroots’, repeatedly name corruption as one 
of the major obstacles for development. Still, many researchers and journalists have noted 
that corruption is in actual practice accepted. People involved in corruption often see their 
own actions as legitimate, and only the practices to which one falls victim or from which 
one is excluded are denounced as being corrupt. 
7.2 Corrupt practices are generally not linked to shame, and people who engage in them often 
conduct their activities with a clear conscience. Moreover, there may not be a social stigma 
for being dismissed from one’s position due to corruption. In the URA, for example, there 
is a perception among some of the staff that the agency is a place to stay for a few years 
only to make money. Then, if one is finally caught in corruption, it doesn’t hurt much to be 
fired. 
7.3 Based on anthropological research, our study explores a set of social practices that do not 
necessarily have anything to do with corruption, but which provide a favourable ground for 
its generalisation. Five ‘cultural logics’ are singled out which all provide a fertile ground 
for corruption: (i) gift-giving; (ii) negotiation; (iii) solidarity networks; (iv) predatory 
authority; and (v) redistributive accumulation: 
7.4 Petty corruption tends to enter into the ‘gift-giving’ category, often making use of the 
terms and expressions that are traditionally associated with gift giving. To not thank 
someone for a service is not only a sign of bad manners, but may also mean that one invites 
misfortune. If a civil servant kindly disregards ‘the rigours of the law’, doesn’t he then 
deserve a gift? And why not just as well give the gift in advance? 
7.5 The logics of negotiation that apply to marriage negotiations for example, also apply to 
corruption. ‘Petty corruption’ often has a rhetorical dimension to it. It is not uncommon to 
leave these negotiations to a middleman – a broker – who organises the transaction and 
who saves both parties time and risk. 
7.6 The logics of solidarity networks entail an obligation of mutual assistance. This applies to 
friends of friends as well, so that the circle of people to whom one has responsibilities may 
be almost infinite. ‘Traditional’ networks are based on ascribed identities such as family or 
ethnic origin. But in modern, urban society, people may find it even more useful to nourish 
networks that cut across such boundaries. It is argued that the elite in African countries 
tends to be so small that the price of open conflict is simply too high. This may be one of 
the reasons why the culprits are rarely prosecuted. Moreover, positions in the revenue 
authorities are regarded as extremely attractive, to the point that applicants may try to use 
their networks in order to get the jobs. 
7.7 In Uganda, the authorities have sought to avoid the problem of mutually protective 
networks by appointing women in core positions. Educated women have often studied at 
separate girls schools and are therefore considered less inclined to get involved in the 
(predominantly male) elite corruption networks. This does not mean that women are innate 
or ‘naturally’ less inclined to get involved in corruption. But it may support the proposition 
that there is a connection between ‘old boys’ networks and mutual protection in cases of 
corruption. This kind of reasoning seemed to lie behind the appointment of Julia Sebutinde, 
a high court magistrate, to head the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Corruption of the 
Police Force, and, in 2002 to her appointment as chair of the Commission of Inquiry in the 
URA. The appointment of Annebritt Aslund as the Commissioner General of the URA may 
also be seen as part of this new strategy of placing women in key positions. While 
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indigenous Ugandans have somewhat mixed feelings about the practice of appointing 
expatriates in key positions, Aslund’s candidature was at the time widely applauded. 
7.8 Appointing expatriates in key management positions may also be a technique to avoid the 
unfolding of the logics of predatory authority. The background for this way of exercising 
authority is partly to be found in the pre-colonial system, partly in the colonial form of 
administration. In many of the pre-colonial political systems, the chiefs were obliged to 
show largesse to all. The capacity to redistribute was founded on patrimonialism, which 
regulated traditional power in the context of confusion between the wealth of the state and 
that of the sovereign. Thus, many contemporary leaders and civil servants see it as their 
right to exploit the opportunities that a given office offers. 
7.9 There is an intricate form of reciprocity in this relationship, in what is termed the logics of 
redistributive accumulation. Politicians at all levels – from local councillors to the 
executive – need to enrich themselves in order to redistribute, a redistribution which is 
necessary in order to uphold their authority and their networks. Seen from the relatives’ 
point of view (and that of network associates), someone who holds a prestigious position 
must spread the benefit around. Often there is a considerable social pressure in the direction 
of the accumulation of wealth in view of redistribution. Only someone who accumulates, 
can redistribute, the entering point to an identity as a ‘man of honour’ or ‘big man’. 
7.10 A major proposition in anthropological studies of corruption is that it is not realistic to 
combat corrupt practices as long as the people who take part in them view them as 
acceptable. Thus, a challenge is to work for a reform of the public attitudes towards 
corruption in general. But, for this to succeed one may need an almost utopian change at 
the administrative level since corruption is on the one hand, a result of the incompetence of 
the state apparatus and on the other, its cause and agent of reproduction. As long as the 
political elites are unwilling to give up some of their privileges and to reform, changing the 
general public’s attitudes may ultimately take the form of ‘puritanical’ or ‘fundamentalist’ 
movements based in the ‘grassroots’. 
 
 
8 Lessons and implications for reform 
8.1 This report has emphasised the economic, social and political dimensions of tax 
administrative reforms, and the limitations of some of the ‘technocratic’ approaches to 
institutional reforms taken by donors. The technocratic approach has overlooked the fact 
that reforming a tax administration, though it has important technical aspects, also is a 
social and political phenomenon driven by human behaviour and local circumstances. It is a 
long and difficult process that requires tax officials to change the way they regard their 
jobs, their tasks and their interaction with taxpayers. 
8.2 Another problem is the lack of local ownership that has characterised many donor-
supported tax administrative reforms in Africa. Such reforms are unlikely to succeed if the 
main source of energy and leadership for it comes from outside. It should be recognised 
that tax administrative reforms are highly political processes that will inevitably pose a 
threat to important local stakeholders. Hence, strong and well-placed leadership of the 
revenue authority is essential for overcoming the political and bureaucratic obstacles that at 
present confront the TRA and the URA.  
8.3 This also requires a better demarcation of management authority between the board and the 
Commissioner General in both the TRA and the URA. A board acting as the chief 
executive is certainly not a recipe for a strong and effective daily leadership which the 
revenue authority needs. The present problems of micro-management and the board’s 
involvement in day-to-day operations must therefore be addressed. This may imply a re-
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composition of the board that better matches the expectations of the Government about the 
status and performance of the tax administration.  
8.4 Furthermore, the successful implementation of such reforms requires political will to back 
them up. An indication of the limited political willpower in Tanzania to fight fiscal 
corruption and tax evasion is the rise in tax exemptions granted in recent years. Experience 
has shown that tax exemptions create room for bribery and corruption, reduce the tax base, 
and expands loopholes for tax evasion. Recently, the Tanzanian Government discontinued 
customs duty exemptions for public sector imports of goods and services. This is a step in 
the right direction. But, many openings for abusing the system remain. The removal of tax 
exemptions, including those granted to aid organisations and their employees, would help 
boost the credibility of both the revenue authority and the donors in relation to anti-
corruption measures, and, at the same time, contribute to widening the tax base and 
simplifying the tax system. 
8.5 The TRA and the URA are today top-down organisations characterised by submissiveness. 
Promotion is in general based on seniority. Younger staff members are given few 
opportunities to developing their skills. Incentives are in general weak in the sense that 
good performance is not rewarded and bad performance is not punished. Thus, a reformed 
pay structure and advancements mechanisms conducive to attracting, retaining and 
motivating highly qualified staff is required. Improved retirement benefits and physical 
working conditions should be part of this modernisation programme.  
8.6 Recent economic research on human behaviour indicates, however, that reformers and 
economists have an inclination to exaggerate the impact of monetary incentives because of 
a too narrow understanding of intrinsic motivation and group dynamics. Moreover, an 
additional aspect of wage incentives that has received little attention in connection with 
institutional reforms in Africa is associated with the role of family networks and 
obligations. Increased pay rates may also imply more extensive social obligations, resulting 
actually in a net loss to the employee. This state of affairs can develop into a vicious circle 
with higher wages leading to more corruption because the tax officer has to make up for the 
loss caused by such obligations. 
8.7 Appointing expatriates in key managerial positions may be an efficient technique to avoid 
the unfolding of the logics of patronage and predatory authority. Experiences from some 
countries, including Zambia, show that a few expatriate senior advisors and top managers, 
who are in place for a limited period of time, can contribute to the development of integrity 
and professiona lism in the tax administration. Strong expatriate leadership may more easily 
confront political and bureaucratic pressures, and may provide a ‘buffer zone’ within which 
systemic changes and new forms of staff behaviour are implanted. The required systemic 
changes include a rigorously planned and executed re-staffing process, also at the senior 
management levels, and introduction of human resources policies relating to transparent 
recruitment, adequate remuneration, pension/retirement schemes, etc. Such measures ought 
to take place before proceeding with traditional forms of technical assistance such as 
training, computerisation, and process re-engineering, including better forms and filing, 
auditing and management of revenues, taxpayer education programmes, etc. The 
experiences in Africa with the latter form of technical assistance for revenue enhancement 
and transfers of skills suggest that such measures have failed to provide sustainable results.  
8.8 Private management contracts are raised as a possible approach to strengthen tax 
administration in Uganda. But historical evidence and recent experiences from other 
African countries (e.g., Mozambique) give reason for concern: Such reforms have produced 
few sustainable results; the transfer of skills has been limited and the contract has been very 
expensive for the government. Tax practitioners are therefore increasingly questioning the 
value of outsourcing tax administration. 
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8.9 Although local political and bureaucratic leadership is an essential ingredient for tax 
administrative reform, it is not sufficient. The tax administration cannot be relied upon to 
reform itself. Large numbers of taxpayers and citizens regard the tax system as illegitimate. 
Thus, to tackle the serious problems of taxpayer-tax administration relations impetus for 
reform must also come from taxpayers. Business communities, taxpayers’ associations, 
trade unions and other influential domestic institutions have a critical important role to play 
in pressuring the revenue administration to do a better job of serving the society. There are 
today some promising indications that an organised response to tax policies is developing 
within the business communities in both Tanzania and Uganda. 
  1 
1 Introduction 
One of the areas of government where corruption looms largest is in the assessment and 
collection of taxes (Galtung, 1995:1). Substantial amounts never reach the treasury (Kiser and 
Baker, 1994; Ul Hague and Sahay, 1996; Ghura, 1998). Tax systems in most poor countries are 
characterised by widespread corruption and tax evasion. This erosion of the tax base has 
several detrimental fiscal effects, and there are at least four reasons for concern. First, the 
consequences of lost revenue to the funding of public services are of special concern (Tanzi, 
2000a). Second, income distribution suffers because the effective tax rates faced by individuals 
may differ due to different opportunities for bribing (Slemrod and Bakija, 1998; Hindriks et al., 
1999). Third, corruption and tax evasion may have harmful effects on economic efficiency in 
general (Chand & Moene, 1999; Tanzi, 2000b). Finally, there is a growing concern about the 
expanding underground economic activities, and how these activities affect economic policies 
(Tanzi, 2000a). Acts of corruption by tax collectors often play a role in promoting or sustaining 
underground economic activities and in facilitating tax evasion (Tanzi, 1995). Fiscal corruption 
may thus contribute to undermining the legitimacy of government. Moreover, citizens' 
disrespect for the tax laws may expand disrespect for other laws. 
 
In order to increase revenue and curb corruption, a number of African countries have 
implemented comprehensive reforms of their tax administrations over the past two decades 
(Devas et al., 2001).1 Uganda introduced a major reform in 1991 with the formation of a semi-
autonomous revenue authority – the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), and Tanzania 
followed in 1996 with the formation of the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA). The choice of 
a revenue authority model aimed partly to limit direct political interference by the Ministry of 
Finance, and partly to free the tax administration from the constraints of the civil service 
system. 2 Firstly, it was assumed that the revenue authority model would be less vulnerable to 
political interventions in its operations. Secondly, a semi-autonomous revenue authority can, in 
principle, recruit, retain and promote quality staff by paying salaries above the civil service 
regulations, and also easier dismiss staff. It was assumed that such steps would provide 
incentives for greater job motivation and less corruption. Moreover, it was believed that a 
single purpose agency could integrate tax operations and focus its efforts on collecting 
revenues better than what was possible under civil service rules. A shift to a semi-autonomous 
revenue authority model was also attractive to donors and senior politicians because it opens 
opportunities for more widespread reforms of tax administration (Therkildsen, 2002b:5). To 
this should be added an additional concern: the deep fiscal crisis in the two countries in the late 
1980s and 1990s, and the chronic inefficiencies of the existing tax administration arrangement s 
placed in Ministries of Finance.  
 
How successful were these reforms? It is too early to pronounce a final verdict at the present 
moment. Reforms need time and results will always depend on the criteria underlying the 
evaluation. However, neither the TRA nor the URA have been able to sustain their early 
successes. In Uganda, the reforms appeared to be a success in URA’s first six years of 
existence.  Reported tax revenue increased sharply - from about 7% of GDP in FY 1991 to 
more than 10% in 1997 (see Figure 1). Corruption seemed to be declining too. But since then, 
                                                 
1 In Africa, the revenue authority model has been instituted in Ghana (1985), Uganda (1991), Zambia (1994), 
Kenya (1995), Malawi (1995), Tanzania (1996), South Africa (1997), and Rwanda (1997). Mauritius is planning 
an authority and several West African countries may follow.  
2 McCourt & Minogue (2001) examine the conceptual and practical problems connected with such policy transfers 
to developing countries. 
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the tax-to-GDP ratio has remained stagnant around 10%.3 There are also clear indications that 
corruption is on the rise again. The Tanzania Revenue Authority has experienced a similar 
development, though the decline in the tax-to-GDP ratio and rise in corruption took place faster 
compared to the URA: Reported revenue increased in TRA’s first year of existence from about 
10% of GDP in 1996 to almost 11% in 1997. Thereafter, tax revenue has declined to less than 
10% of GDP in 2000 (Figure 1). In both Tanzania and Uganda this pattern, initial increases in 
revenue collection followed by stagnation or decline, took place despite continued economic 
growth, further reforms of important tax legislation in line with ‘best practice’ as prescribed by 
the IMF, and accumulated operation experiences in the new revenue administrations 
(Therkildsen, 2002:3).4  
 
The developments within the Ugandan and Tanzanian tax administrations can be summarised 
in the following way: 
· Prior to the establishment of TRA and URA : Widespread and systemic corruption. Low 
tax revenues in percentage of GDP. 
· Establishment of the TRA and the URA: Focus on wage incentives, control, recruitment 
and steps to reduce political interference. 
· Post-reform phase 1: Low(er) corruption levels. Sharp annual growth in tax revenue. 
· Post-reform phase 2: Rising corruption levels. Stagnant or declining revenue in 
percentage of GDP. 
 
Rising levels of corruption may help explain why the growth in revenue has tailed off in recent 
years in both Uganda and Tanzania (see Figure 1).5 But other explanatory factors are clearly 
also at work. First, tax revenue depends on external factors of which the tax administration has 
no control. For instance, general economic trends have an impact on tax bases such as income 
tax, VAT and import duties. Import restrictions and politically allocated tax exemptions for 
different sectors and businesses also contribute to reducing the tax base.6 Furthermore, staff 
productivity may have changed possibly due to falling motivation caused by, for instance, 
declining real wages. However, there are many indications that an increase in fiscal corruption 
has contributed to reducing the growth in reported revenues. Thus, a closer look at the pattern 
of corruption may shed light on the development of tax revenues.  
 
                                                 
3 On average, the tax-to-GDP ratio in sub-Saharan Africa is around 21%, compared with the OECD average of 
about 32% (World Bank, 2002). These data only include central government tax revenues, and not non-tax 
revenues and local government taxes. Different sources report slightly different figures both with respect to the 
tax-to-GDP ratios and in absolute numbers. For instance, the tax shares reported in TRA (2003) and URA (2002) 
for FY 2000/01 are above 11% of GDP, including non-tax revenues. The revenue trends, however, are the same as 
those referred to in this study. To make the data comparable across countries, we have chosen to apply the same 
source, i.e., the World Bank’s African Development Indicators 2002.  
4 This pattern is not atypical for tax administrative reforms in Africa as the experience from Ghana show (see 
Chand and Moene, 1999; Hadler, 2000). According to Taliercio (2001), similar developments are observed in 
several Latin-American countries. 
5 One should be careful about drawing a too confident conclusion about successes and failures on the basis of the 
tax-to-GDP ratio since it tends to be a relatively imprecise measure of performance (see Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 
1997). However, increase in revenues has been the major performance criterion publicly announced by the 
Tanzanian and the Ugandan governments, clearly reflected in the Budget Speeches of the Ministers of Finance. 
Moreover, the International Finance Institutions (IFIs) and various bilateral donors usually also refer to the tax 
share as the key performance indicator.  
6 In Tanzania, for instance, there has been a considerable increase in the use of tax exemptions in recent years, 
which obviously erodes the tax base, at least in the short run. For instance, generous investment incentives in the 
form of tax exemptions have been granted foreign investors, especially in the mining and tourism sectors 
(Fjeldstad, 2003).  
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The purpose of this report is twofold: Firstly, to explore in greater detail factors that may 
explain the observed patterns of corruption within the TRA and the URA. The study will focus 
on the key assumptions behind the revenue authority model and discuss the realism of these in 
an African context characterised by (a) scarcity of qualified tax officers, including accountants 
and auditors, and (b) clientilistic networks between political, bureaucratic and economic 
agents. Secondly, based on this work, the study aims to identify available options for sustainable 
tax administrative reforms in the two countries in light of existing political, economic and 
administrative constraints. 
 
Figure 1: Tanzania and Uganda; tax revenues in % of GDP (1990-2000)
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Source: World Bank (2002) African Development Indicators. 
 
(local government taxes and non-tax revenues are not included in the revenue data) 
 
 
Reliable information on levels of corruption and tax evasion is obviously hard to come by. 
Given the sensitive issues at stake, one cannot work towards an understanding of the 
phenomena discussed in this report by the standard methods of random sample, structured 
questionnaires and formal interviews.7 A combination of informal and formal methods is often 
required. This analysis is therefore based on a variety of sources of information collected 
during fieldwork in Tanzania and Uganda: official reports and data on tax revenues in Tanzania 
and Uganda; available grey literature produced by the governments, the TRA and the URA, 
donors and business communities; personal interviews and discussions with present and past 
tax officers and board members of the revenue authorities, staff at the Ministries of Finance, 
business people and customs clearing agents in Dar es Salaam and Kampala, aid workers, tax 
consultants and researchers; and newspaper articles on tax issues in the two case countries.  
 
The remaining part of this report is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 presents briefly the 
main characteristics of the central government tax system in Tanzania and Uganda, including 
                                                 
7 Wade (1982) provides an excellent account of methodological challenges and approaches for analysing systems 
of corruption in public sector institutions. 
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the major revenue bases and recent tax reforms. The institutional set-up of the tax 
administrations in Tanzania and Uganda, including staffing and remuneration, are discussed in 
chapter 3. The chapter also briefly discusses the extent and types of corruption in the two tax 
administrations. Chapter 4 provides a general introduction to the themes discussed in detail in 
the three forthcoming chapters, by assessing the key assumptions behind the administrative 
reforms and the choice of the revenue authority model. In chapter 5, the limits of the revenue 
administration’s autonomy are discussed, followed by a discussion in chapter 6 of incentives 
and staff performance, while the ‘cultural logics of corruption’ and patronage are the focus of 
chapter 7. Finally, chapter 8 examines lessons learned from these case studies which could 
benefit future reforms of tax administrations in poor countries. 
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2 The central government tax systems in Tanzania and Uganda 
This chapter provides a brief presentation of the central government tax systems in Tanzania 
and Uganda, including the major revenue bases and recent tax reforms. 
2.1 The central government tax system in Tanzania 
2.1.1 The tax structure 
The tax structure is composed of direct and indirect taxes (see figure 2). Direct taxes are levied 
on the factors (i.e., human and capital) that produce the incomes, while indirect taxes are levied 
on households or firms that consume the taxed items. Direct taxes include corporation tax, 
personal income tax (e.g., Pay-as-you-earn (PAYE)), withholding tax, rental income tax, tax on 
interest in banks, and presumptive income tax. The indirect taxes include taxes on domestic 
goods and services such as value added tax (VAT), and excise duties on so-called demerit 
goods (e.g., on beer and cigarettes). Moreover, indirect taxes include taxes on international 
trade transactions such as import duties, VAT on imported goods and services, and excise 
duties on specific imported goods such as beer and cigarettes.  
 
Indirect taxes on goods and services are the major revenue bases, and contribute about 52% of 
total tax revenues in 2000 (Figure 2). However, direct taxes on income and wealth are also 
important, and generated almost 40% of total tax revenues in 2000. Of these, corporate income 
taxes are most important, followed by pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) taxes on formal sector 
employees.  
 
 
Table 1a: Annual changes in tax revenues (in %) 
        
  1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–00 
Total tax revenues   36.1 28.6 33.4 10.0 8.9 11.1 
Tax on imports  81.9 32.8 43.7 3.7 21.1 0.7 
Tax on exports      -100.0  
Sales and excise tax on 
domestic goods 
 3.1 44.2 35.3 -0.9 14.8 11.6 
Income taxes  48.2 29.5 19.5 11.6 8.7 28.7 
Other taxes  19.9 -7.7 41.5 40.2 -18.8 2.3 
        
Table 1b: Tax revenues in % of GDP 
        
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total tax revenues 11 11.3 11.4 12.1 10.9 10.1 10 
Tax on imports 2.5 3.4 3.6 4.1 3.5 3.6 3.2 
Tax on exports 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 
Sales and excise tax on 
domestic goods 
3.5 2.7 3.1 3.3 2.7 2.6 2.6 
Income taxes 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.2 2.9 2.7 3.1 
Other taxes 2 1.9 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.1 
 
Source: Mokoro & Oxford Policy Management (2001). 
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Figure 2 Tanzania: Direct and indirect taxes in % of total revenues (excl. grants) and 
tax revenues as share of total expenditures (1990-2000)
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Source: World Bank (2002) African Development Indicators. 
2.1.2 Reforms 
Since the mid-1990s, reforms of the tax system have focused on improving the tax 
administration and removing discretionary tax exemptions, and simplifying the direct and 
indirect tax structures. Table 2 provides a summary of the major tax reforms in Tanzania 
during the last decade. In addition to revenue raising, efficiency and economic development 
considerations have motivated recent reforms to the tax system. For instance, export taxes were 
abolished in FY 1999/00. Apart from the introduction of the VAT in 1998, no new taxes have 
been introduced, and there has been a general decrease in overall rates. With each reform to 
simplify the tax system, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(TRA) have aimed to ensure that the changes at least are revenue neutral in the short run. 
Moreover, it is expected that the reforms will be conducive to growth in the formal economy, 
and thereby over time increase tax revenues. However, the present central government tax base 
still rests on three main sources. The first is the traditional excise and VAT base of the so-
called ‘demerit goods’, i.e. beer, tobacco, spirits and so on. The second source is taxes on 
imports, particularly consumer goods, and the third is taxes on company profits and personal 
income (PAYE).  
The reforms have emphasised measures to broaden the tax base while simultaneously flattening 
the tax rates. In summary, the major measures implemented are: 
· introduction of the value-added tax (1998); 
· lower personal and corporate income taxes;  
· simplification of the tax bands and broadening of the bases for personal and corporate 
income taxes; 
· reduction of import duties and simplification of the rate structure; 
· simplification of the excise duty structure; and 
· abolition of export taxes. 
Administrative reforms are also increasingly stressed, and reflected in the establishment of the 
TRA. More recently, reforms of the local government tax system and harmonisation of local 
and central government taxes have also been addressed. 
  7 
 
 
 
Table 2: Tax reforms in Tanzania since the early 1990s 
 
Form of taxation Reforms  
Direct taxes Substantial simplifications of tax structure during the last decade. Reduction in marginal tax rate to 30%. Personal income tax bands reduced to 5. The 
increased income tax threshold (from TSh 20,000 to TSh 45,000 per month) has removed more than 40% of all taxpayers from the tax system. Corporate 
income taxes and PAYE most important.  
Indirect taxes Contribute about 52 % of total revenue. Include at present value added tax (VAT), excise duties and import duties, and “other taxes” (mainly road toll 
and stamp duty).  
Export taxes Export duties were abolished in FY 1991/92 and later re -introduced in FY 1996/97. In FY 1999/2000 export duties on traditional export crops (cotton, 
coffee, tea, tobacco, sisal and pyrethrum) were again abolished.  
Import duties Import duty is levied on the c.i.f. value of imports. Statutory exemptions are diplomatic corps, foreign government projects, and religious, educational 
and charitable institutions. The tariff structure is basically ad valorem for most items. Effective from 1 July 2001 customs duties comprise four tariff 
bands; 0, 10, 15  and 25%.Recent simplifications of the customs duty structure have made the system more transparent. However, still extensive tax 
evasion, which is made possible by weak customs administration and a lack of effective surveillance and deterrence mechanisms. 
Excise duties Since 1992/93 substantial simplifications and reduction of rates. Previously, the base was very wide covering several hundred items. Both ad valorem 
rates and specific rates as well as composite rates for some items were levied. In January 1999 excisable items were grouped into 9 main groups 
covering 40 excisable items. However, the bulk of excise revenues (> 90%) come from only five products, both imported and domestically produced, 
i.e., beer, cigarettes, petroleum products, spirits, and motor vehicles. 
VAT VAT introduced in July 1998. Replaced the previous sales taxes and part of stamp duty and entertainment taxes. Two VAT rates are imposed; a zero rate 
and a standard rate of 20%. The zero rate is applied on exports. The standard rate applies on all other goods not exempted. Food, most basic goods, 
inputs to agriculture and NGOs are exempted. VAT exemptions to Government and its institutions were abolished in July 2001. The threshold for being 
registered for VAT is set to an annual turnover of TSh 20 million in FY 1998/99. The VAT base is significantly broadened vis -à-vis the previous sales 
tax. However, the scope of VAT exemptions and relieves has been broadened steadily since the original VAT legislation was approved by the National 
Assembly in August 1997. For instance, the number of zero-rated and exempted items has increased from 19 to 39. Furthermore, the number of special 
relieves has been increased from 5 to 17. These amendments narrow the VAT base, reduce its revenue productivity, and introduce various distortions and 
inequities in the tax system. 
 
Sources: Fjeldstad, Hussein & Shallanda (2002).
  8 
But still, in spite of reform, official statistics on reported revenue, in particular from customs 
duties, indicate large leakages. While the most commonly applicable import duty rate was 25% 
during 1998-2001, the customs tariff generated a revenue equivalent to less than 9 % of the 
official import value during that period (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3: Effective import duties in Tanzania (1995–2001) 
 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 
(a) Revenue from import 
duties (in million TSh)1 
61,272 78,374 82,047 88,052 88,769 96,356 
(b) Total import value, c.i.f. 
(in million TSh)2  
885,953 
 
807,303 
 
808,168 
 
1,043,097 
 
1,164,841 
 
1,227,757 
(c)=(a)/(b) Effective import 
duties (in %) 
6.9 
 
9.7 
 
10.2 
 
8.4 
 
7.6 
 
7.8 
 
Sources: Fjeldstad (2002) based on: 1 World Bank (2002: 295, Table 5.2); Ministry of Finance (flash 
reports-FY 1995/96, 1999/00 and 2000/01); and 2 BoT (2001, p. 72, Table 4.6, referring to calendar 
years). 
 
2.2 The central government tax system in Uganda 
2.2.1 The tax structure8 
Table 4 shows the percentage contributions of Uganda’s tax structure over the last decade. 
International trade taxes represent the major revenue base. Between FY 1990/91 and FY 
1998/99 trade taxes generated about 55% of the total tax revenue annually and 56% in FY 
1999/2000. In comparison, during the same period revenues from taxes on domestic goods and 
services generated between 23% and 27% annually of the total tax revenue.  The contribution of 
income taxes to total revenue has improved gradually from a low 10% in FY 1990/91 to about 
18% during 1999/00.  
 
 
Table 4: Central government revenue structure, in percentage of total revenue  
(FY 1991/92-1999/2000) 
 
Fiscal year 1990/91 91/92 92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 
Income taxes 10 13 15 15 15 13 14 15 18 18 
Trade taxes 60 55 58 56 57 57 60 55 55 56 
Domestic goods 
and services 
27 24 23 26 25 27 23 26 25 24 
Other revenue 
sources 
3 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 
 
Sources: Obwona & Muwonge (2002a) based on URA (1990-2000, various issues). 
 
Actual total revenue (both tax and non-tax revenue) increased six-fold from USh 180.45 bn in 
FY 1991/92 to about USh 1,031.58 bn during 1999/2000. As a percentage of GDP, revenue has 
risen from 6.97% in FY 1991/92 to an average of 11.7% annually since FY 1994/95. However, 
since FY 1996/97 the tax-to-GDP ratio has been stagnant at around 10% of GDP (see Figure 1). 
Income tax revenue rose from USh 23.64 bn in FY 1991/92 to USh 181.90 bn in 1999/2000 (Table 
                                                 
8 This section is based on Obwona & Muwonge (2002a). 
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4). Trade taxes rose from of USh 99.39 bn in FY 1991/92 to USh 551.02 bn in 1999/2000 with an 
average of USh 346.62 bn. The domestic goods and services registered an average of USh 157.86 
bn annually. Table 5 shows the trends in major taxes in Uganda over the study period. 
 
The strong growth in the tax revenue registered during the FY 1994/95 and FY 1995/96 was 
mainly due to the outcomes of the coffee boom, which indirectly boosted demand for 
consumption goods, particularly some local products such as beer and soft drinks, and to some 
extent increased the level of imports. In addition, the attainment of macroeconomic stability in 
1992 laid down a firm foundation for enhancing production of goods and services. 
 
Table 5: Trends in major taxes in Uganda, in USh bn (FY 1991/92-1999/2000) 
 
FY/ Tax 
categor 
Income 
tax 
Trade tax Domestic goods 
and services 
Other revenue 
sources 
Actual total 
tax revenue 
Share of total tax to 
GDP in (percent) 
 
GDP 
FY 1991/92 23.64 99.39 43.27 14.16 180.46 6.97 2,589.9 
FY 1992/93 43.57 164.27 65.85 8.91 282.59 7.79 3,627.0 
FY 1993/94 57.37 217.33 102.29 11.05 388.04 9.53 4,072.5 
FY 1994/95 77.17 295.52 132.49 17.05 522.23 10.63 4,914.6 
FY 1995/96 82.93 365.78 171.61 19.05 639.37 11.34 5,639.6 
FY 1996/97 102.45 442.18 174.09 23.90 742.62 12.34 6,023.0 
FY 1997/98 124.90 455.56 214.50 26.63 821.59 11.56 7,104.3 
FY 1998/99 170.03 528.55 244.63 26.36 969.57 12.18 7,963.4 
FY 1999/00 181.90 551.02 272.03 26.63 1,031.58 11.94 8,655.9 
Average 95.99 346.62 157.86 19.30 619.78   
 
Source: URA Various Annual Reports. 
 
Figure 3 Uganda: Direct and indirect taxes in % of total revenues (excl. grants) and 
tax revenues as share of total expenditures (1990-2000)
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Source: World Bank (2002) African Development Indicators. 
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2.2.2 Reforms  
In 1996 a uniform VAT which replaced the commercial transaction levy tax and sales tax was 
introduced, and the following year the New Income Tax Act was implemented. A flat VAT-rate of 
17% both on imports and local production was applied. Some commodities and services were 
exempted from VAT and others zero rated. In 1998 the presumptive income tax was introduced, 
and the tax appeals tribunal and Large Taxpayers Department (LTD) created. In the Customs and 
Excise Department, reforms included the simplification and reduction of import duty rates; 
reduction of exemptions and deductions; increased surveillance of taxpayers and improvements 
of Customs’ facilities.  Moreover, the customs computer programme Automated System for 
Customs Data (ASYCUDA) and the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) were introduced in 
1997 for purposes of tracking the flow of customs documents and transit cargo.  
 
These reforms affected the assessment and collection of taxes, the management of taxpayer 
registers, audits and enforcement mechanisms as well as the taxpayer appeals process. The Tax 
Appeals Tribunal was formed to address taxpayers’ complaints against tax collectors on tax 
assessment. 
 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
While addressing many relevant issues, the tax reforms of the 1990s have failed to tackle 
serious problems of taxpayer-tax administration relations. In spite of recent reforms, the tax 
systems in Uganda and Tanzania are characterised by an excessive number of different taxes 
with different rate structures that are difficult for taxpayers to understand. The tax law is 
written in a confusing way and manuals to consult are often absent, opening up for 
discretionary powers by tax enforcers. Tax officials may, for instance, have discretion over 
important decisions, such as those related to the determination of tax liabilities, selection of 
audits, litigation, etc. Many administrative procedures, including the procedures for reporting 
tax revenues, lack transparency and are poorly monitored both within the tax administration 
and by the Auditor General’s Office. Moreover, the legal sanctions to enforce penalties on tax 
evaders and to punish collectors who do not comply with the tax law, in general, weak. Each of 
these factors contributes to a non-transparent and complicated tax system, where taxpayers’ 
often are left to the discretionary power of tax officers. 
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3 The Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities  
The Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and the Uganda revenue Authority (URA) are set up 
as semi-autonomous agencies of government reporting to the Minister of Finance, and operate 
under the supervision of a Board of Directors. The choice of a revenue authority model, which 
originates in the so-called executive agency model, aimed partly to limit direct political 
interference by the Ministry of Finance, and partly to free the tax administration from the 
constraints of the civil service system. 9 The institutional set-up gives the management the 
autonomy to operate the activity like a business, emphasising economic norms and values, 
rather than a civil service department. The extent and nature of the autonomy is, however, 
distinct from that of the autonomy assigned to other types of public sector organisations 
(Taliercio, 2002). The revenue authorities are not intended to be as autonomous as central 
banks, nor as dependent as ministerial line departments, thus the concept ‘semi-autonomous’. 
The autonomy is basically intended as a remedy for managerial and administrative problems in 
the public sector, as well as political problems.  
 
In particular, the revenue authority is meant to be more independent of the financing and 
personnel rules that govern the public sector in general. Thus, in principle, it is not constrained 
by civil service rules on employment, and can pay higher wages to hire and retain quality staff. 
In practice, however, there are staffing constraints: the freedom to set salaries is externally 
constrained and the real wage level has been declining over time. As many other public 
institutions in Tanzania and Uganda, TRA and URA also lack suitably qualified staff within 
key areas, in particular there is a shortage of IT-experts, economists, lawyers and auditors. 
 
This chapter briefly presents the organisational set-up and key responsibilities of the TRA and 
the URA, respectively. 
3.1 The Tanzania Revenue Authority 
A major reform of the tax system in recent years was the establishment of the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority. The TRA was established by the TRA Act. No. 11 of 1995 as a government 
agency charged with the responsibilities of assessing, collecting and accounting for 
Government revenue. The agency became operative on 1 July 1996, the beginning of the fiscal 
year 1996/97.  
 
TRA’s main functions are to administer, assess, collect and account for all revenues due under 
Tanzania's tax laws, and to advise the Government both on changes to those laws and fiscal 
policy in general (TRA, 2003:7). The TRA-act provides for retention of a percentage of target 
revenue collected by the Authority as determined by the Ministry of Finance, from time to 
time. 
3.1.1 Objectives 
The principal objectives of TRA are to: 
                                                 
9 The executive agency model is one institutional model of the new public management (NPM), which is inspired 
by the radical public sector reform programmes of the 1980s that began in the UK, USA, Australia and New 
Zealand. McCourt & Minogue (2001) examine the conceptual and practical problems connected with such policy 
transfers to developing countries. 
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· raise domestic revenues by establishing a sustained revenue base to enable Tanzania to 
finance its recurrent and development expenditure needs and thereby reducing aid 
dependency; and  
· develop a tax regime that is transparent, effective and conducive to economic growth led by  
private investment and international trade.  
 
Of these objectives, increase in revenues has been the major one as publicly announced by the 
government and clearly reflected in the Budget Speeches of the Minister of Finance. The 
performance criterion of this objective is to reach a given revenue target, expressed as a given 
ratio of tax revenue to GDP. This target is revised annually in the Finance Minister’s budget 
speech.   
 
Revenue targets are set on the basis of negotiations between the TRA and the Ministry of 
Finance (URT, 1998:5). Moreover, the Research and Policy Department of the TRA plays the 
unusual policy role of setting collection targets for the TRA revenue departments, once the 
total tax revenue budget has been agreed with the Ministry (Mokoro & Oxford Policy 
Management, 2001:18). This arrangement indicates a strengthening of the tax bureaucracy at 
the expense of politicians.10 It also amplifies the moral hazard problems when the tax 
collection agency becomes involved in the process where its own performance targets are set.  
 
Within the donor funded TRA the Tax Administration Project (TAP) has established 
performance indicators for the TRA as illustrated in Table 6:  
 
Table 6: TRA performance indicators  
Established by the Tax Administration Project (TAP) 
Effectiveness indicators  Efficiency indicators  
Tax gap Registered taxpayers per employee 
Number of declarations/registered taxp ayers Collections per employee 
On time declarations/Total declarations Tax arrears as % of annual revenue 
Arrears recovered Tax revenues/GDP 
· Baseline (av. 1996/97-1997/98): 12.4 % 
· 2002: 13.3 % 
· 2004: 14.8 %    
Source: Mokoro Ltd. & Oxford Policy Management Ltd. (2001). 
 
 
The administrative reforms incorporated in the TAP are expected to have positive fiscal 
impacts by improving the effectiveness in tax administration. The reforms were expected to 
lead to a permanent increase in tax revenues of about 1% of GDP by 2002, and more that 2% 
of GDP by 2004. These projections reflect expected increases due to overall economic growth, 
administrative and policy changes in VAT, customs measures (including harmonisation of 
tariffs with neighbouring countries and tightening of borders), and the impacts of income tax 
reforms such as reduced TIC exemptions, increased petroleum windfall taxes and improved 
efficiency of collection.  
 
However, the expected increase in revenues did not materialise in 2002, and, at present, it 
seems unlikely that the 2004-objective will be achieved. Thus, a recent World Bank/IMF 
document states that “[T]he ongoing tax reform has as one of its key objectives the generation 
                                                 
10 Caulfield (2002) provides an interesting analysis on how recent public sector reforms in Tanzania may have 
strengthened the hand of bureaucrats such that, without enhanced mechanisms of accountability and political 
control, the potential for rent-seeking is high. 
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of higher revenues; the fact that Tanzania has not yet achieved that objective reflects both the 
long gestation period of the effectiveness of the new tax system and certain ongoing 
weaknesses in the tax system that have yet to be addressed” (IDA/IMF, 2000:24). As argued in 
chapter 1, rising levels of corruption may help explain why the growth in revenue has tailed off 
in recent years. But there are clearly other explanatory factors at work as well. In particular, 
politically allocated tax exemptions for different sectors and businesses have contributed to 
reducing the tax base (see chapter 8). There has been a considerable increase in the use of tax 
exemptions in recent years, which obviously erodes the tax base, at least in the short run. For 
instance, generous investment incentives in the form of tax exemptions have been granted to 
foreign investors, especially in the mining and tourism sectors (Fjeldstad, 2003).11  
 
With respect to the second principal objective of the TRA, the basic tax agenda is 
simplification of the tax structure to ease the administration and to reduce the nuisance effects 
of the tax system. As reflected in Table 2 (chapter 2), this has been accomplished through 
substantial simplifications of the excise and import duty structures, as well as simplifications of 
and reduction in the number of income tax bands.  
 
The key institutions involved in tax policy formulation are: (i) The Parliament (final approval 
of tax policy proposals in the Budget and Finance Act); (ii) the Policy Analysis Division 
(PAD) in the Ministry of Finance (preparation of the budget with revenue policy measures); 
and (iii) the TRA’s Research and Policy Department (see Mokoro & Oxford Policy 
Management, 2001:17). Some line ministries, including the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 
also have a notable influence on tax policy formulation. Moreover, the IMF and the World 
Bank are involved in policy debates, in particular with respect to revenue targets (T/GDP-
ratio), policy proposals and technical details.  
 
The broader guidelines for tax reform are discussed and set by the Steering Committee on Tax 
Reform (a task force). The Committee is chaired by the Principal Secretary, Fiscal Affairs, in 
the Ministry of Finance, and draws on inputs from the Policy Analysis Division’s sections 
dealing with macroeconomic and fiscal policy. It also works closely with the TRA’s Research 
and Policy Department. The Committee includes members from the Ministry of Finance, the 
National Planning Commission, Bank of Tanzania, Ministry of Local Government (now within 
the President’s Office), the Tanzania Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture 
(TCCIA), the Chamber of Tanzanian Industries (CTI), the Attorney General, and the Economic 
and Social Research Foundation (ESRF). Proposals from the Committee are passed on to a 
technical sub-committee for more detailed work on the revenue effects. In order to preserve 
confidentiality of the budget preparation process, detailed proposals from the technical team 
are submitted only to the chair of the Steering Committee, the senior management of the 
Ministry of Finance and relevant others on a ‘need-to-know’ basis (Mokoro & Oxford Policy 
Management, 2001:17).  
3.1.2 Organisation 
A key element of the administrative reform was to move the existing revenue departments out 
of the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, TRA also replaced the Institute of Tax Administration 
(ITA). TRA collects all major taxes on mainland Tanzania and the income tax and all taxes on 
imports on Zanzibar. The revenue departments within TRA are (www.tra.go.tz): 
                                                 
11 The rise in tax exemptions has been observed for some time. For instance, while exemptions were 15.2% of 
total collections (i.e., actual collections plus exemptions) in FY 1996/97, this ratio grew to 37% in FY 1998/99 
(Mokoro & Oxford Policy Management, 2001:7). 
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1. VAT Department (VAT, excise duties on domestic goods); 
2. Income Tax Department (direct taxes, including PAYE, company taxes, withholding 
taxes, personal income taxes – it contributes between 25% and 30% of the total tax 
revenue to the Government); 
3. Customs and Excise Department (import duties, VAT and excise duties on imported 
goods - about 50% of the total tax revenue is collected by this department.); and  
4. Large Taxpayers Unit (responsible for assessing, collecting and accounting of all taxes 
from large taxpayers, including corporation tax, PAYE, withholding taxes, VAT and 
local excise duty). 
 
The Tax Investigations Department, supports directly the Revenue Departments in enforcing 
the various tax laws through regular investigation of tax cases with substantial amounts of 
revenue at risk.  
 
In addition, TRA has eight support departments: 
(1) Legal Services 
(2) Human Resources and Administration  
(3) Information Systems  
(4) Finance  
(5) Internal Audit  
(6) Tax Investigations  
(7) Research and Policy  
(8) Taxpayer Education. 
3.1.3 Management and board 
To ensure a sense of ‘local ownership’ to the reforms, board and executive management 
positions in the TRA have been filled with Tanzanians since the establishment of the agency. 
Persons recognised for their integrity and past good performance are appointed as Chairman of 
the Board and Commissioner General. The rest of the executive management, with a few 
exceptions, have been recruited from outside the system, most from jobs in government-owned 
enterprises.  
 
The Commissioner General is the chief executive of TRA and is appointed by the President 
(TRA, 1999: 4). The TRA Board consists of ten members, including the chairperson who is 
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance (ibid., p. 3). Five 
members are ex-officio who sit on the Board by virtue of their positions (i.e., the Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Finance, the Union Government; the Principal Secretary, Ministry of 
Finance, the Zanzibar Government; the Secretary of the National Planning Commission; the 
Governor of the Bank of Tanzania; and the Commissioner General of TRA). In addition, the 
Minister of Finance appoints four other Board members on the basis of their relevant 
experience and qualifications. The tenure of office for the members is three years and non-ex-
officio members can be re-appointed only once. 
 
The institutional set-up of the TRA seems to have increased the distance between the executive 
management and the staff, by allowing huge differences in pay levels between the top and 
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bottom grades.12 Moreover, few in the top management of TRA had any previous experience 
with tax administration, in contrast to other staff members who were largely recruited from the 
former tax administration. The commissioners lack, in the view of a broad section of the staff, 
knowledge of how the organisation actually works on the ground. This may of course change 
in the future, and it is obviously positive that the present TRA leadership, in general, is 
considered to be ‘clean’.13 But it is not obvious that the esprit de corps among the top 
managers that has characterised TRA will permeate the rest of the organisation.   
 
In July 2002, the TRA Board declined to renew the contracts of six members of the top 
management team, including the Secretary of the Board and Chief Counsel, the Commissioner 
for Human Resources and Administration and the Acting Commissioner for Tax Investigation 
(Daily News, 26 July 2002). Moreover, several heads of department received an extension of 
their contracts with only six months against the ‘normal’ tenure of office of three years. We 
have not been able to trace the reasons why the Board made the decision to not renew these 
contracts. For instance, was this decision based on insights of poor performance or 
accountability problems or does it simply reflect an attempt by the board to allow ‘new blood’ 
into the institution?  
 
The board’s decision not to renew the above mentioned contracts seems to have been taken 
against the advice of the Commissioner General, and indicates that the board is taking a more 
active role in TRA-operations. Increasingly, the TRA-Board has come to play the role of an 
executive management, for instance, by intervening in cases determining the tax- liabilities of 
individual taxpayers.14  This kind of micro-management by the board is certainly not the recipe 
for effective daily leadership and will most likely contribute to undermining the authority of 
the Commissioner General and the top management.  
3.1.4 Staffing 
At present, the TRA-staff counts about 1900 people (see table 7), compared to more than 3300 
staff members of the previous tax administration. From the outset in 1996, drastic measures 
were taken to break the ‘culture of corruption’ in the tax administration. All former staff 
members were dismissed and had to re-apply for a position in the new TRA. More than a third 
(35%) were rejected on evidence or suspicion of misconduct (see Table 7). Almost 1200 
previous staff members, of whom 500 were former Customs officers, were not re-employed. 
All new employees were given a one-year probation period before being accepted on a 
permanent basis. Staff had to report their private financial circumstances, including wealth, on 
starting.  
                                                 
12 A simila r situation prevails in the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), where the internal wage compression rate 
is 34, i.e., equivalent to a wage gap of 3,300% between the top and bottom grades (personal interview, 
Commissioner for Personnel at URA, June 2000; Odd-Helge Fjeldstad).  
13 These opinions emerged from personal interviews with business people in Dar es Salaam and surveys conducted 
by the University of Dar es Salaam.  
14 Personal interview with advisor to the TRA, September 2002, and interview with a previous member of the 
TRA-Board, February 2003 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
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Table 7: TRA staff dismissed for misdemeanours  
 
Year 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 2000/01 
Staff at start of 
fiscal year 
3365 2201 1962 1927 1897 
Dismissed 1164 239 35 30 24 
Percentage 
dismissed 
35 11 1.8 1.6 1.3 
 
Source: World Bank (2001:28). 
 
A key element of the administrative reform was to pay salaries that would enable TRA to 
attract and retain highly qualified staff. Since the agency is established outside the civil service 
system, it is not, in principle, bound by wage rates and employment regulations that apply to 
other sectors of government. This involved dramatic increases in pay rates – for some 
categories of staff up to ten times higher than corresponding positions in the civil service. 
Further emphasis was laid on strengthening accounting and internal monitoring systems and 
curtailing the opportunity of tax officers to deal with cases on the basis of their own discretion. 
A new unit was set up for internal investigation and monitoring. The general scarcity of 
qualified accountants, lawyers and IT-experts in Tanzania meant, however, that these groups at 
TRA would be equally sparse. Finally, steps were taken to improve working conditions for 
employees by improving offices, expanding computer services, purchasing service vehicles etc.  
 
According leakages to the media, the Board has drafted a major restructuring plan for its 
organisation, including the retrenchment of a substantial number of staff. Daily News (26 July 
2002) reports that ‘the main criterion in the retrenchment exercise is mainly non-performing 
workers or staff with doubtful integrity’. The article writes that about 1000 staff members are 
to be retrenched, which corresponds to more than 50 % of the total staff. The management has, 
however, rejected this information as ‘unfounded rumours’, and the restructuring plan has yet 
to materialise.  
3.1.5 Fiscal corruption 
Increasing corruption and embezzlement of tax revenues are documented in a number of recent 
reports from both commercial and official sources.15 However, developments after the 
founding of TRA can be divided into two periods.16 The first was characterised by decreasing 
corruption and a sharp increase in tax revenue. As already indicated, the trend turned, 
corruption seemed to increase and growth in revenue declined. In what follows these changes 
in corruption levels over the two periods are explained.  
 
Phase 1 (1996–97) 
In the first year of TRA’s operations tax revenues grew by more than 30 % compared to the 
previous fiscal year (see Table 1a, chapter 2). Since there were only minor changes in the tax 
structure (rates and bases) and external conditions in this period, the growth in revenue must be 
mainly due to the efforts of the tax collectors and other officials at TRA. 17  
 
                                                 
15 Table 8 provides an overview of types and mechanisms of fiscal corruption and tax evasion in Tanzania.  
16 This section draws on Fjeldstad (2003). 
17 In the Budget Speech for FY 1996/97, the Minister of Finance focused on implementing measures to improve 
efficiency in revenue collection, in particular legal and administrative measures against tax evasion and corruption 
(URT, 1996b: 59-63).  
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It may also suggest that the internal control mechanisms worked. During the probation period 
(1996/97) 239 staff members were dismissed (Table 7). A survey of taxpayers in Dar es 
Salaam also concludes that corruption shrank during the first year (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
1998). But, according to the respondents, at the same time as the number of corrupt acts fell, 
the price per bribe rose (ibid. p. 3). Since there is no evidence that the demand for corrupt 
services grew during the period, the most plausible explanation is that tax officers who were 
willing to take bribes considered it more risky than before, and, thus, incorporated a ‘risk 
premium’ in the bribes. According to the PriceWaterhouseCoopers-study, the most corrupt 
staff members during this period were junior officers. Interviews with business people in Dar 
es Salaam confirmed this observation. This may imply tha t younger staff members were more 
inclined to accept a higher risk, or that they acted as agents for players higher up in the tax 
administration and then shared the ‘proceeds’ with them.18 
 
Phase 2 (1997–2002) 
After the initial success, tax revenues have dropped in percentage of GDP (Table 1b, chapter 
2). Moreover, a new increase in corruption and tax evasion occured (Osoro et al., 1999: 36). In 
particular, corruption seems to be growing at the middle and lower levels of TRA (Waller, 
2000). According to taxpayers interviewed, there is also an increase in the number of tax 
collectors openly demanding bribes after presenting taxpayers with unreasonably high 
assessments (ibid., appendix 2, section 9.2). How can this relapse be explained? The following 
factors may contribute to shed light on this development: (i) probation period; (ii) declining 
real wages; (iii) group dynamics and social obligations; and (iv) corruption networks.   
 
Firstly, one explanation could be that the first year’s success was due to the fact that most 
employees were working on a probationary basis and, additionally, had yet to learn how the 
new system worked (TRA, 1997). So although their attitudes to corruption may not have 
changed, it was perceived to be more risky to get involved at that stage in corrupt dealings. Tax 
officers did not know how the internal control mechanisms worked or how the top 
management would execute the rules and whether they were in danger of losing prospects of a 
permanent job. These points were also confirmed in interviews with present and former TRA 
staff. It was stressed that many employees in the operational departments used their probation 
period to ‘study’ how the system worked: ‘sitting on the fence waiting for better times’. Later it 
was shown that some staff at TRA’s Internal Investigation and Monitoring Unit (IIMU) were 
willing to take bribes to turn a blind eye to corruption. Rumours of corruption in the IIMU 
were circulating as early as 1997, but it was not until December 2000 that the TRA 
management and board took action, resulting in 24 IIMU officers, including the head of the 
unit, being ‘retired in the public interest’.  
 
Secondly, despite a dramatic increase in pay rates compared with normal rates in the public 
sector, it was not enough to compensate for the potential gains from corruption.  (URT 1996: 
285): ‘For a ‘Long-Room’ employee who is used to get bribes of TSh 20–30,000 daily, a ten 
fold increase of his salary from the present level will not make him desist from demanding and 
accepting bribes.’ The situation worsened even more due to the erosion by inflation of the 
initial pay rates for TRA staff, since nominal wages between 1996–2000 remained 
unchanged.19 It is therefore no surprise that the wage reforms seem to have had limited impact 
on restraining the extent of corruption in the tax administration. But, irrespective of wage rates 
the tax administration remains a very attractive workplace. According to the Commissioner for 
                                                 
18 URT (1996: 284) reports that such mechanisms were in place in the previous tax administration, too. 
19 Personal interview, M.E. Sila, then Commissioner for Human Resources and Administration, March 2001 
(Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
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Human Resources and Administration, TRA receives hundreds of applications for every 
advertised vacancy. The tax collection departments are particularly attractive. There is also 
considerable internal competition within TRA for vacancies in the operational departments. 
The 18% increase in salaries of TRA-staff in 2001, may, thus, prove to have only minor 
impacts on motivation (ESRF & FACEIT, 2002: 63). 
 
Thirdly, the assumption that higher salaries will boost productivity over time is most likely 
exaggerated. It is a well-known fact in sociological management theory that workplaces are 
social environments and that people in them are motivated by much more than pure economic 
self- interest (Gillespie, 1993). Recent economic research on human behaviour also indicates 
that reformers and economists have an inclination to exaggerate the impact of monetary 
incentives because of a too narrow understanding of intrinsic motivation and group dynamics 
(see Frey, 1997). An additional aspect of wage incentives that has received little attention in 
connection with institutional reforms in Africa is associated with the role of family networks 
and obligations (see chapter 7). Increased pay rates may also imply more extensive social 
obligations, which in turn may lead to an actual net loss to the individual. This state of affairs 
can develop into a vicious circle with higher wages leading to more corruption because the tax 
officer has to make up for the loss caused by such obligations.20 
 
Another explanatory factor is linked to the impact of corruption networks. Research has shown 
that corruption in public institutions is often conducted by reasonably well-organised networks, 
where there is a high degree of trust and reciprocity among the network members (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999; Gehlbach, 2001). Such relationships are likely to reduce transaction costs, as 
well as any moral costs that may arise from allowing oneself to be involved in corruption. 
Furthermore, the peer networks often function as ‘repositories of knowledge’ for members, 
e.g., on the attitudes of the top management to corruption, how the internal monitoring unit 
works, who is potentially bribable among staff members and management, etc.  
 
The reforms probably managed to break a few existing networks, but they did not to hinder 
new networks – within and outside TRA – from emerging. The following anecdote may 
illuminate this process within TRA. 21 The TRA board is responsible for appointing people to 
high-ranking positions, while vacancies at lower levels are taken care of by middle- level 
managers. Already in TRA’s first year, board members were made aware of a practice in some 
units in TRA where applicants had to pay ‘speed money’ just to have their applications 
processed. The board suspected this to be a method of sifting applicants which ensured that 
only those who signalled their readiness to pay bribes – and therefore probably also a readiness 
to get involved with the internal corruption networks – were recruited. This indicates the 
emergence of an informal market for jobs in TRA. 22 
 
Just as intriguing is to see how new networks gradually established connections between TRA 
and former employees in the tax administration. As already mentioned, about a third of former 
employees in the tax administration were not given new jobs in TRA. They were persons 
considered by the new management and board to have compromised themselves through 
involvement in corrupt dealings and misbehaviour. Many of the dismissed people were, 
                                                 
20 This point was raised by several past and present TRA-officials interviewed (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad).  
21 Personal interview with former board member of TRA, December 1998 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
22 According to the Warioba-report, such mechanisms also existed in the previous tax administration (URT, 1996: 
284). From other countries it is known that a market for lucrative positions can emerge in public institutions that 
pay wages considerably over the market rate, where those with the capacity to pay the most get the jobs (see 
Andvig, 1999).  
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however, attractive for the private sector due to their inside knowledge of the workings of the 
system. For example, former customs officers were recruited by clearing agencies or they set 
up their own agencies.23 These persons had intimate knowledge of the tax administration, of 
loopholes, etc. Since many of their former colleagues remained in the tax administration, good 
connections to the inside were assured.24 It is therefore not surprising that this type of 
corruption network eventually managed to reverse the positive process that characterised 
TRA’s first period.  
                                                 
23 Since 1995/96, a total of 1,492 employees of the tax administration have been dismissed (Table 7). Of these, 
656 came from the Customs Department (Business Times , 21–26 September 2001). 
24 An employee in the Research and Policy Department of TRA referred to these former tax collectors as  ‘ticking 
bombs’ loaded with potentially dangerous information and knowledge about TRA (personal interview, March 
2001 – Odd-Helge Fjeldstad).  
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Table 8: Tax evasion and corruption in Tanzania – typologies (mid-1990s) 
 
Different types of tax evasion and corruption  Mechanisms and extent  
1. ‘Unadulterated’ tax evasion (without the involvement of tax officers) 
Smuggling Smuggling of goods (beer, spirits, soap, sugar, cooking oil, etc.). Border police is involved in some cases. Extensive. 
The Zanzibar loophole Goods are imported via Zanzibar where tariffs are lower. They are then transported to the mainland. Tanzania Harbour Authority may be 
involved in some of the cases. Extensive. 
Underreporting of the value of imports  A general problem in imports of goods. 
Underreporting of turnover Common within retail and wholesale sectors. 
Misclassification of goods  Import goods with high tax and duty rates are classified as goods with lower rates. One example is the classification of alcoholic beverages as 
mineral water. Extensive.  
Taxable income/transactions are not reported or are underreported in 
accounts  
Several ledgers are often used, including one for taxation purposes that shows a deficit. Common within many businesses. Extensive.  
Goods in transit are sold on the domestic market  Could involve many types of commodities. Extensive, especially for oil and petrol.  
VAT fraud Falsified claims for VAT refunds. Can occur with the help of collaborators within the tax administration. 
Overreporting of expenditures An accounting trick to reduce tax burden. Common. 
2. External corruption (involves both tax officers and taxpayers directly) 
Goods in transit  Tanzania is a major transit country for the importation of goods to Burundi, Eastern DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia. One way of 
evading tax is to report import goods as transit goods. Customs officers and importers work together occasionally. Substantial taxation losses. 
A review in 1996 concluded that at least 50% of all transit imports were unable to provide final documents proving that goods had arrived at 
their final destination. Most likely they ended up on the domestic market. Extensive. 
False classification of goods Customs officers may be involved (see above). 
Underreporting value of goods  To avoid pre-shipment inspection of goods before shipment from the export country, a common method is to split the goods into units which 
individually are worth less than the minimum required to trigger inspection. The goods are therefore exempted from pre-shipment inspection. 
Underreporting the value of goods is also common, in particular for used cars. Customs and excise officers may be involved.  
Tax exemption Involves the tax administration, the Ministry of Finance, and Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC). In some cases, the tax payer is not registered 
in the tax registers, but pays a lower tax “privately” to tax collectors. Goods imported to religious and non-governmental organisations are 
exempted from taxation by law, but this is misused by business people who, by bribing tax officers, register goods as if they were intended for 
these types of organisations. In some cases business people also collude with NGO officials. Extensive.  
Extortion 
 
 
 
Taking advantage of taxpayers incomplete knowledge of tax legislation, tax collectors threaten taxpayers to increase rates and/or assume that 
taxpayers will not be financially able to press charges. Difficult to quantify, but small businesses, e.g., hotels and restaurants, claim that this is 
a big problem. 
3. Internal corruption within the tax administration (does not involve taxpayers directly) 
Embezzlement of collected revenue Tax officers steal tax money, leaving little or nothing behind for the treasury. May take place with or without the collusion of bank employees 
and/or auditors within the tax administration. Extensive.  
Fraud Falsifying tax receipts is common.  
Corrupt inspectors/auditors Internal auditing within Customs is considered inefficient and corrupt. Exacerbates the problems of corruption since it undermines the 
credibility of the monitoring policy. Extensive. 
 
Source: Fjeldstad (2002) 
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3.2 The Uganda Revenue Authority 
The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) was set up on September 5, 1991 by the Uganda 
Revenue Authority Statute No. 6 of 1991 as a central body for the assessment and collection of 
specified tax revenue, to administer and enforce the laws relating to such revenue (Table 9) and 
to account for all the revenue to which those laws apply 
(http://www.ugrevenue.com/profile.htm). URA is also required to advise the Government on 
matters of policy relating to all revenue, whether or not this revenue is specified in statute No. 
6. 
 
Table 9: Revenue related laws administrated by the Uganda Revenue Authority   
 
 1 The Income Tax Act, 1997  
 2 The Stamp Duty Act, (Cap172) as amended;  
 3 The Finance Statute 1998 (statute No. 4 of 1998)-section 12 and the seventh scheduled to the statute (which 
provide for the imposition and collection of road users tax) as amended;  
 4 The Customs Tariff Act, 1970 (Act No. 17 of 1970) as amended;  
 5 The East African Customs Management Act (EAC Cap. 27) as amended  
 6 The Value Added Tax Statute, 1996 as amended.  
 7 The Finance Statute 1989 (Statute No. 3 of 1989)-Section 3 (which imposes a commission on import licenses) 
as amended;  
 8 The Traffic and Road Safety Act, 1998 (Act No.15 of 1998) and Regulations. All provisions for the collection 
of license fees and other fees, fines (other than fines imposed by Courts) and other levies collectable under the 
Act. 
 9 The Excise Tariff Act (Cap. 174) as amended; and  
 10 The East African Excise Management Act (EAC cap. 26) as amended.  
 
Source: http://www.ugrevenue.com/profile.htm 
 
3.2.1 Objectives 
The role and objectives of the Uganda Revenue Authority can be summarised as follows:  
(1) To identify the taxpayers; 
(2) To inform the taxpayers of their tax rights and obligations by provid ing them with - 
necessary information;  
(3) To assess the taxpayer fairly with regard to those taxes relevant to them;  
(4) To collect the taxes in accordance with the law and related regulations and practice; 
(5) To account for the taxes collected in accordance with the statute; and  
(6) To enforce collection of taxes where default has occurred.  
3.2.2 Organisation 
A restructuring exercise in the URA carried out in July 2002 led to major changes in the 
organisational structure affecting the formation of departments and their functional structures 
(URA, 2002).   The four revenue departments within the new URA organisational structure and 
their functions are listed below: 
 
(1) Customs & Excise (mainly customs duties, excises and VAT on imports). 
(2) Domestic Indirect Taxes (VAT and excises - tax contribution from in 2001/02 was 26% 
of total revenues) 
(3) Domestic Direct Taxes (tax contribution in FY 2001/02 was 21%) 
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(4) Expansion & Collection Improve Revenue contribution of Domestic Taxes (a new 
department which is responsible for the collection of domestic taxes and pioneer 
initiatives geared towards expansion of the tax base. The department is to register, 
collect and account for domestically generated revenues due in accordance with the 
relevant laws of Uganda – aims to improve revenue contribution of domestic taxes (i.e., 
local indirect  and direct taxes) to total revenue from 47% in FY 2001/02 to 55% in FY 
2006/07. 
 
The Internal Audit and Tax Investigation Department handles investigations, related to tax 
fraud system and transaction audits in respect of revenue and expenditure. This department 
provides support to the revenue collection and administration by reviewing systems of internal 
controls and investigating cases of suspected tax evasion. 
 
The Commissioner General's Office is composed of six units: Administration, Tax Education, 
Public Relations, Business Analysis and Revenue Support, Staff Monitoring Unit, Revenue 
Protection Services.  However, generally, the Commissioner General’s office aims at providing 
a facilitative role and executive control in making the organisation achieve its objectives. In 
addition, there are four support departments:  
· Legal Services And Board Secretariat;  
· Information Technology And Corporate Services;  
· Finance; and  
· Human Resources. 
 
3.2.3 Management and board 
URA is managed and administered by a Board of Directors, which is the policy making body 
and has general over sight power (http://www.ugrevenue.com/). The Management of URA is 
headed by the Commissioner General, and is assisted by two Deputy Commissioner Generals 
and all the Commissioners. Management is responsible for the day-to-day administration and 
operation of the Authority, and makes recommendations to the Board for new policy 
initiatives. 
 
The Commissioner General is the Chief Executive of URA and is responsible for the day-to-
day operations of the Authority, management of the entire organisation and control of all the 
departments. The Commissioner General’s office comprises of two Deputy Commissioner 
Generals one in charge of Revenue and another in charge of Administration. Generally the 
Commissioner General’s office aims at providing a facilitative role and executive control in 
making the organisation achieve its objectives. The Commissioner General is directly 
responsible for the Staff Monitoring Unit and the Public Relations; the Deputy Commissioner 
General – Administration is directly responsible for Administration Unit and the Deputy 
Commissioner General – Revenue is directly responsible for Tax Education Unit, Business 
Analysis and Revenue Support and Revenue Protection Services. 
 
In contrast to the TRA, expatriates are employed in high level positions in the URA. The first 
Commissioner General (1991-97) was a Ghanaian and the present one is a Swede. The 
philosophy behind the use of expatriates is to contribute to improved professionalism and 
integrity. Moreover, given tribalism and the prevalence of patronage in the public sector, it was 
considered necessary to hire outsiders to undertake serious reform of the tax administration. 
When the current Commissioner General, Annebritt Aslund was appointed (2001), President 
Museveni is reported to have remarked that she came from a “very distant tribe” (Taliercio, 
  23 
2002:129). Aslund worked as a tax consultant at PricewaterhouseCoopers in Uganda before 
being recruited to the URA, and the President became aware of her due to her involvement in 
the public debate on taxation in Uganda. 
 
The original URA statute of 1991, created a fairly autonomous Board of Directors (see 
Taliercio, 2002:125). It was composed of the chairperson, the Commissioner General, the 
secretary to the Treasury, the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce, the 
Commissioner for Industry, the Governor of the Bank of Uganda, and three members 
appointed by the Minister of Finance. However, the statutes set up conflicting responsibilities 
for the URA-Board. The board was responsible for both the formulation and implementation of 
the policy of the URA. Furthermore, it was responsible for complying with any directives 
given by the Minister of Finance. Thus, the Minister of Finance appointed the majority of the 
members of the board and gave also directives to the board.  
 
This design of the board soon laid the foundation for conflicts between the board, the Ministry 
of Finance and the Commissioner General. In particular, the board became directly involved in 
day-to-day operations, which contributed to undermining the authority and credibility of the 
Commissioner General and the top management (Taliercio, 2002:126). Moreover, the Ministry 
of Finance came to see the board as problematic, partly because powerful members of the 
board who were not appointed by the Ministry came to disagree with the Ministry in some 
cases, and partly because the Ministry perceived that the board did not possess the required 
technical expertise on taxation matters. Thus, in 1998 the Parliament approved the refashioning 
of the board to be explicitly under the cont rol of the Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the 
responsibilities of the board were reduced to make it less operational and more policy-oriented 
and supervisory. To provide for stakeholder representation, the Parliament also gave the 
Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) a seat on the board.  
 
According to URA-managers interviewed, the board is still too much involved in details. 
Although the board does not seem to intervene in cases determining the tax-liabilities of 
individual taxpayers, complaints have been raised that the UMA-representative uses his 
position to pursue his own company’s interests on the board.25 But, in general, the current 
board has not been very active, something which may reflect the fact that the Ministry of 
Finance is almost in full control on the board (see Taliercio, 2002:127). Thus, the present board 
is regarded by some as a ‘rubber stamp’ for the Ministry. For instance, in contrast to the 
statute, which says that all management personnel are appointed by the board, it is the Minister 
of Finance who in practice recommends the appointments of commissioners. According to 
Taliercio (2002:128) it is not clear why the Ministry is micromanaging the URA, but the 
effects of its interference is reported to be negative. It has also led to frequent accusations in 
the media of ‘tribalism’ and ‘secterism’, in particular with respect to staffing (Therkildsen, 
2002). 
3.2.4 Staffing26  
By 30 June 2000, the URA payroll had 2191 staff members (Table 10). Owing to the merger 
between the Internal Revenue Department (IRD) and the Value Added Tax (VAT) department, 
which was effected in April 2000, IRD is the largest department with about 39 % (863 people) 
of the total URA staff. This is followed by the Customs and Excise Department (CuE), 
Commissioner General’ s (CG) Department, and the Finance and Administration Department 
                                                 
25 Personal interviews, Kampala, March 2003 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
26 This section draws on Obwona & Muwonge (2002b). 
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(FAD) constituting 32 % (697 employees). Staffing in the CG and the Finance and 
Administration departments increased most from 111 employees and 108 employees, 
respectively, in FY 1996/97, to 257 employees and 225 employees, respectively, during 
1999/2000. This represents an increase of 131 % in the CG’s Department and 108 % in the 
Finance and Administration department. In the Customs and Excise Department and the Internal 
Revenue Department, staffing increased by 25 % and 35 %, respectively during the same period. 
 
The percentage share of staff at the revenue officer level has increased from 35 % to about 47 % 
of the total workforce between FY 1995/96 and FY 1999/2000. On the other hand, while the 
number of employees at the rank of revenue assistantship and junior revenue assistantship has 
increased, the share of these workforce categories in the total workforce seems to have declined 
over time. This may indicate a policy of promoting staff members as a motivation and measure 
to encourage morale. For example, during 1999/2000, promotion or re-grading of lower cadre 
staff was used to boost staff morale. At least 411 staff members were promoted during 
1999/2000. Of these 89 were from IRD, 126 from CuE, 61 from VAT, 32 from Large Taxpayers 
Department (LTD), 66 from FAD, 25 from Internal Audit and Investigations, 10 from Board 
secretary’s office and 2 from CG’s office. In terms of gender, about 7 women currently hold the 
ranks of assistant commissioner and the Commissioner General is a woman. By end 1998, 1999 
and 2000 the total number of men (women) were 1340 (605), 1338 (608) and 1497 (694), 
respectively.  
 
Table 10: Staff distribution by employment category (FY 1995/96-1999/2000) 
 
 FY 
1995/96 
 FY 
1997/98 
 FY 
1998/99 
 1999/2000  
Staff by Rank Staffing Percent 
share 
Staffing Percent 
share 
Staffing Percent 
share 
Staffing Percent 
Share 
I 20 1.18 33 1.70 36 1.85 38 1.73 
II 594 35.02 742 38.15 750 38.48 1032 47.10 
III 479 28.24 503 25.86 515 26.42 493 22.50 
IV 303 17.87 391 20.10 363 18.62 339 15.47 
V 300 17.69 276 14.19 285 14.62 289 13.19 
Total  1696 100.00 1945 100.00 1949 100.00 2191 100.00 
 
Source: Obwona & Muwonge (2002b) 
Notes: In the table (I) denotes employees at commissioner level; (II) denotes employees at Revenue officer level; 
(III) denotes employees at Revenue assistantship level; (IV) denotes employees at Junior Revenue assistantship; 
and (V) denotes the support staff (i.e., drivers, messengers, cleaners, and domestic servants). 
 
 
Table 11 shows the statistics on human resource changes. Over the last decade a total of about 
127 members of staff have been dismissed. Of these, the CuE department registered the largest 
number of staff dismissal (78 employees), followed by the FAD (18 employees) and IRD (17 
employees). Most of the dismissals are staff of the ranks ranging from RO9 to R13 
(synonymous to levels I, II, and III in Table 10). Over 46 deaths have occurred, most of which 
are HIV/AIDS related. Moreover, abscondments are relatively high while retirements are few. 
Most of the terminations have taken place in the CG’s office. Out of 33 resignations, most of 
them (11 employees) have occurred within the CuE department.  
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Table 11: Termination and other related issues (1991-2000) 
 
  Board CGO FAD CUE IRD R&D LTD IA Total 
Resignation 1 1 5 4 11 4 1 5 1 33 
Retirement 0 0 0 1 4 1 0 0 0 6 
Dismissal 3 0 4 18 78 17 0 1 6 127 
Death 0 0 3 24 14 4 0 0 1 46 
Abscondment 0 1 1 9 5 25 0 0 1 42 
Termination 0 0 20 2 2 6 0 0 1 31 
Total 4 2 33 58 114 57 1 6 10 285 
 
Source: Obwona & Muwonge (2002b), based on URA (various records, 1991-2000) 
 
The URA Corporate Plan provides forecasts of human resource data each year for the 1996-
2000 period. Four URA staff members were expected to retire per annum. Dismissals were 
expected to increase from 14 members of staff in 1996 up to 70 members of staff in 2000. 
Resignations were set to an average of 7 persons per annum while deaths were expected to 
average 23 persons per annum. Table 11 shows human resource data for the whole 1991-2000 
period and not on an annual basis. The deaths and retirements are relatively low compared to 
dismissals and resignations. 
 
With respect to salaries, in 1993 the URA received 8-9 times higher wages than other civil 
servants (Therkildsen, 2002).  By 2000, however, this gap had been reduced to 4-5. For high-
level technicians, remuneration (i.e., salaries plus benefits) has declined by about one third 
since the mid-1990s, and by about 10 % for low level administrative staff over the same period 
(Taliercio, 2002:128).  
 
The remuneration system allows huge differences in the pay levels between the top and bottom 
grades. In 2000, the internal wage compression rate was 34, i.e., equivalent to a wage gap of 
3,300% between the top and bottom grades.27 This is probably the highest compression rate in 
any public agency in Uganda. Moreover, pension differences are of a similar magnitude. The 
huge differences in enumeration between top and bottom staff are regarded as unfair by lower 
level staff. Hence, well-paid staff does not ensure that the staff is highly motivated. Actually, 
high compression rates may have the opposite effect. The 10 % bonus that was paid to the staff 
on top of their salaries in FY1998/99, because revenue targets were reached, contributed also to 
highlight the huge wage differences within the organisation (Obwona & Muwonge, 2002b).  
3.2.5 Fiscal corruption 
In a recent interview, the Commissioner General, Annebritt Aslund, listed corruption as 
‘problem number one’ in the organisation.28 Frequent media reports support the perception that 
corruption is endemic in the URA. Also EME (2000:20) points to the continued public 
perception of a high level of corruption, reflected in the widespread availability of ‘duty free’ 
goods on local markets and arrests of senior URA officers. Thus, in March 2000, President 
Museveni is reported to have called URA ‘a den of thieves’ (Therkildsen, 2002).  
 
Corruption seems to have riddled the URA since its outset. For instance, a survey conducted in 
Kampala in 1993, two years after the URA was established, revealed that there was ‘a general 
                                                 
27 Personal interview, Commissioner for Personnel at URA, June 2000 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
28 Personal interview, 20 March 2003 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
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impression that URA is a corrupt institution, high-handed and inconsiderate’ (Zake 1998:77). 
Moreover, in a survey conducted in 1998, which covered 243 respondents, as many as 43 % 
said they were paying bribes to tax officers occasionally or always, while 38 % reported paying 
bribes to customs officials (Gauthier & Reinikka, 2001). The frequency of bribe-paying 
increased with firm size. However, the actual burden of bribe extraction by public officials was 
heaviest for the medium sized firms (26-75 employees). These firms paid 3.5 % of their sales 
in bribes, equivalent to 60 % of what the average sized firm actually paid in taxes. This is 29 
times more per unit of sales than larger firms, and 9 times more than smaller firms (less than 6 
employees). Furthermore, small-scale businessmen and women interviewed in Kampala in late 
2002, expressed strong antipathies against the URA and its staff (Lange, 2003).  
 
Exemptions have increased in prevalence and importance from 1995-97 when Gauthier & 
Reinikka (2001:4, 23) looked into this – despite official policies to the contrary. In particular, 
large firms have benefited from exemptions (Therkildsen, 2002:17). Although the Income Tax 
Act of 1997 provided more effective means to reduce exemptions, the introduction of 
accelerated depreciation allowances have weakened the effects of the reduction in exemptions 
(EME, 2000:17). 
 
Smuggling is also an increasing problem. The government itself is increasingly focusing on 
this problem in recent budget speeches and background papers to the budget (Therkildsen, 
2002:18). According to the Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA), smuggling accounted 
for a revenue loss of 10% per year in the late 1990s (EME, 2000:17). The Customs 
Department, in particular, has most consistently had difficulties in meeting its targets (Obwona 
& Muwone, 2002:27). Hence, smuggling, which implies the involvement of Customs officers, 
may be part of the explanation for the tax share stagnation in recent years.  
 
In contrast to the information we have acquired on corruption in the TRA, senior managers 
seem to be heavily involved in corruption in the URA. This is, for instance, reflected in the 
ongoing court case against five senior officers attached to the Large Taxpayers Department 
(LTPD), who are accused of defrauding the URA USh 338 million. The accused include the 
commissioner of the LTPD, three assistant commissioners (i.e., for audits and business 
analysis), and the public relations officer (The New Vision, 11 March 2003, p. 4). However, 
according to officials in the URA, this court case is only the ‘tip of the iceberg’.29  
 
As a measure to combat corruption, all URA staff members were in January 2002 requested to 
fill out an asset declaration for themselves and their relatives. This is something Members of 
Parliament are supposed to do as well, 30 although several MPs refuse to comply (Musamali, 
2002; Mwenda, 2002; Osike, 2002). Asset declaration has proved to be a very difficult process 
in the URA as well. Many staff members own property that is not registered in their own name, 
and sometimes not even in the name of their spouses or other relatives. As part of the anti-
corruption programme, ‘Integrity Councillors’ are supposed to ‘carry the message’ to the rest 
of the staff. A letter has been distributed within the URA where all staff members are asked to 
tell what they know about misappropriation of tax revenues. According to the Commissioner 
General (CG), this initiative has resulted in a lot of information. The CG has also established a 
separate e-mail address to which only she has access, and where the general public may report. 
Information on this address has been publicised in several newspapers (Mpagi, 2002).  
 
                                                 
29 Personal interviews, Kampala, March 2003 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
30 Leadership Code Act of July 2002. 
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In March 2002 a Commission of Inquiry of Corruption in the URA was appointed. On this 
occasion the BBC News Online wrote: “A three-month judicial probe into Uganda's tax 
authority has started to root out ‘massive’ corruption and boost tax revenues.” 31 The 
Commission is chaired by High Court Magistrate Julia Sebutinde, who also headed the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Police Force. Judge Sebutinde is assisted by commissioners 
Fawn Cousenes and James Kahoza. The secretary is Geoffrey Kiryabwire, and Maureen Owor 
and Monica Twesiime are counsel. 
 
The Commission started its work in May 2002 and was expected to deliver its report and 
recommendations after 3-4 months. However, after almost one and a half year, the Commission 
has yet to reach its conclusions. Thus, the initial enthusiasm – and expectations - which met the 
Commission seems somewhat blurred today. There are also indications that the long standing 
of the Commission, and the rumours surrounding it, are contributing to the erosion of staff 
morale within the URA. 32  
 
According to leakages from the Commission, around 100 corrupt individuals are named in its 
report, which, according to some observers, is less than what one ‘hoped for’, considering the 
total number of the staff (about 2200) and the size of the problem. Moreover, some of the 
‘known’ offenders do not appear to be referred to in the investigation. Some observers 
therefore suspect that the Commission’s inquiry now has become so politically sensitive that its 
conclusions is unlikely to have any positive impacts on the fight against corruption in the 
URA. Under these circumstances, it is argued, some other method has to be found to break the 
cycle of corruption. Thus, Jenkins (2003b) argues that a major re-staffing is required to 
‘eliminate’ corrupt staff. This measure would also send a signal that the URA-management is 
serious: “That signal is awaited by the core of good staff” (ibid., 15). However, according to 
senior officials interviewed in the URA, there is only a limited pool of qualified people who 
can fill the positions of the corrupt officers if they are to be retrenched.33 In other words, it is 
hard to replace corrupt staff. One cannot recruit expertise, but have to take the costs of training 
them. Another issue emphasised by senior officials interviewed, is that one may actually have a 
corrupt officer who is efficient, and a non-corrupt officer who simply ‘does not do anything’. 
  
                                                 
31 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1873529.stm 
32 A recent dramatic development in the tale of the Commission appeared on Friday night 10 October, 2003, when Justice 
Sebutinde’s home reportedly was attacked by six gunmen. No one was hurt. In an interview, Justice Sebutinde linked the 
attack to the inquiry in corruption in the URA: “I don't think it was an attempted robbery. Otherwise they would have begun 
with my neighbours who are richer, do not have armed guards and have expensive cars parked in their compounds. But the 
report (on URA) is ready and will be out anytime. We shall stand by our positions and leave the rest to God,” Sebutinde said 
(The Monitor, 13 October 2003).  
33 Personal interviews, Kampala, November 2002 (Siri Lange).  
  28 
4 Autonomy, incentives and patronage: An introduction to the 
themes  
Tax administration comprises three interrelated activities: (i) the identification of tax liabilities 
based on existing tax legislation; (ii) the assessment of taxes to determine if the taxes actually 
paid are smaller (or larger) than tax liabilities; and (iii) the collection, prosecution and penalty 
activities that impose sanctions on tax evaders and ensure that taxes and penalties due from 
taxpayers are actually collected (Das-Gupta& Mookherjee, 1998:28). Such activities require 
some degree of autonomy if a tax administration is to effectively enforce a government’s tax 
policies. Moreover, they require that tax officers are provided with incentives to perform their 
tasks in accordance with the objectives of the tax administration. However, social relations in 
the form of networks grounded on ties of kinship and community origin may rule out the 
formal bureaucratic structures, incentives and positions. Hence it is required to look beyond the 
formal structures of public institutions to the informal networks of patronage and social 
domination that often determine how political power actually is wielded. 
4.1 Autonomy34 
A revenue authority is not meant to be as autonomous as a central bank, nor as dependent as 
departments in line ministries. Hence, it is referred to as ‘semi-autonomous’ (Taliercio, 
2002:13). But a revenue authority is meant to be more independent of the financing and 
intended personnel rules that govern the public sector in general. Moreover, a revenue 
authority is meant to be more independent from the Ministry of Finance on matters pertaining 
to corporate governance. Likewise, in aid dependent countries like Tanzania and Uganda, the 
tax administration’s autonomy depends on donor influence and on the relations of tax agencies 
to other state actors and state elites because fragmentation is a key feature of these states and of 
individual organisations therein (Therkildsen, 2002:6). Autonomy with respect to taxation is 
therefore multi-dimensional and relational, and depends on interactions between the tax 
administration and a variety of actors.  
 
Autonomy is intended as a remedy for political as well as managerial and administrative 
problems. Firstly, an important element of the revenue authority reform is to give the tax 
administration’s management autonomy from undue political influence. Secondly, the 
managerial and administrative problems often refer to problems of recruiting and retaining the 
professional, specialized staff that the revenue administration need.  
4.1.1 Political interference  
Few public agencies are as powerful and as interwoven with society as the tax administration, 
which monitors and appraises the economic activities of many of the citizens and corporations 
in the country. For instance, the tax administration has often important financial information 
about the economic operations of these actors. Hence, having political control over the tax 
administration can pay high political dividends (Taliercio, 2002:17). Politicians can, for 
example, intervene in the tax administration to grant favours such as tax exemptions to 
supporters or to harass political opponents through audits.  
 
In many African countries, the frequent use of the tax administration for political purposes has 
contributed to eroding taxpayers’ confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the tax 
administration, which again has contributed to undermine tax compliance. An important 
                                                 
34 This section draws on Taliercio (2002) and Therkildsen (2002).  
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element of the revenue authority reform is therefore to give the tax administration’s 
management autonomy from undue political influence. Hence, Taliercio (2002) argues that the 
establishment of a revenue authority represent an attempt by politicians to create a credible 
commitment to taxpayers that the tax administration will be more competent, effective and fair 
by delegating power to tax bureaucrats. The level of autonomy is the factor that enables 
politicians to make the commitment credible, since tax administration traditionally has been a 
area characterised by high levels of political intervention (ibid.:16).  
4.1.2 Revenue targets 
One challenge is to understand under which conditions autonomy of a tax administration is 
possible vis-à-vis the actors from which some autonomy is sought (Therkildsen, 2002:5). 
Economic policy in Tanzania and Uganda is intimately linked to donor influences and must be 
interpreted in this light (ibid. 18). This is also the case for tax policies and tax administration. It 
seems clear that neither the TRA nor the URA have autonomy in setting revenue targets. This 
has important implications for both staff motivation and tax collection priorities. Donors, and 
in particular the IMF, are actively involved in the annual exercise of setting revenue targets, as 
is the Ministry of Finance. The tax-to-GDP targets are announced in the Budget Speeches, and 
are written into the Policy Framework Papers (PFP) which the government co-signs with the 
IMF (ibid. 19).   
 
There are no indications of any major disagreement between the Ministry of Finance and the 
IMF about revenue targets in Tanzania and Uganda. However, many staff members of the TRA 
and URA interviewed complain about their own lack of influence in setting the revenue targets. 
Both TRA and URA staff blame the MoF and the IMF for setting unrealistic targets, based on 
expenditure needs rather than revenue potentials. Others points out that the international 
comparisons of tax shares frequently used to argue for the existence of large untapped 
revenues, and hence for the legitimate expectations of better TRA and URA performance, has a 
shaky empirical basis. Firstly, due to the fact that the GDP-figures themselves are subject to 
discussion. And secondly, straight tax share comparisons fail to take into account the 
differences between countries with respect to economic structure (e.g. the size of small-scale 
agriculture and the extent of the mining sector), income per capita, urbanisation, tax policies 
etc. (see Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 1997).  
 
The focus by the MoF and the IMF on short-run revenue maximisation is also translated 
directly into a TRA and URA concentration on the larger known taxpayers, as reflected in the 
establishment of large taxpayers departments, which draw resources from the other revenue 
collecting departments within the revenue authorities (Therkildsen, 2002:19). Hence, the 
targets have substantial influence on the way the revenue authority allocates its internal 
resources. Moreover, the failure to reach the externally set revenue targets may have the 
opposite effect on staff motivation than intended (ibid. 20). 
 
In Uganda, we also observe that the relations between the Ministry of Finance and the URA 
have deteriorated over the years as the URA has failed to meet is targets. Hence, the MoF and 
the URA frequently have quite different views about revenue collection targets and the 
analytical basis for these (Therkildsen, 2002). On the one hand, the MoF regards itself as the 
key tax policy maker. On the other hand, the URA has the administrative expertise without 
which realistic target setting and tax policy cannot be met. Thus, when targets slipped in 
Uganda, the conflicts between the MoF and the URA seems to have intensified. In contrast, the 
relations between the MoF and the TRA seem to be more ‘harmonic’ in Tanzania. This may be 
due to the special policy role the Research and Policy Department plays in the TRA of setting 
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revenue targets for the revenue departments, once the total tax revenue budget has been agreed 
with the ministry (see section 3.1.1). 
4.1.3 Managerial autonomy and political intervention 
To operate a tax administration effectively requires that chief executive has some autonomy 
over the setting of organisational goals and recurrent operations vis-à-vis the political system 
and donors. Obviously, it needs ‘adequate’ resources, too, without which autonomy has little 
practical meaning. Fina lly, to secure internal discipline and efficient operations, the chief 
executive needs some control over resources, staff and their use. According to Grindle 
(1997:491), autonomy in personnel matters is crucial. This autonomy implies that an 
organisation can identify positions, advertise for candidates, establish routines for hiring people 
to fill positions, promote staff based on organisationally defined standards, and punish those 
that do not meet them (Therkildsen, 2002b:6). Such autonomy is associated with good 
performance as it facilitates effective chief executive and management practices so that 
performance-oriented norms and behaviours are possible. But, obviously autonomy does not 
assure these outcomes.  
 
Experiences from the revenue authorities in Tanzania and Uganda show that the establishment 
of a proclaimed semi-autonomous authority with comparatively generous remuneration 
packages and substantial budgets has not protected them from political interference. To the 
contrary, as argued by Therkildsen (2002b), it has made the revenue authority (RA) a more 
attractive target because the authority offers both relatively well paid jobs and considerable 
rent-seeking opportunities. Consequently, a revenue authority is vulnerable to political 
interference - especially in personnel matters.  
 
The arguments supporting this observation can be summarised as follows:  
 
1. Politics dominates over law: Legal provisions for organisational autonomy of revenue 
authorities have limited importance in contexts where political elites do not respect 
them.  
2. Autonomy may also contain seeds of its own destruction: RAs have become attractive 
targets of political interference due to both comparatively favourable remuneration 
packages and to rent-seeking opportunities.  
3. Success may help to protect autonomy: Respect for organisational autonomy 
established by law depends to some extent on the success of the tax administration. The 
undermining of, for instance, Uganda Revenue Authority’s autonomy became 
increasingly open once it did not meet its revenue collection targets after 1996.  
4. Inflated expectations may help undermine autonomy: Donors and the Ministry of 
Finance, by pushing for high revenue targets help to undermine the RA’s credibility in 
the eyes of state elites and the public, because such targets create expectations that 
cannot be met.  
5. Autonomous organisations often become easy targets for political blaming: In Uganda, 
for instance, the public denunciation of the URA by high level political figures, the 
president included, has helped to undermine the credibility of the tax administration, 
and hence its capacity to enforce tax laws.  
 
Taken together, these factors may contribute to explaining why the initial success of the RA 
after a period fades somewhat.  
 
  31 
4.2 Incentives 
4.2.1 Principals and agents 
Fiscal corruption is caused by the aggregate effects of numerous decisions by taxpayers, tax 
collectors, administrators, and political decision makers. Individuals respond to the natural, 
cultural, social, political, legal and economic environment that surrounds them. In this section 
we concentrate on economic explanations and consider the key assumptions behind the policy 
recommendations which derive from economic models of organisations. The emphasis is on 
how incentives and disincentives in the tax administration affect tax collectors’ decisions about 
whether to engage in corrupt acts or not.  
 
The revenue authority model, as well as many other New Public Management (NPM) inspired 
public sector reforms, has at its roots the principal-agent theory of incentives and corruption. 35 
In this theory, divergent motivations spur strategic behaviour where agents pursue their 
personal ends, rather than the success of the institution. This is possible due to asymmetric 
information across individua ls. Such informational asymmetries may be significant in a tax 
administration. For example, tax collectors are often more informed about the revenue potential 
of a tax base than is the top management of the revenue authority or the treasury. Tax 
collectors may thus have incentives to exploit these informational advantages to their own 
personal gain, whereas the management has incentives to encourage tax collectors to reveal 
truthfully their knowledge of the revenue potential. By the same token, taxpayers may have 
informational advantages over tax collectors concerning their tax liability.   
 
In models of fiscal corruption, the typical structure of the principal-agent relationship is as 
follows. The principal, in this case the government or the top level of the tax administration, 
hires an agent, i.e., the tax administrator or collector, to collect taxes from a client, i.e., the 
taxpayer. It is assumed that tax collectors (agents) and taxpayers (clients) are motivated by 
narrow self- interest. This implies that their decision to behave honestly or corruptly is based on 
calculations of potential personal gains and losses that may result from their behaviour. 
 
In this setting, the principal faces two informational limitations. The first is that he cannot 
perfectly observe the inclinations of agents to perform corrupt acts. This leads to a problem of 
adverse selection, where some proportion of the agents hired will be corrupt. The second 
limitation is that once an agent has been hired, the principal can only imperfectly monitor his 
performance. The principal cannot tell how much of the outcomes of tax collection he observes 
are due to the agent's efforts. This leads to a problem of moral hazard, in which the agent 
chooses to take bribes or expend little effort on tax collection. Consequently, the principal 
faces two basic challenges: 
1. How to screen and detect opportunists before they are employed, i.e. how to solve the 
problem of adverse selection. 
2. If opportunists are employed, how to design an incentive scheme that makes them choose 
to be honest. 
 
The first question is about recruitment procedures, while the second question focuses on how 
one might use sticks and carrots (incentives) to elicit productive and honest behaviour from the 
agents hired. Though both are important questions, the following chapter 5 mainly addresses 
the issue of incentives. Numerous variables affect the tax collector’s decision to either behave 
                                                 
35This approach builds on Becker (1968) and Becker & Stigler (1974).  
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honestly or corruptly. Box 1 presents a list of some key factors (van Rijckeghem & Weder, 
1997:21). Let us review each of these in turn. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Payment 
A common observation about the wages received by tax collectors in many developing 
countries is that they are so low as to invite corrupt behaviour (Chand & Moene, 1999; 
Mookherjee, 1997). This was also the case in Tanzania and Uganda before the establishment of 
the TRA and the URA. Many scholars, including, Palmier (1983); Gould & Amaro-Reyes 
(1983), and Klitgaard (1988) seem to argue that increasing civil service wages will reduce 
corruption. The basic idea is that a rise in the tax collector's salary is like an increase in his fine 
for bribery, since that is what he will lose if he is caught and fired. And a key element of the 
tax administrative reform in both Tanzania and Uganda was to raise the salary of tax officials 
without parallel increases for the rest of the public sector.  
 
Van Rijckeghem & Weder (1997) provide empirical evidence that wages affect corruption in 
public institutions. They find that corruption seems to be less in countries where bureaucrats 
are relatively well paid compared to private sector employees. However, in order to eliminate 
Box 1 Factors impacting on fiscal corruption 
 
1. Payment: 
- Salary.  
- Fringe benefits, pensions, allowances, other financial incentives. 
2. Controls: 
2.a. Internal control: 
- Supervision and control systems. 
- Standards of performance for employees. 
- Recruitment and selection procedures for personnel. 
- Rules and procedures for tax collection and reporting.  
2.b  External control: 
- General auditor’s independence and capacity. 
- Law and order tradition, checks and balances. 
- Public attitudes about corruption (e.g., public tolerance of corruption and the role of 
civil society). 
- Information made available to the public (e.g., newspapers, media). 
- The judiciary system. 
3. Statutory penalty: 
- The size of penalty (amount of fine, confiscation of wealth, prison sentence). 
- Administrative sanctions. 
4. Public sector regulations: 
- Governmental regulations (e.g., licences, fees, the etc.). 
- The tax law and tax regulations (including tax bases, collection procedures and 
transparency).  
- Statutory tax rates. 
5. Other factors: 
- Parliament and political institutions. 
- The bureaucratic structure. 
- Political and administrative leadership. 
- Concentration of economic power. 
- Education of civil servants. 
- Cultural and ethnical determinants (e.g., the role of social networks and family ties). 
- Development aid organisations. 
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corruption very large increases in salaries are needed.36 Hence, fighting corruption only on the 
basis of wage incentives may be extremely costly to the authorities, and will most likely have 
limited impacts if not combined with other measures such as improved auditing and monitoring 
of tax officers (Besley & McLaren, 1993; Tanzi, 1998). This also reflects the experiences of 
both the TRA and the URA. Despite a dramatic increase in pay rates compared to normal rates 
in the public sector, it was not enough to compensate for the expected gains from corruption. 
4.2.3 Control and penalty 
In addition to wage incentives, tax collectors’ decision whether to behave  honestly or corruptly 
depends on the anticipated costs of the decision. Two variables matter: First, the probability of 
being detected, and second, the size of the penalty. The behaviour of the bureaucrat needs not 
be influenced by a high probability of being detected if the penalty is insignificant. Similarly, 
the size of the penalty may be unimportant if the probability of being detected is minimal.  
 
To increase the probability of detecting corrupt activities, the principal can hire an auditor.37 
The role of the auditor is to reveal the true level of taxes collected for the principal. Thus, the 
goal of the monitoring policy is to identify and report tax fraud. Hiring an auditor, however, 
does not automatically solve the problem. A self- interested auditor may choose to expend little 
effort on detecting tax fraud, or may choose to collude with tax collectors in corrupt activities.   
 
The problem of collusion can to some extent be dealt with by hiring an (external) auditor to 
audit the (internal) auditor (‘hawk over hawk’). And a bonus system linked to the number of 
fraudulent cases reported to the principal may provide the auditors with the right incentives. 
The reward (or bonus) to the auditor detecting fraud must, however, match the potential bribe 
from the tax collector. In a situation where bribes are very large, this may therefore result in a 
very expensive monitoring system. 
 
Lack of effective monitoring systems characterised the situation in Tanzania before the 
establishment of the TRA. A study of the Customs Department in 1996 reports that internal 
auditing and inspections functions had become for the most part non-operative and ineffective 
(Cunningham, 1996). The establishment of the TRA did not manage, however, to root out the 
problem of corrupt monitors. Almost from the outset of the TRA, corruption seems to have 
been entrenched in the Internal Investigation and Monitoring Unit (IIMU) where staff were 
willing to take bribes to turn a blind eye to corruption. Rumours of corruption in the IIMU 
were circulating as early as 1997, but it was not until December 2000 that the TRA 
management and board took action, resulting in 24 IIMU officers, including the head of the 
unit, being ‘retired in the public interest’ (Fjeldstad, 2003).  
4.2.4 Regulations and tax structure 
What impacts do public sector regulations have on the incidence of corruption? Some studies 
argue that a country characterised by large government involvement is more likely to 
experience high levels of corruption (Tanzi, 2000b). The basic argument is that the more 
                                                 
36 van Rijckeghem & Weder (1997) estimate, for instance, that to reduce the corruption level in Ghana and 
Colombia to the low Singapore level, one needs to raise the public sector’s pay by 975 percent and 660 percent, 
respectively. 
37 A paper that carries a lot of insight into the problem of monitoring is Mookherjee & Png (1995). The paper 
studies the optimal incentive arrangement for a bureaucracy in which a pollution inspector must monitor a firm for 
compliance with pollution regulations. The insights of the model can, however, be applied directly to the 
monitoring (and auditing) problem in tax administration if the word "compliance" is taken to mean compliance 
with the tax law instead of with pollution regulations.  
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governments intervene in the economy, the more opportunities for discretionary interpretation 
of regulations and allocation of resources by civil servants. However, the public sector is 
extensive in some of the least corrupt countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden. At the same time corruption seems to have increased in some countries, including 
Tanzania, which have gone through economic liberalisation and privatised public companies. 
According to the Commission on Corruption in Tanzania (URT, 1996), economic liberalisation 
has significantly contributed to increase corruption in the country by facilitating new 
opportunities for culprits. Hence, empirical evidence indicates that it is not the size of the 
public sector, but the way the public sector works that are of importance for the level of 
corruption.  
 
Despite quite comprehensive changes in the tax structure (rates and bases) in recent years, the 
tax systems in Tanzania and Uganda are still complicated and non-transparent. In Tanzania, tax 
legislation is unclear and causes random and partly ad hoc collection procedures (Luoga, 
2002). Assessors are considered to have wide discretionary powers to interpreting tax laws, for 
instance, to allow or disallow expenses or charges, or to exempt import duty on items imported 
(ESRF & FACEIT, 2002, p. 62). Added to this, are weaknesses of legal sanctions to enforce 
punishments on either taxpayers or collectors who do not comply with the law. Furthermore, 
tax enforcement often implies direct physical contact between taxpayers and collectors, since 
many taxes are paid in cash by individuals to tax collectors. 
4.2.5 Bureaucratic and political structures 
In the principal-agent model focusing on the public-sector it is usually assumed that the 
principal plays the determining role in the reform process: The principal selects the agent; sets 
the rewards and penalties of the agent; and affects the moral costs of corruption (Galtung, 
1998). Hence, the principal embodies the public interest, in other words, it is a highly 
principled principal who is representing the public interest (Klitgaard, 1988). It is therefore 
implicitly assumed that the principal is committed to systemic reform, improvements in tax 
collection efficiency and greater integrity in the tax administration. There are (at least) two 
objections to this assumption. First, there may be several principals involved each with 
incoherent objectives and interests. Second, the principal may also be corrupt and not acting in 
the interests of the society but pursuing his or her own narrow self- interests.  
 
The institutional structure of the TRA and the URA is characterised by at least three principals: 
(i) the administrative leadership (management team) of the revenue authority; (ii) the Board; 
and (iii) the Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, some foreign aid organisations and the World 
Bank are heavily involved in the revenue administration with various types of projects and 
capacity building exercises, and may impose significant influence. These principals, 
independently of each other, may try to influence the revenue target and, thus, the actions of 
the tax collectors (the agents). What we may observe is that the principals fail to co-ordinate 
their strategies, either because they do not value the same variables, or because they cannot 
commit to collaborate. The effect is severe weakening of the power of the incentive schemes 
provided to the tax collectors. The more the principals’ interests diverge, the more room for the 
agents’ discretion, and the less effective monitoring and control of the agents.  
 
Moreover, the political and administrative leaders may themselves be corrupt. Hence, the 
principal may to some extent not bother about corruption at lower levels in the public sector. 
The risk of being involved in corruption will then be lowered. In addition, corrupt leaders will 
contribute to reducing the moral and stigma costs associated with corruption. This seems to 
characterise the present situation in the Uganda Revenue Authority. There is a widespread 
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perception within the URA and among donors that several top managers are involved in 
corruption. 38 The ongoing fraud case against the management of URA’s Large Taxpayers 
Department supports this perception. In contrast, the present leadership of the TRA is considered to 
be clean (Fjeldstad, 2003). 
4.3 Patronage and social obligations39 
One cannot understand the logic and practices of Tanzanians and Ugandans vis-à-vis the state 
and the wider economy without examining how local histories, institutions, and moralities have 
shaped the political economy of the two countries. As in much of Africa, it is common that 
people in these countries identify themselves with their kin group and their ancestral 
community (Geschiere & Gugler, 1998). This sense of identity and the moralities that are tied 
to it both shape and are shaped by a political economy structured by patron-clientilism. 
Community, family, or kin interests rather than the market define values governing economic 
activity in what could be considered a ‘moral economy’ (Tripp, 2001a:5). 
 
Particularly important for negotiating one’s way in contemporary East-Africa is what natives 
refer to as the ‘having people’. By this is meant people – especially kinspeople – strategically 
placed across the social and economic landscape to get access to opportunities and resources 
(see Smith, 2003:706). Generally, kinship and other social relationships of reciprocity are used 
to mobilise affective ties for instrumental political and economic purposes (see chapter 7). 
Such relationships combine moral obligation and emotional attachment. They also serve to 
perpetuate an ethic of appropriate redistribution that fuels corruption (see Olivier de Sardan, 
1999). The importance of such ties may be growing rather than withering away as the countries 
try to modernise and democratise in a context of economic instability and uncertainty. Thus, 
many people rely on the social connections of their extended families to secure admission to 
schools and to paying school fees, to gain employment, to be awarded a business contract, or to 
benefit from government services.40  
 
Patron-clientilism is fuelled and sustained by obligations to ‘home’ and ‘home people’ – that 
is, people of the same kin group or community of origin (Smith, 2003; Bayart, 1993; Chabal & 
Daloz, 1999). Chabal & Daloz (1999) are perhaps most prominent in their emphasis on the role 
of clients in fuelling the corruption that characterises political economies structured around 
patron-clientilism. They argue that politics in Africa must be understood as driven by vertical 
ties of patronage on which power is maintained by redistributing resources accumulated 
through ‘corruption’ to clientilistic networks according to rules of reciprocity that have their 
origin in a kinship-based social organisation and morality. According to Chabal & Daloz 
(1999:27), the peoples’ reference unit remains family- and kin-based. It is the fundamental 
‘circle of trust’ within which individuals operate. Moreover, political elites seek to establish 
principles of mutual aid, of patron-client reciprocity, based on kin and family relations.  
 
Central to Chabal & Daloz’s argument is the assertion that patron-clientilism is structured in 
such a way that the whole society is invested in a system that privileges informal, personal ties 
over ‘rational’ Weberian bureaucratic rules and regulations. Thus, while we in the West tend to 
think of modernity as privileging individuality and increasing the atomism of individuals vis-à-
vis the extended family and the community, this is, in many respects not the case in 
contemporary Africa. Since the nature of personhood is often grounded in relationships with 
                                                 
38 Personal interviews with URA staff, Kampala, March 2003 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). Request for anonymity is 
respected.  
39 This section draws on chapter 2 in Andvig & Fjeldstad (2001) and Smith (2003). 
40 According to one observer interviewed, the Ugandan society is ‘ruled by school fees’.  
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family, kin-group and community of origin, the motives of individual actors are tied to the 
interest of the social groups to which they belong (Smith, 2003:707).  
 
How do these general arguments fit observations from the URA and the TRA? In the Uganda 
Revenue Authority, but also in the TRA, patronage runs through networks grounded on ties of 
kinship and community origin. As such, people recognise the benefits of large extended 
families and strong kinship ties, even as their social and economic aspirations may be 
unambiguously modern. This implies that such social relations rules out the formal 
bureaucratic structures and positions. For instance, according to some informers, one of the 
Commissioners in the URA is fully controlled by a lower ranking official in her department, 
because this person is ranking above the Commissioner in the kinship system. 41 The traditional 
system rules over the formal ‘modern’ one. Fiscal corruption may therefore, to some extent, be 
understood in the context of a political economy in which access to social resources depends 
on patron clientilism.  
 
For instance, when someone gets a job in the tax administration, perceived to be a well paid 
job, it is expected that he/she helps his/her kin and family. According to a previous staff 
member of the TRA, there is a general perception among many people in Tanzania that TRA-
officers have high salaries.42 This attracts extended family members who expect to get their 
share of the high wages. It is your social obligation to help and share. TRA and URA staff are 
therefore seen by their family members and social networks as important potential patrons who 
have access to money, resources, and opportunities that they are morally obliged to share. A 
person in a position of power is expected to use that influence to help his or her kin and 
community of origin. Hence, increased salaries may lead to increased social obligations, which 
again may ‘force’ tax officers to take bribes to compensate for the higher expenses. What looks 
like corruption from outsides, is undertaken by some tax officers in a context where the 
reciprocal obligations of kinship and community loyalty require such behaviour in order to be 
regarded as a ‘good person’. The standard definition of corruption as ‘the abuse of public office 
for private gain’, thus, assumes a rigid dichotomy between public and private that glosses over 
a complexity that characterises the relationship between the individual and society in Africa. 
 
To accumulate then, even by corrupt ways, is not necessarily bad in itself. It is accumulation 
without distribution which is considered unethical (Barber, 1997). Only someone who 
accumulates, can redistribute, the entering point to an identity as ‘man of honour’ or ‘big man’. 
In a recent interview, Annebritt Aslund, General Commissioner of the URA, gives the example 
of two URA employees from the same family. One of them is honest, the other is corrupt. The 
one who has not accumulated more than he could from his official wage, is, according to her, 
‘regarded a fool by the society’ and earns no respect what so ever.43 He can not offer needy 
relatives or friends any assistance to speak of. In their eyes his un-corrupt attitude is not only 
foolish but in essence selfish.  
 
Moreover, it is in the tax officer’s own interest to help others because he/she might be the one 
who need help in the next time around. Thus, a manager in the tax administration may ‘forgive’ 
a tax collector who is caught taking bribes or embezzle money, because next time he/she may 
be the one who needs forgiveness (see Tripp, 2001: 5). This may explain why several corrupt 
tax officers in both the TRA and the URA have not been sacked, but instead are transferred to 
other positions within the tax administration. Favours of this kind may also be understood as a 
                                                 
41 Personal interview, Kampala, March 2003 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). Request for anonymity is respected. 
42 Personal interview, Dar es Salaam, 23 March 2001 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
43 Telephone interview, Kampala, 29 November 2002 (Siri Lange).  
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way of consolidating and building social capital. In other words, tax officers are building up 
networks made up of family, friends, and acquaintances that are based on trust and reciprocity 
as a way of banking assistance in the future. The larger the network, the greater the 
accumulation of social capital that can be drawn on in a future time of need (see Tripp, 2001: 
6). Thus, one possible explanation for the persistent corruption in the URA (and the TRA) may 
be due to the fact that people at the middle and low end of the political-economic spectrum, are 
just as involved in vertical networks of patronage as the elite patrons who benefit the most.  
 
Why do people continue to depend so greatly on their kin?  Smith (2003: 707) argues that one 
of the reasons is that the state is ‘unreliable’ when it comes to delivering basic services and 
assistance through formal channels. The manipulation of kinship and other social relationships 
that invoke moral obligations and affective ties is, therefore, a rational endeavour that enables 
everyday people to get access to social resources that they might otherwise be denied. Yet it is, 
in part, the very demands of the clientilistic networks to deliver public resources, including 
employment, based on moral obligations and affective attachments that make it almost 
impossible for officeholders to run offices in accordance with Weberian principles.  
4.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has discussed key assumptions behind the recent reforms of tax administrations in 
Tanzania and Uganda. Present controversies on public sector reforms, the redefinition of 
government roles, efficiency and accountability have been explored. The discourse is not about 
the need for reforms, but about how and what type of reforms. While advocates of the 
principal-agent model conceive it as a device for improving efficiency and responsiveness, 
some scholars argue that there is little in the principal-agent model and the more general New 
Public Management (NPM) adoption of more competitive and business- like practices that is 
appropriate for the politicised revenue administrations in poor countries.  
 
What impacts have NPM had on efficiency, accountability and corruption control? There has 
been no systematic evaluation of the outcomes of NPM inspired reforms in developing 
countries. The most comprehensive overview is offered by Batley (1999). Batley summarises 
the experiences that have emerged from a range of new approaches to service delivery in South 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South America during the period 1994-99. His conclusion is that 
the effects of the reforms have been mixed at best with some improvements in efficiency and 
mixed effects on equity. Moreover, according to Batley’s review, public sector reform 
programmes pushed by donors and emphasising technocratic solutions, have led to increased 
managerial power without a strengthening of the accountability of the managers to politicians 
and the public.  
 
More recently a number of case studies of executive agencies conclude that outcomes of the 
reforms with respect to efficiency and accountability also have been mixed. Studies of semi-
autonomous revenue authorities in sub-Saharan Africa find that after an initially successful 
period characterised by a sharp increase in reported revenues and a decline in perceived 
corruption, the success has not been sustained (Devas et al., 2001; Fjeldstad, 2003; Hadler, 
2000; Therkildsen, 2002). In several countries, including Tanzania and Uganda, tax revenue is 
now dropping in percentage of GDP and fiscal corruption seems to be on the rise again (see 
chapter 1). 
 
How do we explain the many disappointing developments? Critics of the NPM-approach (e.g.,  
McCourt & Minogue, 2001) argue that institutional change can only be brought about by a 
political process, i.e., by the complex interplay of various groups (including politicians, 
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bureaucracies, trade unions, economic pressure groups, etc.) who are motivated by economic 
interests but also by their traditions, ideologies and psychological investments. Because NPM 
has a higher political content than most other policies, the way it is introduced, the forms it 
takes, and the sequencing that is used, determine its success or failure as much as or even more 
than the substance of the policy. An understanding of these mechanisms is essential, not least 
for making relevant policy advices. However, economic theory and recent empirical work by 
economists also provide important insights on the shortfalls of principal-agent and NPM-
inspired reforms. Let us illustrate this point by focusing on four issues:44 (i) job motivation and 
group dynamics; (ii) above-the-market salaries; (iii) performance contracts; and (iv) job 
security. 
 
1. (i) Job motivation: The general theory of incentives assumes that an agent gets utility 
solely from the money income the principal pays her or him, and disutility from the effort 
she or he exerts on behalf of the principal. However, there are many indications that 
reformers and, in particular, economists have an inclination to exaggerate the impact of 
economic incentives (see Dixit, 2000; Frey, 1997). In reality, agents often get utility from 
some aspects of the job itself. This in turn can define the organisational culture of the 
agency for a long time. Another non-monetary factor motivating agents is professionalism, 
which naturally goes together with career concerns. Thus, James Wilson (1989:47) argues 
that “[t]he principal challenge facing public managers is to understand the importance of 
carefully defining the core tasks of the organisation and to find both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary incentives that will induce operators to perform those tasks as defined”. 
2. (ii) Above the market wage rates: Significant, above-market rate wages in specific public 
institutions (e.g., a revenue authority) in order to reduce shirking and corruption, may 
actually have the opposite implication in some situations, and make a fertile ground for 
corruption and rent seeking (see Huther & Shah, 2000). In a high-corrupt environment, 
attractive jobs are likely to be sold. Thus, by inflating the wage levels in some public 
institutions new forms of corruption may arise, for instance in the form of info rmal markets 
for attractive positions. 
3. (iii) Performance contracts: One of the most extensive empirical studies of how 
performance contracts works in developing countries is entitled Bureaucrats in business, 
published by the World Bank (1995). The study focuses on incentive schemes for managers 
in state-owned companies in 12 developing countries. It finds that performance contracts 
either did not improve performance or, in some cases, exacerbated the incentive problems. 
Why? First, they did not reduce the agents’ information advantage. Instead agents were 
able to use their knowledge to negotiate soft targets that were easy for them to reach. 
Second, such contracts rarely included rewards and penalties that could motivate the agents 
to put more effort into their jobs. For instance, when bonuses were offered they had little 
effect because they were not linked to better performance. Third, the leadership (i.e., the 
principals) proved little commitment to the terms of the contracts, giving the agents 
incentives to use their information advantage to negotiate soft targets. 
4. (iv) Job security: The rationale behind high public-sector wages, according to the 
elementary theory of incentives, is to reduce the asymmetric information problem which 
also makes it difficult to prove that any agent is involved in a corrupt act. Hence, the 
demands for proof are likely to be relaxed if the probability of being detected is to increase. 
This means that the standard principal-agent approach requires that the security of 
employment for public officials has to be lowered. However, this approach weakens one of 
the Weberian principles for creating an honest, non-corrupt and efficient government, 
                                                 
44 These issues are further explored in chapter 5 and chapter 6. 
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which also is supported by historical experiences from Germany and the Nordic countries 
(Rothstein, 1998), and more recently in an econometric study by Rauch & Evans (2000) on 
bureaucratic structure and performance in a sample of developing countries. Here it is 
shown that increased job insecurity for public officials goes together with increased 
corruption.  
 
Hence, recent economic research on incentives and public sector organisations seems to 
converge – to some extent – with the position taken by critics of the NPM-approach: The 
current fad of market simulation in the public sector, aimed at improving the efficiency and 
reducing corruption, may, at least in some circumstances, have the opposite result. It should, 
however, be acknowledged that the theoretical arguments behind several of the Weberian 
arguments of public management have still not been developed to the same extent as the new 
public management arguments in microeconomic theory. Rauch & Evans’ (2000) study on 
bureaucratic structure and performance is a partial exception, and Dixit’s (2000) survey of 
incentives in the public sector indicates that the days of simplistic copying of private 
management ideas have passed. 
 
The severe limits of the principal-agent model needs to be recognised. Still, there should be no 
disagreement about the necessity for tax administrative reforms. A major cha llenge today is 
how to break out of the bureaucratic decline characterised by weak incentives and lack of 
legitimacy. We also need to improve our understanding of why fiscal corruption has become 
endemic in some countries. Thus, research on fiscal corruption in poor countries should look 
beyond the formal structures of the central state to the informal networks of patronage and 
social domination that often determine how political power actually is wielded. 
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5 Autonomy and corruption 
5.1 Introduction 
The traditional way of organising central government tax collection is to let it be handled by  
units within the Ministry of Finance. In many developing countries, Tanzania and Uganda 
included, the integration of the revenue departments in the Ministry of Finance resulted in a 
high degree of political interference into matters of revenue collection (Fjeldstad, 2002; 
Therkildsen, 2002). The establishment of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in 1991 and 
the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) in 1996, as separate agencies outside the respective 
Ministries of Finance, was in part done to limit political interference into matters of tax 
collection. This chapter focuses on the effects of autonomy on corruption and tax collection 
efficiency, and discusses the changes in autonomy that have been observed since the 
introduction of the URA and the TRA. 
 
Limiting political interference, or increasing autonomy, is in effect the same as increasing the 
authority of the revenue collection department at the expense of the Ministry of Finance. The 
separation of tax collection functions from the Ministry can therefore be regarded as a standard 
problem of delegation, where some authority is transferred from the Ministry to the revenue 
authority. 45 The basic trade-off in standard delegation problems is between sharpened focus 
and enhanced efficiency of the agent given greater autonomy, and less control over and 
coordination with the autonomous agent. In other words, an autonomous revenue authority 
might collect taxes more efficiently, but its insulation from political control, good or bad, also 
makes abuses of autonomy possible. Moreover, with autonomous agencies there is less 
coordination of civil service activities, which implies that potential gains from coordination are 
forgone. 
 
This chapter discusses these pros and cons of autonomy in more detail. In section 5.2, the 
impact of increased autonomy on the efficiency of revenue collection is examined. The main 
argument is that autonomy provides the freedom to use incentives in a way that promotes the 
objectives of the revenue authorities (Devas et al, 2001). Moreover, there might also be a link 
between autonomy and a beneficial organisational culture, as argued by Grindle (1997). 
However, for autonomy to affect efficiency in any significant way, it must be real rather than 
nominal. While the URA and the TRA may have been given a degree of autonomy over their 
decisions, the ability to effectively exercise their autonomy is restricted by lack of resources. In 
particular, this is the case for the URA. Moreover, there is evidence that the actual autonomy of 
these institutions has been undermined in recent years. 
 
Section 5.3 takes a closer look at the effect of agency autonomy on the coordination of civil 
service activities. In particular, the impact of autonomous agencies on the level of bureaucratic 
corruption, is discussed. Under certain conditions, one can show that creating autonomous 
agencies increases corruption in the civil service, as measured by the level of bribes demanded 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). A fragmentation of the civil service might also lead to the 
proliferation of regulations, as each civil service unit seeks new ways of extracting rents. 
Though these arguments might to some extent be relevant for the reorganisation of a tax 
administration, we argue that the perspective does not fit the issue of tax evasion very well, and 
                                                 
45 See Bendor et al (2001) for a review of game theoretic models of delegation. 
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that ascertaining the implications for tax administration efficiency therefore requires a different 
approach. 
 
Though a lack of control over revenue authorities can be costly in terms of creating new 
opportunities for rent seeking, there are also situations where it is advantageous to relinquish 
control over a set of decisions. Specifically, in a context where a government institution takes 
action to elicit a response from other agents, but would reverse its action once the response had 
been elicited, rational agents (e.g., taxpayers) would not respond to the initial action of the 
government institution unless the institution could credibly commit to that action. For instance, 
in the case of a tax administration, a policy change stating that taxes will from now on be 
collected more fairly and efficiently, would not increase tax compliance since the taxpayers 
would most likely not trust the administration to live up to its promise. However, creating an 
autonomous revenue authority, thereby curtailing political interference, could be viewed by 
tax-payers as a credible commitment to improving tax collection efficiency and fairness, and 
hence increase tax compliance.  
 
Section 5.4 discusses revenue authorities as a commitment device, and suggests that even in 
the absence of increased compliance, revenue authorities might serve this purpose if the civil 
service is sufficiently fragmented and the Ministry of Finance cares sufficiently about total 
revenues collected. It is suggested that a perspective of this kind explains several important 
aspects of the evolution of revenue authorities, notably why the revenue authorities were 
established with so little opposition from the institutions involved, and how the initial success 
of the revenue authorities may have undermined their autonomy by creating new opportunities 
for rent seeking. 
5. 2 Autonomy, incentives and organisational culture 
A basic implication of autonomy is that it expands the freedom to use incentives to promote the 
objectives of an organisation. 46 The civil service in developing countries is often quite rigid in 
its adherence to rules and formalities, too short on resources to recruit motivated and skilled 
staff, and unreceptive to the idea of increasing pay differentials to reward performance. 
Through the creation of autonomous revenue authorities, these institutions have more of an 
opportunity to run their affairs in a business- like manner, free from the constraints of the civil 
service system (Devas et al., 2001). The institutions have more latitude in introducing pay and 
bonus structures to motivate, retain and recruit staff, and hiring and firing mechanisms to 
promote efficiency. Autonomy can thus be seen as a facilitator of improved management in 
public organisations. 
 
Autonomy can also have a more direct effect on management, by potentially simplifying the 
environment in which an institution operates. Devas et al (2001:212) argue that an autonomous 
agency “as a single purpose agency, … can focus its efforts on a single task”. In other words, 
where a tax administration integrated into the Ministry of Finance adheres to the murkier and 
more general objectives of the civil service, an autonomous revenue authority can focus 
explicitly on its fundamental objective of collecting taxes. Moreover, by limiting political 
interference in day-to-day operations, the structure of interaction with other parts of 
government is simplified, which means that less time and resources are spent on infighting and 
positioning within the civil service. Among other benefits of autonomy, Devas et al. (2001: 
215) include flexibility in budget management, protection from budget cuts, control over 
buildings and equipment, and ability to take legal action. 
                                                 
46 Incentives are discussed more thoroughly in chapter 6.  
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Grindle (1997) suggests that autonomy in personnel matters facilitates an organisational culture 
conducive to improved public sector performance. Based on a study of 29 public institutions in 
six developing countries, Grindle finds that the best performing organisations were 
characterized by a strong mission focus, performance-oriented management practices, high 
performance expectations and autonomy in personnel matters. From the way in which these 
characteristics tended to go together, Grindle (1997:488) argues that autonomy is a “facilitating 
condition that provided organisations and managers the ability to build cultures that allowed 
particular organisations to rise above the norm for public sector organisations”. Though these 
ideas are interesting, the data and methods used by Grindle are at best indicative of a link 
between autonomy and other success factors. The dataset is too small to offer any statistically 
valid conclusions, and the empirical analysis is done in a too simplistic manner to really prove 
the hypothesis. 
 
Whether autonomy actually leads to improved management and in turn to improved 
performance, depends on a number of factors. One key factor is whether autonomy is extensive 
and real, rather than limited and nominal. At their inception, both the TRA and the URA were 
given a significant degree of formal autonomy. The composition of the Board and of the top 
management was also suggestive of a substantial degree of real autonomy (see chapter 2). In 
Uganda, foreign nationals were also recruited to top management positions, with a Ghanaian as 
Commissioner General. In Tanzania, nationals recognized for their integrity were appointed as 
Chairman of the Board and Commissioner General, while top management were mostly 
recruited from outside the tax administration. 
 
Some of the actions taken initially are also indicative of a substantial degree of autonomy. For 
instance, the proportion of TRA staff dismissed on evidence or suspicion of misconduct was a 
whopping 35% in 1995/96 when all former staff members of the old tax administration had to 
reapply for a position at the TRA, and a brisk 11% in the year that followed (Fjeldstad, 
2002:8). Though a slightly different process was used at the URA, it is estimated that 240 out 
of 1700 staff members, i.e. 14 %, were dismissed in the initial screening of employees 
(Therkildsen, 2002:10). 
 
However, the quite extensive use of dismissals in the initial phases has not been sustained. In 
Tanzania, dismissals have in later years dropped to less than 2% of the staff total. In Uganda, 
failure to meet revenue targets has lead to changes in the formal autonomy of the URA. In 
particular, the MoF has secured a greater representation (three of seven members) on the 
Board. There are also examples of direct Ministry interference into staff decisions 
(Therkildsen, 2002:20). On the whole, autonomy has proved hard to maintain, as the Ministry 
and the Board have become increasingly involved in the day-to-day operations of the Revenue 
Authorities in both Tanzania and Uganda. 
 
As for monetary incentives, Revenue Authority staff initially saw a rise in their salaries to 
about ten times civil service salaries, both in Tanzania and Uganda. However, given the 
extremely low levels of civil service pay, this rise might not be sufficient to make tax officials 
desist from taking bribes (Fjeldstad, 2003). The limited nominal wage increases in later years, 
only serves to underscore this point. So even if one does postulate that incentives of this kind 
can have an impact on performance, the incentives offered might simply be too small to have 
much of an effect on behaviour. In other words, if the formal autonomy of the Revenue 
Authority is not backed up by sufficient funds, the real autonomy of the Authority in effecting 
changes in staff behaviour is constrained. 
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5.3 Autonomy, civil service co-ordination and the level of bribes 
Changing the organisational structure of the tax administration has implications not only for 
how the administration orders its own internal affairs, but also for the way in which it interacts 
with other parts of the civil service. While an autonomous Revenue Authority may have a 
sharper focus due to less political interference, the downside of this is that it may take a narrow 
view of its activities, disregarding its place in the wider civil service context. In particular, an 
autonomous Authority could be less inclined to align its activities with those of the Ministry of 
Finance, where the activities of the two conflict or where there is a need for coordination. And 
vice versa, the Ministry might be less eager to assess the impact of its policies and practices on 
the Authority. To use an example, the Ministry might impose new taxes that the Revenue 
Authority is ill equipped to collect, or the Authority might effectively kill a tax reform by 
devoting insufficient resources to its implementation. There is an element of strategic 
interaction between institutions which comes to the fore when a separation is effected. 
 
To discuss how a reorganisation of the tax administration affects the interaction of institutions, 
and in turn the efficiency of the civil service, we need a basic conceptual framework. In the 
words of Shleifer & Vishny (1993), a reorganisation of this kind would amount to a change in 
the market struc ture in the supply of government goods. Shleifer & Vishny study a situation in 
which different government agencies supply complementary permits to private agents. In other 
words, a private agent needs a permit from each of the agencies to do business. Examples given 
are of an importer needing several licences and permits, obtained from different agencies, to 
bring in, unload, transport and sell an imported good, or a builder needing several permits from 
different departments, such as fire, water and police. 
 
Since each agency has discretion in the supply of its permit, it is in a position to extract bribes 
from private agents needing the permit. The bribe paid by private agents is thus akin to a price 
for the permit. In this setting, integrated agencies are analogous to a monopolist selling 
complementary goods, while two separate agencies constitute a duopoly with complementary 
goods. Shleifer & Vishny show that the level of bribes is higher in the case of separate 
agencies than when agencies are integrated. In other words, creating autonomous agencies may 
increase the bribes demanded by agency officials. 
 
The intuitive reason for this result, is fairly simple. If one agency raises the bribe demanded for 
its permit, fewer private agents will be willing to pay the bribe to obtain the permit. But since 
permits are complementary, these same agents will not be willing to pay for the permit offered 
by the other agency, since a permit from one agency is no good without a permit from the other 
agency. Raising the bribe for a permit issued by one agency, thus reduces demand for the 
permit issues by the other agency. When two agencies are integrated, they decide on their bribe 
levels jointly, taking into account the effect that bribes taken for one permit have on the 
demand for the other permit. The agencies, thus, choose the bribe levels that maximize their 
total bribe revenues, which they share among themselves. 
 
When the two agencies are separate entities, each does not take into account the impact of their 
bribe level on the demand of the other agency. Since the agencies operate independently and 
receive only the bribe revenue extracted by means of their own permit, bribe decisions are not 
disciplined by the fact that demanding higher bribes is detrimental to the revenue of the other 
agency. And without this joint discipline in setting bribe levels, both agencies will demand 
higher bribes for their permits than in the case where they are integrated. The level of bribes is 
therefore expected to be higher with autonomous agencies, than with integrated agencies.  
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A consequence of this is that the total bribe revenues of the agencies are lower when they are 
autonomous than when they are integrated. In other words, autonomy entails a loss in bribe 
revenues for the agencies. Again, the reason is that each agency keeps raising bribes even when 
their own added revenue is lower than the revenue lost by the other agency due to lower 
demand. Thus, separate agencies raise bribe levels beyond the point where total bribe revenues 
peak. 
 
The problem is made even worse if independent agencies have the power to introduce new 
permits or licences, in other words if there is “free entry into the collection of bribes” (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1993:606). If it is not too costly to do so, agencies might then impose any number of 
permits to increase their share of the total bribe revenues, and we get what we might term a 
proliferation of permits. However, as an increasing number of bribes must be paid to do 
business, the private sector would be even less inclined to pay for the package of 
complementary permits needed to conduct business. As a result, total bribe revenues collected 
by the government agencies decrease. Once more, the uncoordinated actions of the agencies, 
where each agency does not take into account the negative effect one more permit has on the 
demand for the permits of other agencies, produces a situation in which all agencies lose. 
 
This general perspective on autonomous agencies is in some ways relevant to the specific case 
of tax administration reorganisation, and in other ways less directly applicable. In a sense, 
settling your tax liabilities or getting tax exemptions is similar to receiving a permit that allows 
you to keep doing business. Failure to satisfy the requirements of the tax authorities, entails 
costly penal sanctions and in the end foreclosure. Unmet tax liabilities also constitute a 
powerful signal to creditors, suppliers and customers that something is amiss, which makes 
transactions more costly if at all possible to conduct. 
 
Perceiving tax exemptions or settlements as permits, nevertheless entails one important 
deviation from the perspective of Shleifer & Vishny (1993). In providing tax exemptions, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Revenue Authority provide not complementary permits, but 
permits that are substitutes. A company that bribes an official of the Revenue Authority not to 
be audited, which amounts to a de facto tax exemption, does not need to bribe staff at the 
Ministry of Finance to get an exemption, and vice versa. A company needs an exemption from 
one agency or the other, not from both. 
 
If tax exemptions are substitutes, the implications for bribe levels under integrated and separate 
agencies are reversed. While integrated agencies collude to keep bribes at a level that 
maximizes total bribe revenue, separate agencies are in direct competition for bribes from the 
private sector. It is therefore rational for the private sector to buy tax exemptions from the 
agency that demands the lowest bribes. This puts a downward pressure on the level of bribes, 
and if the degree of competition is sufficiently strong, bribes may decline towards zero. For 
substitutable tax exemptions, then, autonomous agencies entail lower bribe levels than 
integrated agencies.  
 
The impact of autonomy on the total bribe revenues collected by the agencies, is qualitatively 
the same as in the case of complementary permits. By competing for bribes from the private 
sector, autonomous agencies hurt each other’s revenues as they keep lowering bribe levels. The 
total bribe revenues are thus lower in the case of separate agencies than when agencies are 
integrated. However, the private sector benefits from competition between agencies, since the 
bribes paid are lowered by a separation of agencies. In this case, private sector activity is 
therefore higher with autonomous agencies than with integrated agencies. 
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There might, however, exist complementarities between tax exemptions and other types of 
permits provided by the agencies involved. If in addition to an effective tax exemption from the 
Revenue Authority, a company needs to register with or obtain additional permits from the 
Ministry of Finance to conduct its affairs, the arguments from the analysis of complementary 
permits are applicable. Whether a separation of the tax administration from the Ministry of 
Finance on the whole raises or lowers bribe levels, thus depends on the existence or 
introduction of permits complementary to tax exemptions. An important point to consider is 
whether the two agencies will attempt to introduce new permits and regulations to recoup some 
of the bribe revenue lost in their separation. 
 
The above analysis of how a reorganisation of the tax administration affects the market 
structure in the supply of government goods provides useful insights. However, on a couple of 
points, the basic model presented does not seem to fit the particular context of Revenue 
Authorities in Tanzania and Uganda very well. Firstly, the establishment of Revenue 
Authorities in these countries was marked by a noticeable absence of protests from the 
institutions involved (Therkildsen, 2002). This does not fit well with the present model, 
according to which these institutions stand to lose from a separation, whether permits are 
substitutes or complements. If separation is to their disadvantage, one would expect the 
institutions to oppose the reorganisation. 
 
Secondly, there is some doubt as to whether integrated agencies in countries like Tanzania and 
Uganda would actually coordinate their actions. Though the tax administration was previously 
organisationally integrated into the Ministry of Finance, there is still the possibility that the 
Ministry was fragmented in terms of its decisions, and thus unable to collude in setting bribe 
levels. Shleifer & Vishny in fact suggest that the idea of collective bribe decisions fits some 
East Asian countries and previously Communist regimes, whereas African countries and post-
Communist transitional countries are characterized by a more fragmented supply of 
government goods. On a more general level, collusion can be enforced more easily when 
changes in bribes can be detected easily and punished heavily (Stigler, 1964). In turn, detection 
is easier where there is an effective monitoring system, where the ruling elite is small and 
society is closely knit. Punishment is more effective where rents are large, and these can be 
confiscated easily. African countries fail to meet at least a few of these criteria, which makes 
collusion harder to enforce. We return to the issue of a fragmented civil service in the next 
section. 
5.4 Autonomy, commitment and compliance 
In certain situations, an institution can benefit from tying its own hands, leaving certain 
decisions to agents outside its control. In particular, when government institutions have the 
discretion to revoke an action after it has been taken, a certain kind of pathology in its 
interaction with other agents might arise. For instance, a government may give investors a tax 
break to spur investment, yet once investors make their investments, the government would 
benefit from raising taxes again. Rational investors would understand the government’s 
incentive to raise taxes after investments have been made, and would thus desist from making 
investments. The result is that the initial action of the government does not spur a response 
from the private sector, since sustaining the initial action is not a credible government strategy. 
As a consequence of the government’s inability to commit to an action, both the government 
and the private sector may lose.  
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There are, however, several ways in which to get out of this impasse, in terms of several 
commitment technologies a government can utilize. One possibility is to leave decisions of this 
kind to an agent outside government control, which effectively takes away government 
discretion. If the agent has different statutes or preferences than the government, it can be in 
the agent’s interest to stick to the action needed to elicit a private sector response. In turn, the 
private sector will perceive sustained action as credible, and invest or act accordingly. An 
independent agency thus has more success in eliciting the desired response, and the 
government therefore benefits from relinquishing discretion in situations where policies can be 
revoked. 
 
This argument is in fact what underlies the creation of autonomous central banks in many 
countries. Consider a government with the dual objective of keeping unemployment and 
inflation low. If the government determines monetary policy, it will want to signal a tight 
monetary policy, to keep workers and businesses from raising wages and prices, and thus keep 
inflation low. But given a private sector decision not to increase wages and prices, the 
government would benefit from a more expansionary mone tary policy, since the level of output 
would thereby increase, and unemployment decrease. Rational private sector agents understand 
this, and therefore increase wages and prices to fit the expected monetary policy rather than 
that signalled. A promise to keep monetary policy tight is thus not credible, and as a 
consequence we get higher inflation without any increase in economic activity, which does not 
sit well with government objectives. However, by leaving monetary policy to an autonomous 
central bank, whose sole objective is to curtail inflation, the government can credibly commit 
to a low inflation policy, and thus improve its situation. 
 
Given the centrality of the commitment idea to the creation of autonomous agencies in other 
areas of government, it is surprising that this perspective has by and large been absent from the 
discussion of tax administration reforms. One recent exception, however, is Taliercio (2001), 
who discusses the link between autonomy, commitment and tax compliance. The basic point of 
departure is that taxpayers base their decision whether to comply or not on the perceived 
competence, effectiveness and fairness of the current tax administration. 47 Accordingly, in 
countries with an incompetent, ineffective and unfair tax administration, we can expect low 
compliance rates. A government wanting to increase compliance rates therefore has an interest 
in reforming the tax administration. However, a reform is costly in terms of investment in 
personnel and equipment, in addition to the foregone opportunities of patronage and other 
discretionary use of the tax administration. 
 
Any promised or attempted reform will be met with suspicion among the taxpayers, who will 
assume that the reform be discontinued if tax compliance increases. A promise to sustain 
reform is simply not credible in the eyes of taxpayers, and will thus have little or no impact on 
their compliance rates. To increase taxpayers’ compliance in this situation, some sort of 
commitment technology is needed. Taliercio (2001) argues tha t the establishment of 
autonomous Revenue Authorities is a convincing means of commitment, by affecting 
taxpayers’ perceptions of the tax administration in three different ways. Firstly, Revenue 
Authorities signal a more competent tax administration, where improved quality of taxpayer 
services (e.g. simplicity and help in filling out tax declarations) reduces the compliance costs 
for taxpayers. Secondly, an autonomous Revenue Authority is more effective in detecting non-
compliance, and less prone to outside influence in the enforcement of tax regulations. Thirdly, 
                                                 
47  See also Fjeldstad & Tungodden (2003) for a discussion on the impacts of fiscal corruption and on taxpayers’ 
compliance.  
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a Revenue Authority will be fairer in its treatment of individual taxpayers, and in taxing 
taxpayers in similar situations equally hard. 
 
The fact that service quality, effective detection and fairness are factors which influence tax 
compliance, is well established in the literature on compliance (see, e.g., Levi, 1988; Andreoni 
et al., 1998; Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001). Taliercio (2001) goes on to test empirically which 
features of a tax administration produce a perception of the administration as competent in 
delivering services, effective in detecting non-compliance and fair in its administration of 
taxes. Three broad indices are used as explanatory variables: (1) Organisational Autonomy; (2) 
Service Delivery; and (3) Political and Policy Environment. Each of these three broad indices 
is an aggregate of several narrower indices.  
 
· The Index of Organisational Autonomy (1) consists of three narrower indices: (i) 
Managerial autonomy which reflects how and by whom management are appointed and 
dismissed, and the tenure of managers. (ii) Personnel autonomy which captures how 
and by whom hiring and firing and remuneration decisions are made. And (iii) financial 
autonomy, which addresses the funding of the tax administration, i.e. whether it is 
funded by a percentage of its proceeds or by the Ministry. 
· The Index of Service Delivery (2) is an aggregate of four narrower indices, capturing 
(a) the ease with which a tax declaration can be submitted, (b) the diffusion and 
simplicity of new regulations, (c) the availability of tax information, and (d) the quality 
and effectiveness of audits and sanctions. 
· Finally, the Index of Political and Policy Environment (3), consists of two narrower 
indexes measuring the general credibility and performance of government, and the 
simplicity and fairness of tax policy. 
 
To test which of the broader and narrower indices have an impact on perceptions of tax 
administration competence, effectiveness and fairness, Taliercio (2001) uses survey data from 
200 large corporate taxpayers and professional tax consultants in four Latin American 
countries (Peru, Venezuela, Mexico and Bolivia, the first three of which have implemented 
Revenue Authority reforms). The results show that the broad indices of Organisational 
Autonomy (1) and Service Delivery (2) are significantly associated with perceptions of 
competence, effectiveness and fairness, whereas the Political and Policy Environment (3) has 
less of an impact. Based on the estimated coefficients, organisational autonomy matters the 
most for perceptions of fairness, while service delivery matters more for perceptions of 
competence and effectiveness. 
 
Using the narrower, more detailed indices as explanatory variables of perceived competence, 
effectiveness and fairness, provides the following results. 
 
Table 12: Explaining perceptions of competence, effectiveness and fairness 
 
Competence depends on Effectiveness depends on Fairness depends on 
· Information 
provision 
· Personnel autonomy 
· Tax payment services 
· Audits and sanctions 
· Political environment 
· Financial autonomy 
· Personnel autonomy 
· Managerial autonomy 
· Regulations 
 
Source: Adaptation of table 4 in Taliercio (2001) 
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The table orders the statistically significant variables in each case, ranked by their importance 
as measures by the estimated coefficients. In other words, information services is the most 
important variable for perceptions of tax administration competence, the quality of audits and 
effectiveness of sanctions matter the most for perceived effectiveness, and personnel autonomy 
is the variable with the greatest influence on perceived fairness. The results by and large 
confirm the previous findings that (1) Organisational Autonomy is vital for perceptions of 
fairness, whereas different aspects of (2) Service Delivery matter the most for perceptions of 
competence and effectiveness. 
 
Taliercio’s results provides a detailed perspective on the variables that make a tax 
administrative reform credible in the eyes of taxpayers, and thus gives important policy advice 
on how to increase tax compliance through tax administration design. Yet, the study says less 
about the impact of creating a Revenue Authority than Taliercio purports. The empirical 
approach attempts to explain certain perceptions of tax administration activities by reference to 
other perceptions of tax administrative activities, and, therefore, does not explicitly consider 
how actual differences in the implementation or organisational design of Revenue Authorities 
affect their credibility. Since the data for the study stems from countries that differ in whether 
and how a Revenue Authority has been implemented, it should be possible and would have 
been preferable if the study instead of perceptions, used institutional variables as explanatory 
variables. Moreover, a particularly troubling aspect of the study is the use of service quality as 
both a dependent and independent variable. Since competence is essentially measured by 
service quality, the result that service delivery is the most important variable for competence 
seems tautological, and probably introduces a bias in the results obtained for other variables, 
such as autonomy. 
 
In both Tanzania and Uganda, the formal autonomy awarded the TRA and the URA upon their 
inception, and the degree to which this autonomy was exerted in the initial phases of their 
existence, could very well have had a favourable impact on taxpayers perceptions of their 
operations, and hence possibly on compliance rates. In particular, the initial increases in wages 
and the extensive use of dismissals arguably would be easily observable indicators of a high 
degree of personnel autonomy. Similarly, the appointment of Board and management from 
outside the tax administration (and in the Ugandan case from abroad), and the recruitment of 
individuals publicly recognized for their integrity, would be a signal of a high degree of 
managerial autonomy. The initial reforms could therefore be expected to have had an impact 
on taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness and competence in collecting taxes. 
 
However, failure to sustain the initial reform efforts has in both countries provided a powerful 
signal to the contrary. The fact that nominal wages in the Revenue Authorities have been 
stagnant until recently, and that the use of dismissals has decreased substantially, point to a 
decreasing degree of personnel autonomy. Increasing Board and government interference in 
staffing matters has a similar effect, and also signals a lesser degree of managerial autonomy. 
Moreover, managerial autonomy has been substantially undermined by the increasing use of 
tax exemptions granted by political leaders in Tanzania, and by the politically motivated 
appointment of new Board members in Uganda (Fjeldstad, 2003; Therkildsen, 2002). Several 
instances of political interference in the operations of the TRA and URA have been heavily 
featured in the local press. There is thus reason to believe that any initial improvement in 
taxpayer perceptions due to the Revenue Authority reforms has been reversed in later years. To 
the extent that taxpayers were able to foresee this backlash, the reforms might not have had 
much of an impact on tax compliance in the first place, which indicates that any initial rise in 
tax revenues would be attributable to other factors. 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
The failure to sustain autonomy in Revenue Authority reforms may reflect the particularly 
difficult problem of credible commitment in these matters. A reform in the tax administration 
is not only costly to sustain in terms of increased pay and the purchase and maintenance of 
equipment, the costs of foregone opportunities for patronage and discretion in matters of 
taxation, are probably at least as important to the delegating institutions. And arguably, the 
more successful a Revenue Authority is in increasing tax revenues, the higher are the costs of 
foregone patronage, since higher revenues provide more opportunities for embezzlement. In 
the words of Therkildsen (2002:1), a successful Revenue Authority may be “a more attractive 
target [for political interference] because the authority offers both relatively well paid jobs and 
considerable rent-seeking opportunities”. Paradoxically, then, the success of the Revenue 
Authority model might contain the seed of its failure. 
 
If the government and the Ministry of Finance in particular, believes that the creation of a 
Revenue Authority will increase tax compliance, one can understand why there was not much 
dispute over the implementation of these reforms in the countries in question. However, as 
previously argued, if taxpayers foresee the gradual reversal of the reform, one would expect the 
Ministry of Finance to be equally rational, and understand that an autonomous Revenue 
Authority would not constitute a credible commitment to sustained reform, and hence would 
not increase tax compliance. Explaining the creation of autonomous Revenue Authorities as a 
means to greater compliance, thus raises some fundamental questions which cast doubt on the 
soundness of the argument. 
 
There is also another way in which one could explain why it would be in the interest of the 
Ministry of Finance to establish a Revenue Authority outside its control. If the tax 
administration is organisationally integrated into the Ministry, but the two are fragmented in 
the sense that they make their decisions independently, then their individual decisions on bribe 
levels may incur costs on the other party. In this situation, if the Ministry cares sufficiently 
about the level of tax revenues that ends up in Treasury coffers, and the tax administration is 
sufficiently inefficient, it can be in the interest of the Ministry to limit its own ability to extract 
bribes. In other words, if the bribes to be had are small, the Ministry may be willing to trade off 
these bribes for an increase in tax revenues. Again, this requires commitment, as Ministry staff 
will otherwise be tempted to return to past practices. Unfortunately, even with these motives 
for creating an autonomous Revenue Authority, if the reform has the added effect of increasing 
the tax administration’s efficiency or compliance rates, the increased opportunities for rent-
seeking could lead the Ministry to seek a reversal of the reform. 
 
In summary, the initially quite substantial degree of autonomy awarded revenue authorities in 
Tanzania and Uganda has in recent years been undermined. One way in which to understand 
these recent developments is to consider the strategic interaction of the institutions involved 
and their interaction with the taxpayer community. In particular, the problem of credible 
commitment to sustained tax administration reform seems particularly difficult to resolve. 
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6 Incentives and corruption 
6.1 Introduction 
A key part of setting up Revenue Authorities in Tanzania and Uganda was the introduction of 
new incentive schemes for tax administration officials. Tax administrations integrated into the 
Ministry of Finance are often hampered by civil service restrictions on pay levels, and rigid 
regulations and procedures. Hence, a core idea behind the introduction of semi-autonomous 
Revenue Authorities is their freedom to use pay and incentive structures to improve the degree 
to which organisational objectives are met. In particular, pay increases can be used to improve 
the motivation of staff and attract qualified staff members, less compressed pay structures 
could facilitate the recruitment of qualified personnel to higher level positions, and bonuses can 
be used to increase productivity in terms of revenues collected. And moreover, occupational 
misconduct and corruption can be made less attractive through the use of increased monitoring 
and staff dismissals. In other words, a Revenue Authority can be run more along the principles 
of a private business, as compared to a tax administration confined by the codes of the civil 
service (Devas et al., 2001). 
 
The initial years of existence of the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and its Ugandan 
counterpart (URA), were characterized by extensive reform of the incentive structures. 
Fjeldstad (2002:8) reports a dramatic increase in pay rates in the TRA, “for some categories of 
staff up to ten times higher than corresponding positions in the civil service”. Similarly, in 
Uganda in 1991, “URA staff got 8-9 times as much as other public servants” (Therkildsen, 
2002:11). In both countries, replacement of higher level officials provided credible signals of 
an anti-corruption stance. In Tanzania, most executive positions were filled by managers 
recruited from outside the tax administration. In Uganda, the first Commissioner General 
appointed was a foreign national. The Revenue Authority reforms were also used as an 
opportunity to significantly change and to reduce staffing. In Tanzania all former staff 
members were dismissed and had to reapply for positions in the TRA, upon which almost 1200 
staff members were not reemployed, a third of the total tax administration work force. A less 
dramatic approach was used in Uganda, where the entire staff was placed on probation at the 
inception of the URA, and approximately 250 out of 1700 staff members were dismissed. 
 
The introduction of Revenue Authorities in Tanzania and Uganda initially appeared to have a 
favourable impact on productivity and performance, measured by tax revenues to GDP. There 
also appears to have been a reduction of corrupt activity in the tax adminstrations. However, in 
subsequent years the performance of the TRA and URA seem to have stagnated or 
deteriorated, with corruption on the rise again (see chapter 1). It is of course hard to isolate the 
impact of incentive structures on the evolution of TRA and URA performance, other factors 
might have had a more significant impact on the trends observed (Fjeldstad, 2003). 
Nevertheless, by analysing what incentive-based reforms are meant to achieve, how such 
reforms should be designed to be effective, and the extent to which the actual Revenue 
Authority reforms in Tanzania and Uganda were appropriately designed, we can get an idea of 
whether the reform of incentive schemes has contributed to the observed trends. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 defines incentive-based reforms, and provides 
a general discussion of the various measures that fall into this category. Section 6.3 focuses 
more explicitly on pay and bonus incentives, and shows how the effects of these are intimately 
linked to other measures such as monitoring and sanctions. The main point of this section is 
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that for pay and bonus reforms to be successful, one must consult the basic models of 
economic incentives, and consider whether other important assumptions or conditions of these 
models are met. Section 6.4 introduces an additional complication, by discussing how the 
effect of economic incentives might be affected by the organisational structure of a tax 
administration. For instance, incentives to lower level tax officials may have a limited impact if 
corruption at higher levels is rampant. Section 6.5 gives voice to the claim that simple 
economic models of incentives often ignore important behavioural traits of human beings, such 
as reciprocation, the desire for social approval, or intrinsic motivation. In the presence of such 
motives, monetary incentives may backfire. On the upside, however, these motives can also be 
exploited to heighten the effect of incentive reforms. Section 6.6 concludes by arguing that a 
great number of factors must be considered in the design of successful incentive reforms, and 
the failure to do so might explain some of the observed trends in revenues collected. 
6.2 Incentive-based reforms 
The conceptual framework which underpins the idea of using incentives to influence 
behaviour, is the principal-agent model (see Das-Gupta & Mookherjee, 1998; Fjeldstad, 1999). 
In this model, a principal delegates a decision or action to an agent, who may or may not share 
the objectives of the principal. In the case of taxation, the principal might be viewed as the 
Ministry of Finance, the Government or society at large. The decision that is being delegated is 
the collection of taxes. And the agent to whom the decision is delegated is the tax 
administration or Revenue Authority (composed of tax officers). The basic problem 
highlighted by the model is that an agent, who does not share the objectives of the principal, 
might perform the delegated action in a way that fulfils his own private objectives rather than 
those of the principal. In terms of taxation, tax officers might exert little effort in collecting 
taxes for the government, or might choose to focus on collecting the taxes that offer the 
greatest potential for bribes. 
 
Against this backdrop, the princ ipal might attempt to bring the actions of the agent more in line 
with the preferences of the principal, by rewarding actions that benefit the principal and 
punishing actions detrimental to the principal. In other words, the principal can use carrots and 
sticks, or incentives, to elicit the desired behaviour from the agent. For tax administration staff, 
an example of a carrot would be a bonus awarded if revenue targets are met, and an example of 
a stick would be being fined or fired for accepting a bribe. If we focus purely on corruption, 
Rose-Ackerman (1999:39) defines incentive-based reforms as “reforms that reduce the benefits 
or increase the costs of malfeasance”. In short, the idea is to make corrupt acts less attractive 
by reducing the gains and increasing the pain from such acts. 
 
On a general level, a number of measures can be taken to reduce the benefits and increase the 
costs of corruption. Rose-Ackerman (1999) suggests structural reform of the civil service, 
reform of the criminal law, and reform of public procurement as three general measures to 
curtail public sector corruption. Among structural reforms, Rose-Ackerman proposes 
elimination or simplification of regulations, privatisation of public institutions, and the 
introduction of competition in government services. Several of these are relevant to a tax 
administration. Simplifying the tax code or eliminating certain taxes altogether, can 
significantly decrease the opportunities to extract bribes. Reforms along these lines have been 
attempted in developing countries in recent years, sometimes with paradoxical results.48 
Outsourcing of tax administration is also an option. In Mozambique, the assessment and 
                                                 
48 Fjeldstad (2002:7) cites an example from Tanzania, where a ‘revision’ of customs regulations (‘customs 
handbook’) produced a volume of guidelines and rules three times as large as the previous one. 
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collection of customs duties were managed for some years (1997-2001) by the private British 
company Crown Agents. Private management of the tax administration is also raised as a 
possible approach in other countries, including Uganda). 
 
As general reforms of the kind just discussed appear extrinsic to the establishment of the TRA 
and the URA, we do not elaborate on them. Instead, we focus on incentive-based reforms that 
are part and parcel of the TRA and URA reforms. Monetary incentives aimed at tax 
administration staff to improve performance and reduce corruption, are of particular interest in 
this respect. The next section discusses when we can expect incentives in the form of pay 
increases or bonuses to have an impact on performance. Besides the direct motivational aspects 
of monetary incentives, we also discuss how these incentives affect recruitment and, thus, staff 
composition. 
6.3 When do pay increases and bonus systems work? 
The idea that pay increases can have an effect on tax collectors’ performance can be traced to 
two basic economic models. The first is the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), 
elaborated by Besley & McLaren (1993), which basically says that paying high wages makes 
keeping a job more valuable to workers, and they will, therefore, exert more effort. The second 
model is the fair wage model of Akerlof & Yellen (1990), according to which workers provide 
more effort if they perceive wages to be fair. Each of the two models provides conditions under 
which pay increases result in significant increases in performance. To get an idea of whether 
the pay increases following the TRA and URA reforms can be expected to have an effect on 
staff performance and corruption, a useful place to start is to see whether the critical conditions 
of the two respective models are met. 
6.3.1 The shirking model and the role of incentives 
In the shirking model of Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984), workers can choose to perform their job at 
a high or low level of effort. If a worker supplies low effort, i.e. if he shirks, there is a 
probability that he will be caught and fired. If fired, the worker faces a spell of unemployment, 
and the higher the level of unemployment in the economy, the longer is this spell of 
unemployment. So, in deciding what level of effort to put in, a worker weighs the disutility of a 
high level of effort against the possibility of a loss in wages if he supplies a low level of effort 
and is fired. By raising wages, employers can make the loss from shirking and being fired 
greater, and thus make supplying a high level of effort more attractive. If wages are raised to a 
sufficiently high level, the expected loss in wages from shirking will be greater than the 
disutility incurred in exerting a high level of effort, and workers will choose not to shirk.  
 
Now, how high wages need to be in order to make tax officers choose to provide a high level of 
effort, depends on several factors. In particular, it depends on the probability of being caught 
and fired if shirking, and on how long a period of unemployment a tax collector faces if fired. 
The less efficient the monitoring of the collector’s effort, i.e. the less probable that one will get 
caught if not shirking, the higher must wages be to induce a high level of effort. In other words, 
the less risky shirking is, the more a tax officer must stand to lose in the improbable event that 
he is caught shirking. The lower the level of unemployment, i.e. the shorter the period a 
collector does not have a paying job, the higher must wages be to make tax collectors provide a 
high level of effort. In other words, if a fired tax officer can find another job quickly, wages 
must be high for him to perceive a brief spell of unemployment as an undesirable event. From 
a slightly different angle, a given pay increase has less of an impact on the collector’s 
  53 
performance, the lower is the probability of being fired for shirking, and the lower is the level 
of unemployment. 
 
This provides one interesting perspective on why the initial pay increases in the TRA and URA 
may not have had a sustained effect on staff performance. Though the increases in pay were 
substantial, both compared to earlier levels, and to civil service averages, they might not have 
translated into enhanced performance if low effort was not effectively penalized or dismissed 
staff could easily find other employment. Looking at trends in employment at the TRA and 
URA, the initial shake-outs in which a large proportion of staff were dismissed, have not been 
sustained in the years following the establishment of the Revenue Authorities (Fjeldstad, 2003; 
Therkildsen, 2002). This seems to indicate, and could also send a signal to TRA and URA 
staff, that dismissals are not as extensively used to discipline unproductive staff behaviour as in 
the initial phases. Thus, there is reason to believe that staff perceive the risk of being fired for 
misconduct as dwind ling. 
 
Though the levels of unemployment in Tanzania and Uganda are quite high, this might not be 
directly relevant to former staff of the TRA and URA seeking employment. It has been pointed 
out that former Revenue Authority staff is attractive to the private sector, due to their 
knowledge of how the tax administration works and their connections in the tax administration 
(Fjeldstad, 2002; Bjorvatn et al., 2002). The time a sacked tax official spends in unemployment 
might therefore be relatively short. Taken together, the dwindling probability of being fired, 
and the ease with which former tax officials can get new employment, suggest that pay 
increases in the Revenue Authority would have to be large to elicit more effort from staff. If we 
add the fact that pay has failed to be adjusted for increased prices, i.e. that real wages have 
been falling in recent years (see chapter), we have one explanation of why any initial 
improvement in TRA and URA performance has not been sustained. 
 
Besley & McLaren (1993) propose a model of corruption in tax collection that builds on the 
model of Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984). In this model, a proportion of tax collectors is corruptible 
and choose between taking bribes and not taking bribes. A tax collector that takes bribes is 
caught and fired with a certain probability. Tax collectors, thus, compare bribes received to the 
expected loss from being fired, when deciding whether or not to take bribes. Again, an increase 
in wages means that losing your job is more costly, and therefore makes taking bribes less 
attractive. If wages are sufficiently high, all corruptible tax collectors will choose not to accept 
bribes. How high wages have to be to deter bribe taking, now depends on the level of bribes 
and the probability of being caught and fired when a bribe is accepted.49 The higher the bribes 
received by corrupt officials, the higher must the wages be to deter corruption. And once more, 
the lower the probability of being sacked for corruption, the higher are the wages needed to 
make tax collectors desist from taking bribes. Therefore, a given pay increase has less of an 
impact on corruption if bribes are high and the risk of being caught low, than in the opposite 
case. 
 
This offers additional insight into the evolution of corruption in the TRA and URA. As 
frequently noted, the bribe levels in certain parts of the tax administration are very high 
compared to wages. URT (1996) states that “For a [customs official] who is used to get bribes 
of TSh 20-30,000 daily, a ten fold increase of his salary from the present level will not make 
him desist from demanding and accepting bribes”. As for the probability of being sacked for 
corruption, one can note again that the initial wave of dismissals has not been sustained. In 
                                                 
49 Besley & McLaren (1993) assume that fired workers are reemployed at market wages, so unemployment does 
not play a part here, though one could easily fit this idea into the model. 
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addition, the appointment of executives known for their integrity in the initial stages of the 
reform has been undermined by recent examples of politically motivated appointments and 
interference into Revenue Authority affairs. A perception of a more lenient attitude towards 
corruption might thus have formed among TRA and URA staff. The initial pay increases in the 
TRA and URA might consequently not have had much of an impact on corruption, and the 
subsequent decline in real wages has most likely eroded any initial impact. 
6.3.2 The fair  wage model 
A very different model of worker motivation is the fair wage model discussed by Akerlof & 
Yellen (1990). This perspective posits that workers supply less effort the more wages fall short 
of what they perceive to be fair wages. In the present context, several variations on this 
perspective are possible. According to one interpretation, workers are concerned with equity, 
they want a reasonable return for the effort they put in, or they will not put in any effort. In the 
words of Akerlof & Yellen: “When people do not get what they deserve, they try to get even” 
(p. 256). Getting even here might mean providing less effort, is might also mean being more 
corrupt. On a second interpretation, civil service employees in poor countries might receive 
pay insufficient for subsistence. In this case, effort is of necessity diverted to other sources of 
income, or bribes are taken to supplement the official civil service salary. There is ample 
anecdotal evidence that bribes are perceived as income supplement for poorly paid civil service 
staff, indeed this kind of bribe taking seems to be morally condoned in many cases.50 
 
According to the fair wage model, the initial boost in pay rates for Revenue Authority staff 
should result in increased effort and reduced corruption, by moving pay rates closer to a 
perception of equitable wages, or by reducing the need for additional bribe income. However, 
the subsequent failure to maintain the new wage levels in real terms, implies a reversal of effort 
and corruption. On the first interpretation of the fair wage model, a wage increase followed by 
a wage decrease might even produce less effort and more corruption than if wages had been 
constant, if the tax collector’s perceptions of fair wages are adjusted upward with rising wages. 
Finally, in a wider civil service context, rising wages in one department could imply that the 
staff of other departments view their own wages as even more unfair, with detrimental 
consequences for civil service morale.51 
6.3.3 Empirical studies of the importance of civil service wages 
Empirical studies of the effect of civil service wages on bureaucratic corruption show mixed 
results. A prominent study by van Rijckeghem & Weder (2001) shows that across countries, 
increased civil service wages (rela tive to manufacturing wages) has a statistically significant 
negative effect on corruption. In other words, countries with higher civil service wages exhibit 
less corruption, on average. The effect is economically significant; an increase in the ratio of 
civil service wages to manufacturing wages from 1 to 2, implies a decrease in the corruption 
index by 0.5 points. However, within countries, no statistically significant impact of wages on 
corruption is found. For a given country, one can therefore not see any impact of pay reform in 
the civil service on the level of bureaucratic corruption. Hence, the authors conclude that 
increasing civil service pay does not decrease corruption in the short run. 
 
The results of van Rijckeghem & Weder also address the question of whether the shirking 
model or the fair wage model is the appropriate model of behaviour. Under the fair wage 
model, one would expect corruption to be rather more responsive to small wage increases than 
                                                 
50 See Andvig & Fjeldstad (2001:86). 
51 See Minogue et al. (1999) for a discussion of civil service fragmentation. 
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under the shirking model. The authors estimate that civil service wages must be 2 to 8 times 
manufacturing wages for corruption to be eliminated. Based on calibration results for the 
shirking and fair wage models, it is argued that this range is too high for the fair wage model to 
hold, and too low for the shirking model. The results thus do not support either model in its 
pure form. This conclusion should perhaps be accepted with caution, given the fact that 
corruption may be made more responsive to wages in the shirking model, if corruptible agents 
have different attitudes towards corruption. Since the shirking model provides clear conditions 
under which wages reduce corruption, a more direct way to test this model would be to interact 
the wage variable with other variables (such as proxies for monitoring or unemployment) and 
test for statistical significance. 
6.3.4 Bonus systems and targets 
The idea behind using bonuses to improve civil service performance and reduce corruption, is 
rather more straightforward than the elaborate models linking pay to performance. In a general 
principal-agent setting, bonuses improve the performance of the agent by making the right sort 
of effort more rewarding in monetary terms. There are different ways in which to fashion a 
bonus system. One important distinction in this context is between individual and group 
bonuses. With individual bonuses, each tax officer is rewarded for his individual effort. The 
upside to this bonus system is the direct link between what a tax officer does and what he 
receives, possible downsides are opportunism and a lack of coordination between collectors, as 
each pursues the tasks that are most rewarding. With group bonuses, tax collectors are 
rewarded for the performance of a group as a whole. The upside is greater coordination of 
tasks, the downside a possibility of free-riding behaviour, as each officer sees only a marginal 
effect of his own effort on his bonus. Which of the two systems is chosen, depends on several 
factors, of which an important one is the ease of monitoring individual versus group output. 
 
In the case of the URA, the bonuses that have been used appear to have been more of the group 
bonus type.52 Performance is then gauged in terms of a revenue target, which is revised 
annually by the Ministries of Finance. There seems to be an implicit link between the 
fulfilment of this target and budgeting and autonomy of the Revenue Authority. In Uganda, a 
10% bonus to staff was paid when revenue targets were met in 1998. However, in most years 
since their inception, the Revenue Authorities have fallen short of the revenue targets. There 
seems to be a feeling that revenue targets are set unrealistically high, based on desired 
government expenditure levels, rather than the ability to tax (Therkildsen, 2002). A sustained 
upward revision of revenue targets could prove detrimental to staff motivation. Moreover, one 
could ask whether revenue targets in terms of revenues to GDP is too broad a measure of 
performance. For individual staff members, the perceived ability to influence the percentage of 
revenues to GDP is likely limited, and bonuses based on this performance measure thus might 
not have much of an effect of staff effort and corruption. If group bonuses are to be used, 
bonuses awarded according to departmental revenues may provide a closer link between effort 
and reward. 
 
The general drift of this section is that TRA and URA pay reforms are likely to have had little 
impact on staff performance and corruption, since the conditions under which pay would affect 
performance do not seem to hold. Whatever bonus systems which have been introduced have 
been too general to provide effective incentives for individual staff members. Besides pay and 
bonuses, there are of course other types of quasi-monetary incentives relevant to a discussion 
of the TRA and URA. Promotion policies based on merit would be one, similar in effect to a 
                                                 
52 The TRA has not introduced a bonus scheme, yet. 
  56 
bonus. Though some effort has been made to improve hiring and promotion practices, 
however, there are still strong indications of internal markets for positions in the Revenue 
Authorities (Fjeldstad, 2003). The impact of pay structures on the composition of staff is also a 
subject which requires consideration. Given the decreasing real wage levels of tax collectors, 
there is a risk that mainly persons willing to supplement their wages through bribes are 
recruited to the Revenue Authorities. 
6.4 Incentives in hierarchical organisations 
The principal-agent relationship underlying the basic economic models of wage and bonus 
incentives, assume an extremely simple organisational form. In reality, civil service 
organisations are complex hierarchies, with several tiers of management above tax collectors, 
and a Commissioner General and a Board at the top. Thus, in reality one has a more 
complicated structure of interaction than that captured by the simple principal-agent model, 
where the decisions made by one level of the hierarchy has implications for other levels. In 
particular, corruption at higher levels may have consequences for corruption at lower levels. 
This in turn implies that incentives may have a different effect on lower level corruption, 
depending on the degree of corruption at the higher level. 
 
Chand & Moene (1999), referring to the Ghanaian tax administration, examine these questions 
more closely in a model of a two-tiered tax administration. In this model, tax collectors choose 
the level of effort with which they audit corporate taxpayers. If a taxpayer is found to 
underreport profits, the tax collector bargains with the taxpayer for a bribe. The bribe in a sense 
gives the tax collector the incentive to exert effort in auditing taxpayers; the higher the bribe, 
the more can a tax collector earn by uncovering tax evasion, and the more effort does he exert 
in auditing books. For the taxpayer, more effort on the part of tax collectors implies a higher 
probability of being detected for evading taxes, which provides an incentive for reporting more 
of his profits (income). Finally, in the event that a tax collector uncovers tax evasion, both the 
taxpayer and the collector can appeal the finding to higher level tax officials, a certain 
proportion of whom is corrupt. 
 
Consider the introduction of a bonus to tax collectors in this setting, where the bonus is a 
percentage of revenues collected. This would have the following effects. When uncovering tax 
evasion, a tax collector can expect to earn more from reporting this finding to his superiors 
than he would in the absence of a bonus. In turn, this implies that the taxpayer would have to 
pay a higher bribe to make the tax collector desist from informing his superiors. A higher bribe 
means that tax collectors will work harder to uncover tax evasion. In turn, if tax collectors 
work harder to detect evasion, corporate taxpayers will find it profitable to report more of their 
profits. Therefore, the introduction of a bonus system for tax collectors increases the amount of 
profits that is declared to the government. 
 
The quantitative impact of a bonus on reported profits depends, however, on the proportion of 
corrupt higher level officials. The more corruption at the higher level, the less of an impact will 
a bonus have. This is best explained by considering the case in which all higher level officials 
are corrupt. The taxpayer can then always pay off a high level official, and a tax collector thus 
cannot increase his bonus payments by reporting evasion to his superiors. Hence, the 
introduction of a bonus does not affect the bribes a tax collector can extract. And if bribes are 
not affected by the introduction of a bonus, neither is the level of effort a tax collector exerts in 
auditing taxpayers. By implication, no change in the probability of detection means that 
corporate taxpayers will not report more of their profits. In the extreme case of perfect 
  57 
corruptibility of higher level officials, then, the introduction of a bonus will have no effect on 
reported profits. 
 
The basic insight to be gained from this model is that the introduction of a bonus system for tax 
collectors, may have greater costs in terms of bonus payments than benefits in terms of added 
tax revenue, if corruption at higher levels is rampant. The evolution of higher level corruption 
in the URA makes this argument an important one to consider. While at their inception, great 
care was taken to staff top management positions with individuals known for their integrity and 
independence, there seems to be a reversal to past practices of political appointments in recent 
years. In particular, this seems to be the case on the URA. However, also in the TRA it has 
been suggested that the initial reduction in corruption indicated that higher level corruption was 
dormant rather than dead. Moreover, higher level corruption may have been masked by the fact 
that higher level officials let junior staff do more of the dirty work (Fjeldstad, 2003). A failure 
to root out higher level corruption might thus have softened the impact of new incentive 
schemes on tax collection performance. 
6.5 Incentives and human behaviour 
The models of incentives presented above take a simple view of human motivation and the 
effect of monetary incentives. In particular, it is assumed that the relationship between the size 
of the monetary payoffs and the effort provided is a simple increasing one. In other words, 
workers always prefer more money to less money, and adjust the ir behaviour accordingly. A 
host of experimental studies suggests, however, that human behaviour is governed by a far 
more complex set of preferences, even in purely economic settings (Fehr et al., 2002). Humans 
appear to exhibit preferences not only for their own well-being, but also for that of others, 
reflected in acts of altruism, reciprocity, or conversely spitefulness. Moreover, a range of 
situation specific properties appear to influence economic decisions; some tasks are 
intrinsically valuable to an agent and will be performed even in the absence of a monetary 
payoff; assets come to have a higher value if owned as compared to similar assets about to be 
purchased, and so on. 
 
The presence of a wider set of motives implies that the relationship between monetary 
incentives and staff performance need not be a simple increasing one. A simple albeit extreme 
example in which the relationship is not increasing, is if tax officers are motivated by 
spitefulness. In this case, an attempt to elicit more effort by offering to pay more money will 
have the exact opposite effect, as tax officers choose to work less on tasks that their employer 
flags as important. In this section we focus on three motives that have been demonstrated to 
have a significant impact on workers’ behaviour in organisations; (1) reciprocity, (2) the desire 
for social approval, and (3) intrinsic motivation. We attempt to extract the relevant implications 
of these motives for the design of incentive schemes in public organisations such as the TRA 
and the URA. One main insight is that the effect of monetary incentives depends on the way in 
which the incentives are presented; another is that the presence of other motives can in some 
cases be used to strengthen the effect of incentives on performance. 
6.5.1 Reciprocity 
A motive of reciprocity implies that an agent responds in a friendly way to actions he perceives 
as friendly, while actions signalling hostility are met with hostility. In terms of monetary 
incentives, an incentive that is perceived as benign produces more effort than one that is 
viewed as malicious. Using a different set of terms, incentives that signal that an employer 
trusts a worker implies that workers reciprocate by honouring that trust.  
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A range of experimental studies suggest that reciprocation is indeed an important motive in 
labour relationships. Fehr et al. (2002) summarises some of these, with a view to establishing 
how reciprocity affects the impact of monetary incentives. A first experiment reviewed gives 
employers an opportunity to stipulate a fine if workers are caught shirking. From the shirking 
model presented earlier, one would think that increased punishment for shirking would produce 
more effort from workers. However, compared to a baseline experiment in which no fine is 
available, the possibility of stipulating a fine significantly decreases worker effort. A second 
experiment substitutes a fine for the possibility of stipulating a reward. An interesting 
observation is that the second experiment is rigged in such a way that the payoffs are the same 
as in the first experiment.53 The stipulation of a reward actually increases effort as compared to 
the first experiment featuring a fine, despite the fact that the economic payoffs to workers are 
the same in both cases. In other words, framing a monetary incentive as a bonus rather than a 
fine, leads to substantially more effort. The interpretation is that a bonus (giving something) is 
perceived by workers as a friendly gesture from employers, whereas a fine (taking something 
away) is seen as a hostile act or a signal of distrust. 
 
However, both the reward and the fine experiments produced less effort than the baseline 
experiment in which no reward or fine was available. This raises the question of whether an 
employer can elicit more effort from workers by refraining from using incentives at his 
disposal. An additional experiment with a slightly different slant, suggests that having the 
ability to impose a fine and choosing not to do so, increases effort as compared to a case in 
which no fine is available. The interpretation here is that having sanctions at your disposal that 
you vow not to use, signals a high level of trust in your staff, and makes them honour your 
trust. 
 
The experiments cited so far have the common feature that fines, rewards etc are stipulated in 
advance, i.e. before an employee chooses his level of effort. In other words, an employer binds 
himself to a certain action if shirking is later discovered. A final set of experiments allows the 
employer discretion in rewarding or punishing workers after they have chosen their level of 
effort. In other words, if a worker is observed to be shirking, an employer can choose whether 
or not to fine him after the fact. The results show that the opportunity to reward/punish after 
the fact increased worker effort substantially compared to the baseline case without bonuses or 
fines. One explanation of this result is that workers work hard to induce a reciprocal response 
(a bonus) from their employers. Note the different impact of a fine when it can be imposed 
after shirking is discovered, as opposed to being stipulated in advance. While effort is 
decreased if a fine is stipulated before workers choose effort, effort increases if a fine can be 
imposed after workers have chosen their level of effort. An explanation for this difference 
could be that stipulating a fine in advance introduces hostility into the employer-worker 
relationship. 
 
Given motives of reciprocity in staff, monetary incentives should be framed as rewards rather 
than sanctions, and be used to discipline actual behaviour rather than to discourage potential 
misbehaviour. Though the TRA and the URA introduced positive incentives in terms of pay 
increases and bonuses, these were stipulated in advance, and thus might lead to less effort 
rather than more according to the above sets of arguments. Moreover, as these incentives were 
introduced to improve on an organisational performance presented as dismal, they might be 
                                                 
53 In the second experiment, you get a base salary a if you shirk, you get a+r where r is the reward if you do not 
shirk. In the first experiment, you get a base salary b=a+r if you do not shirk, and a salary minus a fine, b-f=a if 
you do. 
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perceived as distrustful towards TRA and URA staff, despite their positive spin. As for other 
types of incentives, the wave of dismissals initially and their subsequent discontinuation might 
be seen as unpredictable politically motivated events rather than fair punishment for misdeeds. 
The idea of letting rewards or punishment be imposed after the fact rather than being stipulated 
in advance, might not be a viable option in the TRA and URA, if there is a suspicion among 
staff that these incentives will not be justly administered. 
6.5.2 Social approval 
The desire for social approval is another motive with important implications for the employer-
employee relationship. That social approval is an important motive in many settings has been 
suggested by a series of public goods experiments, in which it turns out that agents contribute 
more to a public good if the contributions are public rather than anonymous, and even more if 
agents are allowed to punish each other for failing to contribute. However, the desire to punish 
others for failing to contribute might be related to ones own contribution. Thus, very different 
norms may form with this kind of motive. On the one hand, if everyone contributes to the 
public good, everyone punishes free-riders, and a high-contribution norm is enforced. On the 
other hand, if no one contributes, no one punishes free-riders, and a low-contribution norm 
arises. 
 
Fehr et al. (2002) suggest that “social norms pervade the employment relationship”, and review 
a series of experiments that suggest that very different norms evolve under different payment 
regimes for workers. In a piece rate regime, where workers are paid per unit of output, workers 
tend to develop effort-withholding norms. The reason is that if workers work too hard, the rate 
per piece of output might decline, leaving all workers worse off. In other words, if one worker 
increases his effort, all other workers are affected negatively. So to avoid this workers enforce 
a norm against supplying too much effort. By contrast, under a team compensation scheme, an 
effort-enhancing norm often forms. In this case, a worker affects the compensation of other 
workers negatively if he shirks. Thus, workers will enforce a norm under which shirking is 
punished. 
 
The motive of social approval therefore suggests that a compensation scheme might have a 
greater impact on performance if pay is based on group rather than individual performance. For 
the revenue authorities, bonus incentives are to some extent linked to performance, measured 
as the ratio between tax revenues and GDP. However, an important condition for the right 
norms to develop in the above way is that a norm can be enforced. Since the bonus scheme at 
the URA in 1998 were based on performance of the Revenue Authority as a whole, the great 
number of staff involved suggests that effective norm enforcement is unlikely. Once more, 
compensation based on the performance of smaller organisational units might be desirable. 
Finally, since we know that corruption networks use many of the same mechanisms to enforce 
participation as those mentioned above, it is important to determine whether the strengthening 
of group coherence through the design of incentives is necessarily a good thing. 
6.5.3 Intrinsic motivation 
A final motive deemed important for labour relationships is that of intrinsic motivation. Frey 
(1997) suggests that in performing many tasks, humans are driven by an interest in the task 
itself rather than monetary incentives. Frey also suggests that being offered monetary 
incentives for performing such tasks, might in some cases crowd out intrinsic motivation, 
possibly leading to an overall reduction in effort. The conditions, under which a reduction in 
intrinsic motivation occurs, are when incentives are seen as controlling, in the sense that it 
reduces self-determination, self-esteem or personal expression. 
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It is hard to gauge whether the TRA and URA reforms were seen as reducing self-
determination and so on among staff. Given the greater autonomy of the Authorities, one 
would be inclined to think otherwise. The crowding out of intrinsic motivation by incentives 
might thus not be much of a problem in this particular case (though the erosion of motivation 
due to other factors might still be a problem). It should be added that there is some 
disagreement in the literature about the importance of the crowding out problem in general. 
Fehr et al (2002) suggest that this kind of crowding out is a problem “only for those tasks for 
which payment of money is situationally inappropriate, i.e. in situations in which there is 
usually no pecuniary compensation”. Although staff in the tax administrations preceding the 
formation of the TRA and URA were poorly paid, one cannot say that their tasks were usually 
performed without monetary compensation. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
There are several possible explanations for the seeming stagnation in the performance of the 
TRA and the URA, and the apparent rise in corruption. A failure to provide effective incentives 
for TRA and URA staff might be one reason. We have argued here that the incentive schemes 
introduced at the TRA and URA may have failed to improve performance, due to a failure to 
meet the basic conditions under which monetary incentives can be expected to work. In 
addition, organisational and behavioural complexities make the use of incentives less 
straightforward, which underscores the importance of careful and comprehensive reform. 
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7 Patronage and the ‘cultural logics’ of corruption  
7.1 Introduction 
The experiences of the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and the Uganda Revenue Authority 
(URA) indicate that wage increases do not necessarily put an end to corruption. Could it be that 
corruption in Africa is less connected to structural factors than mainstream development theory 
has proposed, and to a greater degree the ‘inevitable’ result of certain African cultural 
characteristics and traditions? This chapter will address this question on the basis of recent 
debates on corruption within anthropology and political science. The chapter is organised as 
follows: The first section examines the ‘cultural embeddedness’ of corruption and its 
symbolisation (7.2). It is followed by a brief discussion of the idealised ‘African 
communalism’ of pre-colonial society and the contradictions of the modern state (7.3).  The 
next section (7.4) discusses why corruption, although often blamed for causing many of the 
problems in Africa, is still somehow accepted and the culprits seldom prosecuted. Five 
‘cultural logics’, which independently and together provide a fertile ground for corruption, are 
identified: gift-giving, negotiation, solidarity networks, predatory authority, and redistributive 
accumulation. The last section draws the discussion together, pointing to the fact that money 
earned through corruption is often redistributed to needy kin, a redistribution that the modern 
African state has failed to fulfil.  
7.2 The symbolisation of corruption: Is Africa a special case? 
Research on corruption has long been dominated by economists and political scientists. The 
common way to define corruption within these fields has been the abuse of public office (or 
power) for private gain (Amundsen, 1999; Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2002:5; Gray & Kaufmann, 
1998; Rose-Ackerman 1998). This definition is based on the Weberian rational- legal 
bureaucracy model in which the distinction between the public and private is central. This 
distinction, however, is less developed in many non-European countries and the above 
definition therefore becomes too narrow. What people regard as corruption varies from context 
to context and in order to understand corruption and to combat it, we need to understand how 
the people who practice it actually evaluate these social practices themselves (Gupta, 1995; 
Sissener 2001). 
 
Is there something distinctive about corruption in Africa compared to other continents? Jean-
Francois Bayart, author of “The State in Africa – The Politics of the Belly” (Bayart, 1993) 
argues that there indeed is. In his view, the corruption of an African civil servant has little in 
common with the corruption of his/her counterpart in Asia, America, or the former Soviet 
Union. He points to two main factors. First, the symbolisation inherent in corruption is 
different in different cultures and at different points in history. Second, the state in Africa has 
its own peculiarities, as a result of its amalgation of age-old foundations and re-appropriated 
institutions of colonial design. We will come back to issues of the state shortly, after presenting 
the major ideas about the symbolisation of corruption. 
 
In most African languages, corruption is referred to by a verb generally translated as ‘to eat’ 
(i.e. kula in Swahili). In many cases, this verb does not only imply to nourish oneself, but also 
to accumulate, exploit and to kill with witchcraft (Bayart, 1993:269). In former French West 
African colonies, for example, the French term bouffer (stuffing) is used to refer to “all illegal 
modes of enrichment through positions of authority” (ibid. 28). Contrary to popular belief, says 
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Bayart, individualism is not particularly ‘underdeveloped’ in African societies, although it is of 
a different nature than the kind of ‘individualism’ we find in the West. Throughout their 
histories, he argues, African societies have been haunted by “the spectre of individual violence: 
that of witchcraft and symbolic manducation” (ibid. 267). To see African societies as 
“harmonic” then, not only glorify them, but also has serious effects on the comprehension of 
these societies. 
 
Another Africanist, the anthropologist J.P. Olivier de Sardan, criticises Bayart for over-
interpretation. He does not agree with the systematic association between witchcraft/sorcery 
and the ‘belly’ metaphors linked to corruption (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:49). Like Bayart, 
however, Olivier de Sardan is concerned with the relations between corruption in Africa and 
African culture. In order to understand this relationship, he argues, we need to study what he 
terms the ‘corruption complex’. This complex does not only imply what we usually perceive as 
corruption, but also a number of illicit practices which are technically distinct from corruption 
but which do have “in common with corruption their association with state, parastatal or 
bureaucratic functions” (ibid. 26). Examples are embezzlement and various forms of 
misappropriation, nepotism, abuse of power, influence-peddling, prevarication, insider trading 
and abuse of the public purse.  
 
Olivier de Sardan points out a number of ‘cultural logics’ which are favourable to corruption in 
Africa. Both he and Bayart, however, emphasise that none of these logics are traditional; they 
do not come directly from some ‘traditional’ pre-colonial culture. On the contrary they are all 
syncretic, a result of the historical processes of the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial 
eras: 
 
The process of state-apparatus building during the twentieth century … is obviously 
fundamental not only for the production of corruption itself, but also for the production 
of a cultural embeddedness of corruption (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:26). 
 
The novel constructions and power relations that the new encounters entailed have resulted in 
what Achille Mbembe has termed ‘the postcolony’(Mbembe, 1992). Let us briefly look at these 
processes before we come back to the cultural logics in section four.  
7.3 Communalism in Africa 
The fact that most pre-colonial African societies were less centralised than their European 
counterparts does not necessarily mean that they had a more ‘communal’ spirit. The image of 
traditional African societies as ‘harmonic’ has been forwarded not only by foreign scholars, but 
also by several African leaders. In the rhetoric of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, 
for example, Africans are ‘natural socialists’:  
 
We, in Africa, have no more need of being ‘converted’ to socialism than we have of 
being ‘taught’ democracy. Both are rooted in our own past – in the traditional society 
which produced us (Nyerere, 1967:170).  
 
Nyerere argued that the principles of the extended family could be extended to the nation as a 
whole. As the failure of the ujamaa policies has proved however, family solidarity is not easily 
transferred to village level, not to mention the national. Despite appearances, village property is 
not common in African societies. Village infrastructures may happen to be used communally, 
but they belong either to the “representative of an eminent local group” or to the state. Olivier 
de Sardan (1999:31) puts it this way: 
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Most African villages are conglomerates of specific sub-communities (families, peer 
groups, ritual societies etc.) often existing in a climate of rivalry and antagonism, with 
no culture of ‘general interest’, partly because the village chiefs supposed to promote 
or represent this general interest were put in place by colonialism or were colonial 
agent. 
 
Bayart traces the roots of present corruption partly to the colonial state. Under indirect rule, the 
Europeans seldom cared about how the chiefs recruited plantation workers etc, and coercion 
was the rule rather than exception. Those who could afford it would buy themselves out, 
providing an additional income for the chiefs. Indirect rule also entitled chiefs to a certain 
percentage of the taxes they collected. And it was not uncommon for the chiefs to invent new 
taxes themselves, claiming they were orders from the whites (Bayart, 1993:70).  
 
Independence witnessed “the hasty construction of a new bureaucracy in the place of the 
colonisers, concerned above all with the exercise of their privileges and the consolidation of 
their status in as short a time as possible” (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:32). The state that Africans 
inherited was not, however, constructed on concepts like democracy, human rights and good 
governance. On the contrary, colonial states were characterised by control, exploitation and 
segregation (Roalkvam, 2002). As Ronald Cohen (1980:81) has pointed out on the basis of his 
work on Nigeria, “Africans learned how to live and operate under a bureaucratic system in 
which illegitimacy was normal”. The central role that the State has achieved in many post-
colonial African countries, now criticised by most of the Western world, is in itself a legacy 
from the colonial times (Tripp, 1997:60).  
 
The norms of the public service in Africa are inherited from Europe so they ought to be, in 
principle, the same. In Europe, however, this model was in part the product of rather different 
sociocultural logics (Médard, 1991:42). These logics - inaugurated in the nineteenth century - 
were based on the distinction between public and private affairs, on puritanism, on egalitarian 
and individualistic demands: 
 
In Europe … the norms of the public service and the legal definitions of corruption 
correspond or harmonise, even if only approximately, with the predominant 
sociocultural logics. In Africa, on the contrary, there is a glaring discrepancy. As a 
result, the functioning of the administrative apparatus, entirely copied from the 
European pattern is of a schizophrenic type. In law, official functioning and budget it is 
totally Western. In practice, it is otherwise, traversed by logics in drastic contradiction 
with the original model (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:47).  
 
African civil servants may agree, in principle, with the bureaucratic principles. Through their 
education and training they have internalised these ideas that follows the same principles as in 
the West. In practice, however, many of them work against it (ibid. 48). This is where the 
aforementioned cultural logics come in.  
7.4 The ‘cultural logics’ of corruption in Africa 
 
Corruption is … as frequently denounced in words as it is practised in fact. But the 
verbal stigmatisation of corruption rarely leads to legal proceedings or sanctions 
(Olivier de Sardan, 1999:29). 
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Donor agencies, the International Finance Institutions (World Bank and IMF), African leaders, 
as well as the ‘grassroots’, all name corruption as one of the major hindrances for development 
in the region. Still, many researchers and journalists have noted that corruption in Africa is in 
actual practice accepted. People involved in corruption often see their own actions as 
legitimate, and “only the practices to which one falls victim or from which one is excluded are 
denounced as being corrupt” (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:34).  
 
A major proposition in anthropological studies of corruption is that one will never be able to 
combat corrupt practices as long as the people who take part in them view them as acceptable. 
What we need to do, therefore, is to see corruption from ‘the actors’ point of view’. In Hindu 
culture for example, favouritism is legitimate, and therefore not considered corruption 
(Sissener, 2001:10). What kind of legitimation processes do we find in the African context? 
Olivier de Sardan (1999:36) focuses on a set of social practices that do not necessarily have 
anything to do with corruption, but which provide “a favourable ground for its generalisation 
and banalisation”. He singles out five ‘cultural logics’ which all provide a fertile ground for 
corruption:  
1. gift-giving 
2. negotiation 
3. solidarity networks 
4. predatory authority 
5. redistributive accumulation  
 
7.4.1 Gift-giving 
The logics of gift-giving in Africa is the cultural logic that often is most readily identified as a 
facilitator for corruption. In most African cultures, gifts are traditionally given to people who 
carry good news, to musicians (especially praise singers), and to friends and family when 
returning from a journey. In Bantu tradition, it is not impolite to ask for a present. The request 
signals that you regard the person you ask as having a higher status than yourself (Pelt, 1971). 
Nowadays, gift-giving in Africa is usually a question of money. In contrast to the Western 
world, money is seldom represented as the antithesis of bonds of kinship and friendship. 
Consequently, there is nothing inappropriate about making gifts of money to cement such 
bonds (Bloch & Parry, 1989:8). Petty corruption tends to enter into the ‘gift’ category, often 
making use of the terms and expressions that are traditionally associated with gift giving. To 
not thank someone for a service is not only a sign of bad manners, but may also mean that one 
invites misfortune. As Olivier de Sardan rhetorically puts it, if a civil servant kindly disregards 
“the rigours of the law”, doesn’t he then deserve a gift? And why not just as well give the gift 
in advance? 
 
There is a continuum rather than a gulf between bribing someone and thanking 
someone for services rendered. Between obtaining a favour from a friend in the civil 
service, which favour will be ‘returned’ later on, and slipping a bank note in return for 
the same favour to a civil servant whom one does not know, there is only a difference of 
form, be it monetary or not, in the exchange (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:35).  
 
7.4.2 Negotiation 
Corruption is a form of transaction. It follows from this that it is a subject of ‘bargaining’. 
Bargaining does not only concern the amount to be paid, but also the rules themselves. The 
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logics of negotiation that apply to marriage negotiations for example, also apply to corruption. 
“Petty corruption”, writes Olivier de Sardan (1999:37), “always has a necessary rhetorical 
dimension” to it. It is not uncommon to leave these negotiations to a middleman – a broker – 
who organises the transaction and who saves both parties time and risk.  
7.4.3 Solidarity networks 
The central role of solidarity networks and trust for innovation and economic development in 
both developing and developed countries has been richly documented (Malecki & Tootle, 
1997, Murphy, 2002:592, Mytelka, 1993, Powell, 1990, Storper & Salais, 1997). The logics of 
solidarity networks entail an obligation of mutual assistance. This applies to friends of friends 
as well, so that the circle of people to whom one has responsibilities may be almost infinite. 
‘Traditional’ networks are based on ascribed identities such as family or ethnic origin, but in 
modern, urban society, people find it even more useful to nourish networks that cut across such 
boundaries. Among the elite, the most central network is perhaps that of the ‘old boys’ who 
studied together under colonial rule or during the early years of independence (Kelsall, 2002). 
Institutions for higher learning were so few that those who studied there often belong to a 
bounded group who all know each other well.  
 
According to some observers, there are parallels between village solidarity and this small 
‘techno-political and political world’. It is argued that the elite in African countries tend to be 
so small that the price of open conflict is simply too high. This may be one of the reasons the 
culprits are so seldom prosecuted. Another reason might be that too many high-ranking people 
are involved. It has indeed been suggested that the majority of African politicians is involved 
in some kind of embezzlement (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:30). As a result, it is all too common 
in African countries to launch anti-corruption campaigns only to accept corruptive practices 
afterwards (Bayart 1993:226; Médard 1991; Reno 1995). 
 
One example is the much-debated Warioba Commission on Corruption in Tanzania (URT, 
1996). This Commission was initiated by Benjamin Mkapa when he took over the presidency 
from Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1995. Mwinyi is said to have been very lax on corruption and the 
Commission’s report revealed several severe cases that were much debated in the media. Still, 
little has been done to prosecute the culprits. Similarly in Uganda, President Museveni seems 
to have become less and less willing to do anything about corruption among high- level 
officials. In 1998, he shocked both Ugandans and donors by stating that “corruption is not 
hurting development as long as the money does not leave Uganda” (Githongo, 1998). 
 
The mutual protection among the elite does not go by unnoticed by the large majority who falls 
outside of the exclusive networks. In Tanzania, the underprivileged complain that during anti-
corruption campaigns, only the ‘small people’ are caught and prosecuted, while the higher- 
level officials and businessmen go free. In Uganda, four high-ranking URA officials were put 
on trial for large-scale corruption in 2001. None of them were prosecuted, due to the simple 
fact that the judicial system itself was corrupt. 
 
In some African countries, the authorities have sought to avoid the problem of mutually 
protective networks by appointing women in core positions (Tripp, 2001:117). Educated 
women have often studied at separate girls schools and are therefore considered less inclined to 
get involved in the (predominantly male) elite corruption networks. This does certainly not 
mean that women are innate or ‘naturally’ less inclined to get involved in corruption. But is 
may support the hypothesis that there is a connection between ‘old boys’ networks and mutual 
protection in cases of corruption. 
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In Uganda, this reasoning seemed to lie behind the appointment of Julia Sebutinde, high court 
magistrate, to head the Judical Commission of Inquiry into corruption of the Police Force. One 
of the national newspapers in Uganda, The Monitor, commented on the appointment in this 
way (7 July 1999): 
 
The master-stroke in the Sebutinde Commission is the choice to appoint a woman to 
chair it. It ensured the chair was unlikely to have chummy old boy links to the Police 
but a total outsider, who brings totally different values to the probe. If the chair had 
been a man, you would have a cover-up, complete with back -room deals being cut to 
soft-pedal on some of the boys. And because Sebutinde is well educated, cosmopolitian, 
holds the high office of judge, and is beautiful, she has presented the male 
establishment a force the boys simply don’t know how to deal with (Quoted in Tripp, 
2001:117). 
 
As the investigations unfolded, Judge Sebutinde became a household name and drivers of 
minibuses would place “her picture on their windscreens to scare off policemen seeking 
bribes” (Tripp, 2001:117). After her success in uncovering corruption all the way to the top in 
the Police Force, Sebutinde was appointed to head the Commission of Inquiry of Corruption in 
the URA as well.  
 
The appointment of Annebritt Aslund as Commissioner General of the URA may also be seen 
as part of this new strategy of placing women in key positions. While indigenous Ugandans 
have somewhat mixed feelings about the practice of appointing expatriates in key positions, 
Aslund’s candidature seem to have been very much applauded. This may partly have to do with 
her sex, but perhaps even more important is the fact that she had worked in the country for 
some years already, and had participated in media debates on tax questions. It was indeed her 
interventions in the media that made President Museveni aware of her and then decided to 
personally appoint her to the position as Commissioner General in 2001.  
7.4.4 Predatory authority 
Appointing expatriates in key management positions may be a technique to avoid the unfolding 
of what Olivier de Sardan calls ‘the logics of predatory authority’. The background for this way 
of exercising authority in Africa is partly to be found in the pre-colonial system, partly in the 
colonial form of administration. In many of the pre-colonial political systems, the chiefs were 
obliged to show largesse to all. ‘The capacity to redistribute’, writes Oliver de Sardan 
(1999:43), “was of course founded on patrimonialism, which regulated traditional power in the 
context of a confusion between the wealth of the state and that of the sovereign”. Thus, many 
contemporary leaders and civil servants see it as their right to exploit the opportunities that a 
given office offers.  
 
Bill Saidi, editor of Daily News, Harare, similarly refers to the role of the chief when 
explaining the roots of corruption: “In a society where the chief traditionally can take whatever 
he wants – including as many wives as he wants – one is not too concerned if people have 
achieved their money in a fair way” (own translation from Norwegian, Saidi, 2002). Saidi 
argues that in Africa, in contrast to Europe, there is no strong resistance against corruption. In a 
society where redistribution at a private level is the norm, it doesn’t make much sense to 
oppose the rich. It simply costs the poor more to oppose the “haves” than to try to become a 
client of them. As Chris Waterman (1990:224) reports from his study in Nigeria: “Among the 
Yoruba urban poor … class-consciousness is tempered by the near-universal belief that every 
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individual has a powerful kinsman or hometown mate who might be persuaded to act as a 
sponsor”.  
7.4.5 Redistributive accumulation 
Patron-client relationships, be they between relatives, ‘home-boys’ or friends, may spur 
corruption through what Olivier de Sardan has termed the logics of redistributive 
accumulation. Politicians at all levels – from local councillors to the president himself – need 
to enrich themselves in order to redistribute, a redistribution which is necessary in order to 
uphold their authority and their networks. Seen from the relatives’ point of view (and that of 
network associates), someone who holds a prestigious position must spread the benefit around. 
In fact, there is indeed considerable social pressure in the direction of the accumulation of 
wealth in view of redistribution: 
 
Illegal enrichment and nepotism are definitely supported by positive social values, 
namely the necessity to seize all opportunities allowing for a manifestation of cardinal 
virtues, such as generosity, largesse and gratitude to all those who in the past, when 
you were unimportant, weak, in need, provided help, encouragement and support 
(Olivier de Sardan, 1999:43).  
 
To accumulate then, even by corrupt ways, is not necessarily bad in itself. It is accumulation 
without distribution which is considered unethical (Barber, 1997). Only someone who 
accumulates, can redistribute, the entering point to an identity as ‘man of honour’ or ‘big man’ 
(mkubwa). In a recent interview, a senior official of the URA gives the example of two staff 
members from the same family. One of them is honest, the other is corrupt. The one who has 
not accumulated more than he could from his modest wage, is, according to our source, 
‘regarded a fool by the society’ and earns no respect what so ever.54 He can not offer needy 
relatives or friends any assistance to speak of. In their eyes his un-corrupt attitude is not only 
foolish, but in essence selfish (see also Médard, 1991). 
 
The relationship to the extended family and other forms of networks is also pivotal for what 
generates shame in an African context. Corrupt practices are generally not linked to shame and 
people who engage in it often carry their activities out with a clear conscience. In contrast to 
Europe, writes Olivier de Sardan (1999:47), ‘borrowing’ from the cash box or bribing a civil 
servant does not generate shame. “Shame”, he says, “is a social morality, a morality based on 
other people’s opinions, rather than one based on an individual examination of conscience”. 
Since ‘shame’ is fundamentally situational, it plays upon another register than what it does in 
Europe, namely that of “the pressure of the family circle and its networks, that of ‘what will 
people say’, and this register favours rather than impedes the practices of the corruption 
complex”.  
 
A study of corruption in Ghana confirms that corrupt officers did not express any guilt or 
shame over their actions (LeVine, 1975). In Uganda, the Inspector General of Government,  
Mr. Jotham Tumwesigye, addressed this problem in his speech at the opening of a workshop 
on public awareness against corruption in Uganda: “We would like to see public intolerance of 
corruption increased and people acquire property through corrupt ways held in contempt and 
not in esteem” (Tumwesigye, 1998).  
 
Some observers argue that there is no social stigma for being dismissed from one’s position 
due to corruption in Uganda. In the URA, for example, there is a perception among some of the 
                                                 
54 Personal interview 29 November 2002, Kampala (Siri Lange). 
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staff that the URA is a place to be for a few years to make money. Then, if one is finally 
caught, it doesn’t hurt much to be fired.55 Sociological work on sub-cultures and their universe 
of legitimation for producing self- justification can shed further light on the lack of shame 
found among corrupt African bureaucrats (Olivier de Sardan, 1999:35).  
 
As long as corrup tion is legitimised as a natural part of public office and as a way to 
accumulate means to support dependants, its participants may view what they take part in as 
some kind of legitimate ‘white corruption’ - in the same vain as people in the Western world 
categorise some of their more innocent lies as ‘white lies’. 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
Despite all the factors that favour corruption, one should be cautious against imputing 
corruption in Africa to some kind of ‘African culture’. The cultural factor is there, but so are 
structural factors like low wages and the crisis of the African state. Development aid, with its 
‘project system’, separate wage system, state-in-the-state development and mushrooming of 
NGOs, also plays an important role in the development of corruption (see Olivier de Sardan, 
1999:32).  
 
It is, unfortunately, extremely hard to turn the negative trend of corruption. As pointed out 
above, there is almost no practical ethic of the public service in Africa and with time, 
corruption tends to become ‘engrained in social habits’ (ibid. 34). This, however, does not 
mean that certain types of corruption is not stigmatised. Many current problems in Africa are 
attributed to it and the people who do not benefit from it often hope that a change of regime 
will bring an end to it. After the recent election in Kenya, for example, the IPS News Service 
referred to a jobless mother of seven who rejoiced Kibaki’s victory. Not only did she believe 
that President Kibaki would bring employment, she also assured the journalists that he would 
“bring an end to the pervasive corruption in Kenya, where nothing is done unless you give a 
small bribe” (Salmon, 2002). 
 
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that some of the cultural logics that favour 
corruption, such as the redistributive system and solidarity networks, seem to be better fit than 
the failed ‘modern’ state under the present economic crisis that most African states go through. 
Solidarity networks ensure at least a minimum degree of redistribution at a time where the 
modern African state hardly fulfils this role at all. ‘African culture’ then, if we may use such a 
concept, facilitates corruption, but at the same time ensures that many unfortunate children get 
a chance to go to school, since their (in our eyes) distant relatives feel obliged to pay their 
school fees. As Roalkvam pointed out in her response to Spinnangers (2002) proposition that 
many of the present problems that African countries face (among them corruption) are due to 
certain African cultural characteristics: 
 
(T)he so-called Western individual values seem to be well internalised in the African 
elite long before state institutions that are supposed to control the free conduct of 
individuals are in place. One does not need to call cultural values to account in order 
to disentangle family and the state. What one really needs, are state institutions that are 
capable of keeping them apart (own translation from Norwegian, Roalkvam, 2002).  
 
The suggested remedies for the URA and the TRA - increased wages and better office facilities 
and infrastructure - do not guarantee that these institutions will become ‘corruption free’ zones. 
                                                 
55  Personal interview with the Commissioner general of the URA Mrs. Annebritt Aslund,  29 November 2002 
(Siri Lange). 
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On the contrary, positions in these institutions may be regarded extremely attractive, to the 
point that applicants may try to use their networks or even bribery in order to get hold of them 
(for the case of the TRA, see Fjeldstad, 2003). Furthermore, since corruption to some extent is 
more a question of lack of social stigma than low wages, high wages will not in themselves 
keep people away from corrupt practices. Decent wages, however, will enable the URA and the 
TRA to attract also those individuals who are not prone to corruption. The challenge then is to 
find these people and to secure enough funding to pay them well.  
 
A more long-term challenge is to work for a reform of the public attitudes towards corruption 
in general. But, as argued by Olivier de Sardan (1999:34), for this to succeed one needs an 
almost utopian change at the administrative level since corruption is at the one hand, “a result 
of the incompetence of the state apparatus” and at the other, “its cause and agent of 
reproduction”. As long as the political elites are unwilling to give up some of their privileges 
and to reform, changing the general public’s attitudes may ultimately take the form of 
‘puritanical’ movements based in the ‘grassroots’ (ibid. 48). As long as such movements tend 
to have their locus in fundamentalist versions of Islam or Christianity and in opposition to each 
other, this scenario is not one that gives much hope for a peaceful transition to less corrupt 
public sector institutions in Africa. 
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8 Lessons and implications for reform  
8.1 Why have tax administrative reforms disappointed? 
Several factors have contributed to the disappointing results of the TRA and the URA, and it is 
difficult to distinguish among these and to determine their appropriate weights. Some observers 
argue that a main cause is that low levels of human capital are responsible for the 
organisational failure. However, why should the revenue authorities perform less well over 
time, despite the extensive resources spent on capacity building and training of tax officers? 
Another view is that the informational environment in tax administration is constrained in 
many ways, for instance by a political environment that favours control over competition and 
incentive systems that have failed to function (see Klitgaard, 1997:223). Others argue that civil 
servants do not perform because they do not identify themselves with their countries, with 
national aims and the government elite. Finally, is the view that kinship and tribal networks put 
an emphasis on social obligations and re-distribution that mitigate against the development of a 
Weberian bureaucracy.  
 
Without passing a verdict on these and other explanations, this report has emphasised the social 
and political dimensions of tax administrative reforms, and the limitations of some of the 
‘technocratic’ approaches to institutional reforms taken by donors.  
 
One lesson to be learned from TRA’s and URA’s first years of operation is that even with 
relatively respectable salaries and working conditions, corruption may still thrive (Fjeldstad, 
2003). The study shows that pay level is only one of several factors affecting the behaviour of 
tax officers. In an environment where the demand for corrupt services is extensive and 
monitoring ineffective, wage increases may end up functioning as an extra bonus on top of the 
bribes taken by corrupt officers. Such a situation requires strong internal control mechanisms 
and effective sanctions that make it easier to dismiss staff.  
 
Moreover, recent economic research on human behaviour also indicates that reformers and 
economists have an inclination to exaggerate the impact of monetary incentives because of a 
too narrow understanding of intrinsic motivation and group dynamics (see Frey, 1997). An 
additional aspect of wage incentives that has received little attention in connection with 
institutional reforms in Africa is associated with the role of family networks and obligations. 
Increased pay rates may also imply more extensive social obligations, resulting actually in a 
net loss to the individual. This state of affairs can develop into a vicious circle with higher 
wages leading to more corruption because the tax officer has to make up for the loss caused by 
such obligations.56 
 
Furthermore, the study shows that hiring and firing procedures may lead to more corruption. 
Corrupt tax officers often operate in networks, which include both internal and external actors. 
The way the administrative reforms are implemented, where many of those dismissed are 
recruited to the private sector due to their knowledge of the workings of the tax system and 
their inside contacts, may strengthen the corruption networks. Thus, a major challenge facing 
reformers of tax administrations is to crack corruption networks and the inherent trust that 
appears to prevail between members of such networks. One suggestion is to introduce rotation 
                                                 
56 This point was raised by several past and present TRA-officials interviewed. See Rose-Ackerman (1998:317–
323) for a discussion of the role of traditional networks in reform processes  
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systems for staff in tax administrations, where tax collectors remain only for shorter periods in 
the same post (Das-Gupta & Mookherjee, 1998). But a danger of the rotation system is that the 
uncertainty which is thereby created for employees may result in increased corruption as 
collectors may use the opportunity to try enriching themselves while they are stationed in the 
most ‘lucrative’ posts. The rotation of officials may also give corrupt superiors undue power. 
For instance, they might ‘sell’ assignments to attractive positions or reassign officials to remote 
stations as a punishment for honesty (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:84). The scarcity of qualified 
personnel like auditors and accountants further reduces the potential of rotation schemes in the 
poorest countries. 
 
Experiences from Tanzania and Uganda also show that the establishment of a proclaimed 
autonomous authority with comparatively generous remuneration packages and substantial 
budgets has not protected them from political interference. To the contrary, as argued by 
Therkildsen (2002), it has made the revenue authority (RA) a more attractive target because the 
authority offers both relatively well paid jobs and considerable rent-seeking opportunities. 
Consequently, a revenue authority is vulnerable to political interference - especially in 
personnel matters. The empirical evidence supporting this finding can be summarised as 
follows:  
 
· Politics dominates over law: Legal provisions for organisational autonomy of revenue 
authorities have limited importance in contexts where political elites do not respect 
them.  
· Autonomy may also contain seeds of its own destruction: RAs have become attractive 
targets of political interference due to both comparatively favourable remuneration 
packages and to rent-seeking opportunities. 
· Success may help to protect autonomy: Respect for organisational autonomy 
established by law depends to some extent on the success of the tax administration. The 
undermining of, for instance, Uganda Revenue Authority’s autonomy became 
increasingly open once it did not meet its revenue collection targets after 1996. 
· Inflated expectations may help undermine autonomy: Donors and the Ministry of 
Finance, by pushing for high revenue targets help to undermine the RA’s credibility in 
the eyes of state elites and the public, because such targets create expectations that 
cannot be met. 
· Autonomous organisations often become easy targets for political blaming: In Uganda, 
for instance, the public denunciation of the  URA by high level political figures, the 
president included, has helped to undermine the credibility of the tax administration, 
and hence its capacity to enforce tax laws. 
 
A major factor contributing to the failure of tax administrative reforms, which is also the case 
for many other types of public sector reforms, has been the ‘technocratic’ approach taken by 
reformers and donors.57 Tax administrative reforms in poor countries have often been treated as 
an ‘engineering problem’ – and as such a phenomenon to be addressed through ‘blueprint’ or 
‘textbook’ solutions. There seems to be an assumption that tax administrative problems and 
their solutions can be fully specified in advance, and that the required measures can be fully 
defined at the outset and implemented on a predictable timetable, over fixed period (Schacter, 
2000:7). This accounts for the prescribed and mechanical approach usually favoured by donors, 
featuring quantitative performance targets, redrawing of organisational charts, rewriting job 
                                                 
57 Schacter (2000) provides an insightful discussion of why many donor initiated civil service reforms have failed 
in developing countries.  
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descriptions, training courses for tax officers, installation of new systems for human resource 
and financial management systems, etc. Klitgaard (1997) refers to this as the ‘more approach’ 
(or the supply side approach); i.e., more training, more equipment, more technical assistance, 
etc. Such strategies may be necessary, but if the demand side of administrative reforms is being 
overlooked, this may lead to distorted incentives through technical assistance and also to 
undermining the government’s commitment to civil service reforms.  
 
The technocratic approach has also overlooked the fact that reforming a tax administration, 
though it has important technical aspects, also is a social and political phenomenon driven by 
human behaviour and local circumstances. It is a long and difficult process that requires tax 
officers to change the way they regard their jobs, their tasks and their interaction with 
taxpayers. As argued by Schacter (2000), the technocratic remedies supported by donors has 
underplayed the degree to which progress in [tax] administration depends upon thorough 
‘culture change’ in the public service. The motives of individual actors are often inextricably 
tied to the interest of the social groups to which they belong. In the URA, but also in the TRA, 
patronage runs through networks grounded on ties of kinship and community origin. As such, 
people recognise the benefits of large extended families and strong kinship ties, even as their 
social and economic aspirations may be unambiguously modern. This implies that such social 
relations may rule out the formal bureaucratic structures and positions. Fiscal corruption must 
therefore, at least to some extent, be understood in the context of a political economy in which 
access to social resources depends on patron clientilism.  
 
A related problem in both the TRA and the URA derives from the micromanagement by the 
top-management. The Board sometimes also intervenes in the day-to-day operations. In 
Tanzania, for instance, the Board is engaged in ongoing cases with individual taxpayers.58 This 
contributes to sidelining and demoralising the staff.  
 
The ‘power of the purse’, added with quite definite ideas regarding what sort of institutional 
reforms are desirable, has led donor agencies to take the centre stage in the tax administrative 
reforms in both Tanzania and Uganda. In theory donors respond to needs identified by client 
governments. But, in practice they often identify clients’ needs for them (Polidano, 2001:7). In 
particular, this seems to have been the case in Uganda where the URA was set up by external 
consultants who arrived with a pre-fabricate, ‘blue-print’ for tax administrative reforms. 
Although the reforms were supported by the political leadership and senior officials in the 
Ministry of Finance for a number of years, this support now seems to erode. Thus, it is 
reasonable to ask whether the political support to establish a semi-autonomous revenue 
authority, as well as the support from the local bureaucracy, was genuine from the outset, or 
whether it reflected the bargaining power of donors. The assumption that donors can build state 
capacity despite the lack of effective internal demand for a more effective tax administration is 
highly questionable. Furthermore, donors may exacerbate the problems when there are several 
of them involved in the same field. This is observed in the Tax Administration Project (TAP) 
in the TRA, in which several donors are involved, including Danida, USAID, GTZ, EU and the 
WB. Representatives from both the donor community and advisors to the TRA complain that 
there is no clear focus in the TAP.59 Moreover, the many donors involved contribute to 
overloading the capacity of the TRA and slowing down implementation of the administrative 
reform.  Thus, Bulir & Moon (2003), in a recent review of the experiences with IMF-supported 
programmes to fiscal adjustment, conclude that ‘…revenue enhancing measures, and perhaps 
                                                 
58 Personal interviews with advisors to the TRA 4 September 2002 and the URA March 2003 (Odd-Helge 
Fjeldstad). 
59 Personal interviews, Dar es Salaam, September 2002 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). 
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also technical assistance provided to program countries, failed to provide a sustainable 
increase in the revenue-to-GDP ratio’ (ibid. 24).  
 
This point about ‘internal demand’ for capable tax administration opens the door to an 
additional insight about the poor record of the revenue authorities in Tanzania and Uganda. A 
key problem is a failure of accountability between government and taxpayers (i.e., citizens).60 
The channels through which governments hold themselves accountable to citizens, and citizens 
communicate their demands for better government, are still highly dysfunctional in Tanzania 
and Uganda. For taxation to have a positive effect on democratic accountability, taxation must 
be ‘felt’ by a majority of citizens in order to trigger a response in the form of demands for 
greater accountability (see Gloppen & Rakner, 2002). But the tax reforms during the last 
decade in both Tanzania and Uganda have only to a limited degree succeeded in widening the 
tax base. It has proven difficult or even undesirable to apply the tax law with full force to 
informal operators. With food commodities often zero-rated and most agricultural inputs 
exempted, VAT has not included many new groups into the tax net.  
 
Only formal business corporations appear to be visibly affected by the central government tax 
reforms (Fjeldstad & Rakner, 2003). The effectiveness of the Tanzania Revenue Authority with 
regard to business is illustrated by the fact that until 1995, Tanzanian manufacturers rarely 
raised the issue of taxation in member-meetings or in member-surveys carried out by their 
association (Confederation of Tanzanian Industries, CTI). Since 1996, however, taxation has 
become the main issue of concern. In Uganda, firm surveys reveal that high taxes, excessive 
levels of tax bureaucracy, ad hoc assessments, and audits are their major complaints (Obwona 
& Muwonge, 2002). However, there are indications  that a voice and an organised response to 
the new revenue policies are developing within the business community in both Tanzania and 
Uganda (Luoga, 2002; Kasimbazi, 2003).  
8.2 What works? 
With respect to tax administrative reforms, we know at present more about what hasn’t worked 
in the past than what is likely to work in the future. There are many cases of obvious failure, 
but few cases of unequivocal success.61 However, mistakes of the past provide indications of 
promising paths for future efforts. Thus, there now seems to be increasing awareness around 
approaches to tax administrative reforms should take into account the following elements:62 
 
1. Local leadership and ownership. 
Lack of ownership, in particular among the officials who have to make the revenue 
administration work, is a critical issue for sustainability.  Tax administrative reforms is unlikely 
to succeed if the main source of energy and leadership for it comes from outside. Donors 
should therefore not play a leading role and they should not dictate the content, pace and 
direction of tax administrative reforms. Moreover, it should be recognised that such reforms 
often are highly political processes that will inevitably pose a threat to important local 
stakeholders. Thus, strong and well-placed leadership of the revenue authority is essential for 
overcoming the political and bureaucratic obstacles that confront the TRA and the URA. This 
also requires a better demarcation of management authority between the board and the 
Commissioner General. A board acting as the chief executive is certainly not a recipe for a 
                                                 
60 Gloppen & Rakner (2002) provide an interesting discussion of the relationship between taxation and 
accountability in the context of tax reforms carried out in some sub-Saharan African countries.  
61 The Zambia Revenue Authority appears to perform better than most other revenue authorities in Africa (Rakner 
& Gloppen, 2003). 
62 Many of these elements are also applicable for more general civil service reforms (see Schacter, 2000). 
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strong and effective daily leadership which the revenue authority needs. The present problems 
of micro-management and the board’s involvement in day-to-day operations must therefore be 
addressed. This may imply a re-composition of the board that better matches the expectations 
of the Government about the status and performance of the tax administration.  
 
2. Political willpower 
The successful implementation of such reforms requires political will to back them up (Tanzi 
& Pellechio, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). An indication of the limited political willpower in 
Tanzania to fight fiscal corruption and tax evasion is the rise in tax exemptions granted in 
recent years. While exemptions accounted for 15.2% of total tax revenues (actually collected 
tax plus exemptions) in 1996/97, this percentage grew to 37% in 1998/99 (Mokoro and Oxford 
Policy Management, 2001). Experience has shown that tax exemptions create room for bribery 
and corruption, reduce the tax base, and increase loopholes for tax evasion (URT, 2002:19). In 
the 2002/03-budget, however, the Tanzanian Government discontinued customs duty 
exemptions for public sector imports of goods and services. This is a step in the right direction. 
But, many openings remain to abuse the system in both Tanzania and Uganda. The removal of 
tax exemptions, including those granted to aid organisations and their employees, would help 
boost the credibility of both the authorities and the donors in relation to anti-corruption 
measures, and, at the same time, contribute to widening the tax base and simplifying the tax 
system. 
 
3. Organisational culture and incentives 
Public institutions with a culture that is outcomes-oriented and ‘mission-driven’ appear to have 
higher levels of performance than organisations lacking these features (see Schacter, 2000). 
This underscores the importance of leadership styles and internal performance management 
practices that focus on results and service to the public. Moreover, in the tax administration an 
appropriate system for setting performance objectives and measuring progress against them 
need to be developed. Both the TRA and the URA are today top-down organisations 
characterised by submissiveness. Promotion is in general based on seniority. Younger staff 
members are given few opportunities to develop their skills. Incentives are in general weak in 
the sense that good performance is not rewarded and bad performance is not punished. Thus, a 
reformed pay structure and advancements mechanisms conducive to attracting, retaining and 
motivating highly qualified staff is required. Improved retirement benefits and physical 
working conditions ought to be part of this modernisation programme. However, such 
measures will most likely have only minor impacts without a major re-staffing which also 
includes the top management. At present, the core of committed staff, who are willing to 
participate in change, are captured by peer pressure to confirm to corrupt practices, or they are 
turned off by an apparent lack of interest by a management – and a board - that seems mainly 
concerned about maintaining status quo.  
 
4. Expatriate management and technical assistance  
Appointing expatriates in key management positions may be an efficient technique to avoid the 
unfolding of the logics of patronage and predatory authority. Thus, President Museveni, 
referring to the appointment of Annebritt Aslund as the Commissioner General of the URA, 
remarked that she came from a ‘very distant tribe’ (Taliercio, 2002:130). Given tribal interests 
and the prevalence of patronage in the public sector, the President seemed to indicate that it 
was necessary to hire an outsider in order to undertake serious reform. Experiences from the 
Zambia Revenue Authority show that expatriate senior advisors and top managers, who are in 
place for a limited period of time, can contribute to effective change by building integrity and 
professionalism in the organisation through systemic changes. Strong expatriate leadership 
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may more easily confront political and bureaucratic pressures, and may provide a ‘buffer zone’ 
within which systemic changes and new forms of staff behaviour are implanted. The required 
systemic changes include a rigorously planned and executed re-staffing process, including at 
the senior management levels, and introduction of human resources policies relating to 
transparent recruitment, adequate remuneration, pension/retirement schemes, etc. Such 
measures ought to take place before proceeding with traditional forms of technical assistance 
such as the design and implementation of integrated computer systems, organisation of formal 
training courses and on-the-job training, and process re-engineering in a wide range of areas, 
including better forms and filing, auditing and management of revenues, taxpayer education 
programmes, etc. The experiences with the latter forms of technical assistance for revenue 
enhancement and capacity building in tax administrations are mixed in Africa. In general, 
external assistance should have a pre-defined and limited time schedule, with clearly specified 
and verifiable outputs.  
 
5. Capacity building for taxpolicy-making in the Ministry of Finance 
Providing timely and well-argued policy advice to the revenue administration is regarded as a 
core responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The MoF’s capacity to fulfil this function is in 
short supply in Tanzania and Uganda, a problem that has been under-addressed by donors 
involved in tax administrative reforms. In particular, there is a need to strengthen the capacity 
for tax assessment and realistic budgeting.  
 
6. Private management and outsourcing of revenue collection  
Private management of the tax administration is raised as a possible approach in Uganda. But 
historical evidence (Webber & Wildavsky, 1986) and recent experiences from other African 
countries (e.g., Mozambique) give reason for concern: Such reforms have achieved few 
sustainable results; the transfer of skills has been limited and the contract has been very 
expensive for the government. Tax practitioners are therefore increasingly questioning the 
value of outsourcing tax administration.  
 
Outsourcing of some customs activities, for instance, verification, convoy security and 
warehousing, can be appropriate, though recent experience suggests it may be expensive and 
susceptible to corruption. (Jenkins, 2003). Instead it might be a better approach to upgrading 
customs capacity to carry out the tasks. Outsourcing of other activities such as valuation and 
entry processing is fraught, since it places the collection of government revenue directly into 
the hands of non-government interests. In countries with a high level of corruption, there is no 
reason to believe that those interests will be any less corrupt or more transparent in their 
dealings than staff of the Revenue Authority. Furthermore, placing expatriate customs 
personnel in line jobs in operational units may compound the current failure to manage and, 
thus, entrench the problems. 
 
7. Taxpayers’ voice 
Although local political and bureaucratic leadership is an essential ingredient for tax 
administrative reform, it is not sufficient. The tax administration cannot be relied upon to 
reform itself. The tax system is regarded as illegitimate by large numbers of taxpayers and 
citizens. Thus, to tackle the serious problems of taxpayer-tax administration relations impetus 
for reform must also come from taxpayers. Business communities, taxpayers’ associations, 
trade unions and other influential domestic institutions have a critical important role to play in 
pressuring the revenue administration to do a better job of serving the society. There are today 
some promising indications that a voice and an organised response to tax policies is developing 
within the business communities in both Tanzania and Uganda. In Tanzania, a constructive 
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dialogue has developed between the government and the major business communities through 
their involvement in the ‘Task force on taxation’, which has contributed to an increased 
understanding on both parts on the needs of reaching compromises. This is important in a 
country where the private sector was completely shunned two decades back. The fact that these 
issues are being treated through formal, public organisations, rather than through bribery and 
public deals may indicate the beginning of a link between the private sector and the 
government in issues of revenue generation.  
 
8. Building accountability 
A strong bond of accountability between citizens (taxpayers) and the public sector may 
contribute to generate demand for tax administrative reforms. The performance of the tax 
administration is determined to some extent by the interplay between the public sector and the 
country’s key institutions of accountability, including the legislature, the judiciary, the auditor 
general’s office, the media, and organised civic groups such as major business communities 
and trade unions.  Successful tax administrative reforms should therefore be adapted to and 
address shortcomings in the accountability environment within which the revenue 
administration operates. Reformers must have an appreciation of factors such as key 
institutions of accountability’s access to information about revenue collection (what has been 
collected from who, where and at what costs), as well as their capacity to analyse information 
about the tax administration and place demands on it for better performance. Wide 
dissemination of information that allows citizens to monitor revenue collection and public 
expenditures may have a powerful positive impact on the attitudes and behaviour of both tax 
officers and taxpayers. 
 
9. Tax reforms 
While addressing many relevant issues, the tax reforms of the 1990s have failed to tackle 
serious problems of taxpayer-tax administration relations. Despite quite comprehensive 
changes in the tax structure (rates and bases) in recent years, the tax systems in Tanzania and 
Uganda are still complicated and non-transparent (World Bank, 2002; Obwona & Muwonge, 
2002a). Tax legislation is unclear and causes random and partly ad hoc collection procedures 
(Luoga, 2002; Kasimbazi, 2003). Assessors are considered to have wide discretionary powers 
to interpreting tax laws, for instance, to allow or disallow expenses or charges, or to exempt 
import duty on items imported. Reforms of tax legislation and procedures, including measures 
to improve transparency in the taxpayer-tax officer relations, should therefore take place 
concurrently to reduce opportunities for corruption and the demand for corrupt services. If not, 
one faces the risk that the administrative reforms will leave behind highly paid, but also highly 
corrupt civil servants.  
 
10. Systemic changes: Gradualism versus a big push? 
Serious cases of corruption, involving high level and politically well connected officers are 
rarely investigated. Thus, with a few exceptions such as the ongoing court case against five 
senior officials of the URA’s Large Taxpayers Department, investigations into fiscal 
corruption only touch the surface. For instance, the ongoing Inquiry of Corruption in the URA 
does not investigate systemic corruption and the role of family relations and nepotism in 
sustaining corruption networks. Tribal networks seem to be particularly strong in the URA and 
influence promotions and transfers within the organisation. There is a need to break the 
influence of these networks on the operations of the revenue authorities. This may take time to 
achieve and requires systemic changes and support from the highest level of the government. 
  77 
Thus, neither key stakeholders in the central government nor donor representatives interviewed 
expect that the Commission will have much impact.63 
 
How do we deal with the problems which can be rooted in social norms and patterns of 
behaviour rather than administrative structures? One approach would be to broaden the scope 
of reform to encompass those root causes, based on the view that reform is meaningless unless 
it does so (see Polidano, 2001:3). Another would be to say that government should reform 
society before it can reform itself. Both arguments are commonly made. According to Langseth 
(1995a:366), ‘[a] wide-ranging, holistic approach is necessary because administrative failure in 
Uganda stems from far more than mere technical competence. The collapse of the 1970s and 
early 1980s was caused by a political breakdown’. This argument is supported by Dia 
(1994:19) who argues that countries with a high level of patrimonialism in government need a 
comprehensive institutional reform programme to ‘correct patrimonial distortions in the 
institutional environment, the incentives framework, and the performance of core government 
institutions.’ This boils down to an ‘advance on all fronts’ argument.  
 
However, other observers point to the dangers of this approach. They complain about over-
elaborate reform projects which attempt to address too many objectives simultaneously and 
which are beyond the capacity of poor aid dependent governments to implement (Polidano, 
2001; Therkildsen, 2001). Thus, Manning (1995) argues that grand reform designs tend to 
squeeze out local innovations. Moreover, Klitgaard (1997:497), referring to performance 
incentives, claims that ‘the idea of designing an incentive master-plan for every part of the civil 
service at once is misguided’. According to Klitgaard (1997), performance measures are so 
problematic that one should start with experiments and then learn from experience.  
 
Evidence from both Western and low-income countries appears to favour the incremental 
approach. Polidano (1995) argues that the public management reforms in developed 
Commonwealth countries (new Zealand partially excepted) succeeded to a large extent because 
they were much more incremental than is commonly supposed. Furthermore, over-ambition is 
cited as a common cause of project failure in various countries (see Schacter, 1995).  
 
This does, however, not imply that the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments should keep the 
scope of tax administrative reform limited. But when governments decide what measures to 
take as part of their reform programmes, they should bear in mind the state of the economy and 
the resources at hand (Polidano, 2001:5). In general, most poor countries have neither the 
political capital nor the administrative capacity to sustain more than a limited range of 
concurrent initiatives. An incremental process of change can add up to a radical transformation 
if it is sustained long enough. Unfortunately, experiences from both Tanzania and Uganda 
indicate that comprehensive reform programmes may be necessary to attract the aid money 
without which reform cannot proceed.  
 
11. Reforms take time 
Perhaps the most easily overlooked lesson about tax administrative reforms is that it takes a 
long time to achieve fundamental reform of a public institution (Schacter, 2000:10). The 
experience of Western countries illustrates this well. It took centuries for today’s industrialised 
countries to develop reasonably effective tax administrations, while Tanzania and Uganda are 
                                                 
63 Personal interviews, Kampala, March 2003 (Odd-Helge Fjeldstad). According to a Ugandan Parliamentarian 
interviewed in May 2003, the lack of support to the Commission from senior politicians is because the top 
management of the URA supports the government. This contrasts the government’s support to the investigation 
into corruption in the police, since the police was perceived to house widespread opposition.  
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attempting to achieve this in a couple of decades. It is therefore not surprising that the record to 
date has been full of failures and disappointments. Sustainable change demands sustained 
effort, commitment and leadership over a long time. Mistakes and setbacks are a normal and 
inevitable part of the process. The big challenge is to use failures as learning opportunities, 
rather than as excuses for abolishing reforms. 
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Summary 
 
The report explores factors that explain the observed patterns 
of corruption within the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) 
and the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). In particular, the 
study discusses the key assumptions behind the revenue 
authority model and the relevance of these in an African 
context characterised by scarcity of qualified tax officers, 
accountants and auditors, as well as clientilistic networks 
between political, bureaucratic and economic agents. Based on 
this analysis and in light of existing political, economic and 
administrative constraints, the study identifies options available 
for sustainable tax administrative reforms in the two countries. 
Issues of particular relevance for foreign assistance towards 
fighting fiscal corruption and strengthening tax administration 
are highlighted.  
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